CAAF: NCOs could enter off-base housing airman appeared to have abandoned

Defendant was an airman who was believed by his landlord to have skipped out on rent and abandoned the premises. He wasn’t around and couldn’t be found. The landlord entered and found it needed a lot of repairs and appeared abandoned. He called defendant’s NCOs who came to the apartment as Air Force representatives to the community to see what was going on. The landlord unquestionably had a right of entry under the lease, and this extended to making the NCOs his “representative.” They did not enter for any regulatory or law enforcement function. In the apartment, they found a piece of a B-1 bomber that was missing from the air base. The entry was valid. United States v. Irizarry, 72 M.J. 100 (C.A. A.F. 2013):

B. Reasonableness of Entry as Command Representatives

MSgt Saganski’s and TSgt Zenor’s status as “government agents” acting in their “official capacity” triggered Appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights. However, this status was based solely on the fact that MSgt Saganski and TSgt Zenor are command representatives performing quintessential command functions — looking out for one of their airmen and maintaining good relations with the local community. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Air Force, Instr. 36-2618, The Enlisted Force Structure ¶ 4.1.9 (Feb. 27, 2009) (providing a mandatory duty for all NCOs to “be familiar with subordinates’ off-duty opportunities and living conditions”); id,. at 5.1.13 (stating the mandatory duties of senior NCOs to “[p]romote responsible behaviors within all Airmen” and “[r]eadily detect and correct unsafe and/or irresponsible behaviors that negatively impact unit or individual readiness”).

Although the NCOs were members of the United States Air Force with supervisory responsibilities over Appellant, they were not acting for a law enforcement or even a regulatory purpose. They were not seeking evidence of a crime or a violation of some regulation. Cf. Chapman, 365 U.S. at 616-18 (striking down a warrantless entry by police to search for evidence of a crime); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-39 (1967) (striking down some warrantless administrative searches). Rather, they were acting as military leaders with at least two purposes related to their command function: (1) to minimize possible adverse consequences — loss of his living quarters and overcharging for damages to his apartment — to a subordinate; and (2) maintaining a good relationship between the Air Force and the civilian community by assisting a landlord who did not want to pursue civil legal remedies against a military member. Rigid application of Fourth Amendment case law from other jurisdictions to the conduct at issue would fail to account for MSgt Saganski’s and TSgt Zenor’s unique “official” duty, as senior NCOs, to be apprised of their subordinates’ behavior and to look out for the well-being of their men and women.

In this context, MSgt Saganski and TSgt Zenor acted reasonably.10 Moreover, where, as here, command representatives entered a subordinate’s off-base residence (1) in order to effectuate their command responsibilities, and (2) with no law enforcement purpose and no expectation that a crime had been committed, or that evidence would be found, it would be unreasonable to expect command representatives to seek a warrant prior to entering. …

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