D.Or.: Search of legal mail in prison is a 1A claim, not 4A

Reading a prisoner’s legal mail may violate the First Amendment, but he can’t show that it violated the Fourth Amendment because there’s no reasonable expectation of privacy in prison and nothing interfered with his cases. Lewis v. Conway, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101995 (D. Or. May 1, 2025), quoting Bhin Tran v. Webb, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 240264 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2022), dismissed, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232887 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2024), Lund v. CDCR, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137570 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2022), Johnson v. Noack, 2018 WL 3340876, at *10 (D. Or. July 6, 2018).

Defendant’s spouse had apparent authority to consent to search of a hidden cell phone she was told to look for that wasn’t on their joint phone plan. When CID was handed the phone and the passcode, they didn’t know anything about its being hidden. CID reasonably believed that she had common authority over the phone to consent. The search was limited to “location data” about where defendant might be, and child pornography was found in the meantime. The search was reasonable. United States v. Brinkman-Coronel, 2025 CAAF LEXIS 420 (C.A.A.F. May 28, 2025).

The challenged statements were overstatements but not baseless, and that didn’t form the basis for a Franks challenge. State v. Hay, 2025 R.I. LEXIS 53 (May 29, 2025).*

This entry was posted in Apparent authority, Franks doctrine, Prison and jail searches. Bookmark the permalink.

Comments are closed.