N.D.Okla.: Longtime boyfriend given standing in girlfriend’s place whether spending night or not

Defendant was the boyfriend of the woman who was the householder, and he had standing to contest the police entry into her home. Whether he was an overnight guest at that moment, the course of their long relationship was such that he had a privacy interest enough in her place to object to that entry. She, however, consented to the entry. There was also sufficient cause for a protective sweep. United States v. Owen, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166115 (N.D. Okla. December 1, 2014):

Plaintiff argues that defendant lacks standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to the entry. To suppress evidence due to a Fourth Amendment violation, a defendant must first “demonstrate that it was his Fourth Amendment rights that were violated.” United States v. Davis, 750 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 2014). A search or seizure implicating a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights occurs in one of two situations: when the officers “‘physically intrud[e]’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects,” Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013) (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950-51 n.3, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012)); or when the person “has an expectation of privacy … and that … expectation is reasonable.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 88 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44). The trespass doctrine enunciated in Jones and Jardines requires an existing constitutional property interest. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. As defendant was a guest in Moore’s residence, he lacks the requisite property right in the residence for the trespass doctrine. Thus, he must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence to assert his Fourth Amendment rights.

To determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts ask two questions: “First, did [defendant] manifest a subjective expectation of privacy …? Second, is that expectation one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable?” United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007). “It is axiomatic that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own homes.” United States v. Maestas, 639 F.3d 1032, 1035 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 884, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97 L. Ed. 2d 709 (1987)). “[I]n some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 89. An overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence where he is staying. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1990). In the Tenth Circuit, a social guest who does not stay overnight has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a residence when the guest has a “degree of acceptance into the household.” Poe, 556 F.3d at 1122 (citing United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1285 (10th Cir. 2003)). By contrast, “‘an individual does not possess an expectation of privacy … when he or she is present solely for commercial or business reasons’ and otherwise has no meaningful connection with the home.” Maestas, 639 F.3d at 1036 (quoting Rhiger, 315 F.3d at 1286).

Moore’s testimony, which the Court finds credible on this point, is that defendant was an overnight guest in Moore’s home, giving him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence. Even if he were merely a social guest who would not stay the night, Moore’s testimony about the course of their relationship and the previous nights spent at the residence show that defendant had achieved the”degree of acceptance into the household” needed to create a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Poe, 556 F.3d at 1122. As defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence, he has standing to assert a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights in the officers’ entry of the residence.