IA: Fanny pack handed off to another on arrest was subject to search incident

On being arrested, defendant removed his fanny pack and handed it to another. It was still subject to search incident. State v. Scullark, 2025 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 74 (June 20, 2025):

Starting with his argument under the Fourth Amendment, Gant did not modify the rule pertaining to searches of the arrestee’s person and the items immediately associated with him. Robinson still governs these searches. See People v. Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, 381 Ill. Dec. 593, 10 N.E.3d 1196, 1203 (Ill. 2014) (“Gant does not apply to a search incident to arrest of the defendant’s person or items immediately associated with the defendant’s person. The search in those circumstances is still controlled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson.”).

The language of the majority opinion in Gant, Justice Alito’s dissent, and the subsequent Riley opinion inform our conclusion. As Justice Alito stated in his Gant dissent: “The first part of the Court’s new two-part rule—which permits an arresting officer to search the area within an arrestee’s reach at the time of the search—applies, at least for now, only to vehicle occupants and recent occupants ….” 556 U.S. at 363-64 (Alito, J., dissenting). Then in Riley, the Court took a limited view of the majority opinion in Gant by referencing it as a case “which analyzed searches of an arrestee’s vehicle” and “authorize[d] police to search a vehicle ‘only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.'” Riley, 573 U.S. at 384-85 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343). The Riley Court also noted that “[l]ower courts applying Robinson and Chimel … have approved searches of a variety of personal items carried by an arrestee.” Id. at 392.

Although other courts have extended Gant outside of the vehicle context, see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2021) (applying Gant to the search of a backpack the arrestee dropped prior to arrest); United States v. Knapp, 917 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2019) (extending Gant’s principles to a purse near the arrestee at the time of search and limiting Robinson to searches of clothing and containers concealed under or within the clothing); United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 318 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying Gant to the search of a bag the arrestee was holding at the time of arrest), we find more persuasive those federal cases that have not, see, e.g., United States v. Perez, 89 F.4th 247, 256, 259 (1st Cir. 2023) (stating that “Gant did not address carried personal property at all,” and the Robinson rule would continue to govern searches “of personal items carried by an arrestee” (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 392)); United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 752 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Gant elaborates upon the circumstances in which an arrestee no longer has the possibility to reach into the ‘passenger compartment’ of his vehicle, and the Court’s discussion of whether the arrestee is no longer ‘unsecured and within reaching distance’ of that area must be understood in that limited context. The Court focuses exclusively on how the rule will affect vehicle searches ….” (citations omitted) (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343)). We therefore find that the reaching-distance rule of Gant does not apply to searches of the arrestee’s person incident to arrest. Robinson still governs these searches.