CA7: “[P]ointing guns at Matz while ordering him to stop or risk having his ‘fucking head’ blown off, frisking, handcuffing, and placing him in a patrol car” reasonable here under Terry
While the question is close, “pointing guns at Matz while ordering him to stop or risk having his ‘fucking head’ blown off, frisking, handcuffing, and placing him in a patrol car—was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which initially justified the interference” under Terry. Summary judgment for defendant officers affirmed. Matz v. Klotka, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 19074 (7th Cir. October 6, 2014):
We are thus left with the question whether Matz has created a triable issue of fact as to whether the manner in which the officers effectuated the detention—pointing guns at Matz while ordering him to stop or risk having his “fucking head” blown off, frisking, handcuffing, and placing him in a patrol car—was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which initially justified the interference. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. The use of a firearm and handcuffs undoubtedly puts Matz’s encounter at the outer edge of a permissible Terry stop. As we have previously recognized, “‘[s]ubtle, and perhaps tenuous distinctions exist between a Terry stop, a Terry stop rapidly evolving into an arrest and a de facto arrest.'” Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1016 (internal quotations and citation omitted). These tenuous distinctions are at the heart of Matz’s claim: he asserts that Zuberbier and Klotka made a de facto arrest without probable cause, and the officers argue, in essence, that a legitimate Terry stop evolved rapidly into an arrest supported by probable cause. The officers argue alternatively that qualified immunity protects them from liability because under the circumstances it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that using force and handcuffs to detain Matz violated clearly established law. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (setting forth well-known qualified immunity test that government officials are protected from civil damages as long as conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known); Jones v. Clark, 630 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2011) (entitlement to qualified immunity turns on whether facts describe the violation of a clearly established constitutional right).
Although the hallmarks of formal arrest such as applying handcuffs, drawing weapons, and placing suspects in police vehicles should not be the norm during an investigatory detention, all of those measures have been recognized as appropriate in certain circumstances. See Bullock, 632 F.3d at 1016 (collecting cases); Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1224-25 (noting “for better or for worse” the trend of expanding Terry stops to include “the permitting of the use of handcuffs, the placing of suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of weapons, and other measures of force more traditionally associated with arrest than with investigatory detention”); United States v. Weaver, 8 F.3d 1240, 1244 (7th Cir. 1993) (measured use of appropriate force does not convert seizure into arrest). In evaluating whether the force used converted an encounter into a full arrest, we must consider whether the surrounding circumstances would support an officer’s legitimate fear for personal safety. See Jewett, 521 F.3d at 824. We must also take into account the suspect’s own behavior in resisting an officer’s efforts. Id at 825. (citing United States v. Lawshea, 461 F.3d 857, 860 (7th Cir. 2006)).
. . .
Although we conclude that the officers’ safety and the dynamic situation they confronted justified using force and restricting Matz’s movement, we again caution law enforcement officers that in the ordinary case a Terry stop should not be functionally indistinguishable from a full-blown arrest. Of particular cause for concern in this regard is Zuberbier’s deposition testimony that he considers such detentions with handcuffs as part of “normal” police work: “[W]e detain people all the time. We handcuff them, we find out it’s all legitimate, talk to them, let them go. It’s part of daily police work.” On the contrary, we remind law enforcement that using handcuffs generally signifies an arrest, which requires probable cause and not the less demanding reasonable suspicion standard that permits only a brief and minimally intrusive detention. Indeed, the fact that we have recognized exceptions for concerns such as officer safety should not be read to imply that the use of handcuffs and more intrusive measures will not be a significant factor in assessing whether officers have exceeded the bounds of a limited Terry detention. See Ramos v. City of Chicago, 716 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The proliferation of cases in this court in which ‘Terry’ stops involve handcuffs and ever-increasing wait times in police vehicles is disturbing, and we would caution law enforcement officers that the acceptability of handcuffs in some cases does not signal that the restraint is not a significant consideration in determining the nature of the stop.”); see also Rabin, 725 F.3d at 639-41 (concurring opinion) (detailing exceptions supporting use of handcuffs and other formal hallmarks of arrest and reiterating that such invasive measures should be exception not rule).
by John Wesley Hall
Criminal Defense Lawyer and
Search and seizure law consultant
Little Rock, Arkansas
Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want /
But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need."
—Mick Jagger & Keith Richards
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by
now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!”
---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers,
is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."
—Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)