IL: Def’s locking self in bathroom overcame husband’s consent to enter under Randolph

Two police officers came to defendant’s home to arrest her for DUI, and her husband arguably consented to an entry to arrest her. Her locking herself in the bathroom, however, was a rejection of consent and binding. The officer’s threatening to kick down the bathroom door to arrest her was unreasonable, and her act overrode her husband’s consent under Randolph. People v. Santovi, 2014 IL App (2d) 130075, 2014 Ill. App. LEXIS 356 (May 27, 2014):

[*P39] We find that the case at bar is factually distinguishable from Parker and more in line with the rationale of Randolph. While defendant was not present at the front door making her objection to the search clearly and directly known, as was the case in Randolph, we find that locking the bathroom door serves the same purpose. Defendant demonstrably objected to any further police intrusion into her bathroom and had the right to do so.

[*P40] In fourth amendment jurisprudence, reasonableness is measured by examining the totality of the circumstances. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). The outcome thus depends on the facts of the specific case. Here, where the circumstances are that defendant purposely excluded police from the bathroom of her home, and the record reveals that officers easily could have secured the premises and sought an arrest warrant, there is no justification to abandoning the warrant requirement.

[*P41] Notwithstanding defendant’s own objection to the search, we further find that the officers exceeded the scope of defendant’s husband’s consent to search. See People v. Baltazar, 295 Ill. App. 3d 146 (1998) (the search must not exceed the scope of consent). The scope of a person’s consent must be measured objectively: what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the police and the person giving consent? Baltazar, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 149-50. Generally, the scope of a search is defined by its expressed object. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). Under the circumstances present here, the husband’s apparent authority to allow officers into the residence to talk to defendant did not translate to unbounded authority to force her out of a locked room. See People v. Rodgers, 96 Ill. App. 3d 416 (1981) (defendant’s invitation to police to enter his home did not imply consent to enter and search all areas when consent was limited to a specific purpose). It is clear on the record that the husband’s consent was limited to allowing officers inside the home for the purpose of speaking with defendant, not to knock down or threaten to knock down interior doors.