OR: Officer pulled into gas station behind defendant and made him talk, thereby making it a stop

Defendant pulled into a gas station, gassed up, and bought a drink. When he came out, a police car was parked behind him, and the officer required him to talk about the reason for the “stop.” This became a stop because defendant wasn’t free to leave, and the state failed in its burden of showing justification. State v. Jackson, A147133 (December 31, 2014) (this case was under submission for 26 months):

Hargis’s statements here differ in two significant ways from the statements and request in Anderson. First, Hargis’s statements did not convey “possible suspicion” that defendant had committed a traffic violation. Instead, they unambiguously conveyed that defendant had committed a traffic violation, that Hargis had seen him do it, and that Hargis required defendant to stay while Hargis talked to him about it. That difference is significant in light of the Supreme Court’s concern in this context, which is to avoid “limiting contacts between police and citizens” when police officers are not restraining citizens’ liberty by behaving in ways that “exceed[?] the bounds of ordinary social encounters between private citizens.” Backstrand, 354 Or at 400. When police officers make statements conveying possible suspi-cion, under some circumstances, they may not be exercising their authority to restrain. Id. at 401. In contrast, where, as here, an officer makes a direct and unambiguous accusation, the officer has conveyed that the citizen is not free to leave; he or she must “stop, respond, and remain until the immediate investigation [is] complete.” Id. at 418 (Walters, J., concurring in the judgment).

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