CA6: Nexus to house just a “fair probability” of its connection to evidence of crime

Being suspected of being a drug dealer is not enough to show nexus to defendant’s home, but the facts required to show nexus apparently aren’t much, as long as there is a “fair probability” they point to drugs in the house. United States v. Jeffries, 457 Fed. Appx. 471, 2012 FED App. 0082N (6th Cir. 2012):

For similar reasons, we reject Calloway’s argument that there was no nexus between the cocaine found in the Lincoln in Louisiana and his home on Oakburn Lane. That Calloway was suspected of being a drug dealer would not have been, by itself, sufficient to establish probable cause to search his home. See McPhearson, 469 F.3d at 525 n.3. But “where the allegation of drug dealing is coupled with independently corroborated information from police officers, it may be sufficient to establish probable cause.” Id. The affidavit at hand was replete with corroborating information: the Lincoln was often seen at the Oakburn residence, was sometimes operated by Calloway, was seen at the Oakburn residence immediately before leaving Louisville for Texas, and was interdicted in Louisiana. And once again, Calloway had been seen removing trash from the premises, had associated with a known felon on the premises, and had a prior drug felony history himself. Thus, there was a “fair probability” that evidence of drug activity would be found at Calloway’s residence, and the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant was sufficient.

On a controlled delivery of a package of heroin by FedEx, officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant when he left the house. His evasive driving, in reverse, added to it. United States v. Smith, 456 Fed. Appx. 572, 2012 FED App. 0083N (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).*