CA11: The staleness doctrine applies to reasonable suspicion for a parole search

The staleness doctrine applies to reasonable suspicion for a parole search. The information here wasn’t stale. United States v. Wade, 551 Fed. Appx. 546 (11th Cir. 2014):

We have developed a staleness doctrine to assess whether evidence that would constitute reasonable suspicion has become stale before officers have acted on it. United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1264-65 (11th Cir. 2000). Whether information is stale depends on the particular facts of the case. Id.

Relevant factors include the length of time before officers act on their reasonable suspicion, “the nature of the suspected crime (discrete crimes or ongoing conspiracy), habits of the accused, character of the items sought, and nature and function of the premises to be searched.” Id. at 1265 (quotations omitted). In determining the sufficiency of evidence, “we make no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.” United States v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936, 945 (11th Cir. 2009).

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The search of Wade’s residence was supported by reasonable suspicion. Although an anonymous caller provided the information leading to the search, the caller provided corroboration for his tip by identifying Wade by name, forwarding a threatening picture of Wade holding an assault rifle, and providing a motive for Wade’s alleged possession of that rifle, namely to harm the caller and his fiancée, who was thought to be Wade’s ex-girlfriend. Moreover, Wade’s staleness argument fails because officers acted promptly on information from which they could infer that the anonymous caller was being threatened contemporaneously with his calling Wade’s parole officer. In the alternative, the warrantless search was justified because Wade’s mother consented to it.