This search warrant for the Airbag Control Modules and the vehicle’s black box was issued on probable cause and was particular in a vehicular homicide case. Hutchins v. State, 2025 Ga. App. LEXIS 134 (Mar. 13, 2025):
The search warrant authorized “[a] download of any Airbag Control Modules (ACM), Electronic [C]ontrol Modules (ECM) and any electronic devices located in [Hutchins’] vehicle” and “[a] vehicle inspection to show any causation factors in this crash.” Pursuant to that warrant, law enforcement downloaded data from the Lexus’s airbag control module. This data included information such as the vehicle’s speed in the seconds leading up to the crash and whether the brake switch was activated. At trial, a witness relied on the report to testify that the Lexus was traveling 78 miles per hour during the entire four seconds leading up to the crash and that the brake was never activated during that time.
Hutchins asserts that the warrant was overbroad because the affidavit failed to set forth probable cause to search “any electronic devices located in the vehicle.” Even assuming that this provision was overbroad, however, there is no indication that any electronics other than the ACM were searched. Thus, Hutchins has failed to establish harm, and this claim fails. See Pugh v. State, 318 Ga. 706, 719 (2) (e) (899 SE2d 653) (2024) (finding that defendant could not show harm where no evidence admitted against him at trial was seized solely pursuant to the allegedly overbroad portions of a search warrant).
Hutchins also claims that the warrant was overbroad because it failed to provide any guidance for, or limitations on, the search. In support of this argument, Hutchins relies on State v. Wilson, 315 Ga. 613 (884 SE2d 298) (2023), in which the Supreme Court held that a warrant authorizing the seizure of “any and all stored electronic information” on the defendant’s cell phones was not sufficiently particularized. See id. at 615-616. However, Wilson involved cell phones, which are “minicomputers” that “differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.” Riley v. California, 573 U. S. 373, 393 (III) (B) (1) (134 SCt 2473, 189 LE2d 430) (2014). In this case, there is no indication that ACMs or ECMs contain the same breadth of information as cell phones, and Hutchins cites no precedent holding that a search warrant requesting data from a vehicle’s ACM or ECM violates the Fourth Amendment under these circumstances. Given the lack of binding appellate precedent on this issue, Hutchins has not carried his burden of showing that his trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress the search warrant was patently unreasonable, and this claim fails. See Hurston v. State, 310 Ga. 818, 829-830 (3) (b) (854 SE2d 745) (2021).
by John Wesley Hall Criminal Defense Lawyer and Search and seizure law consultant Little Rock, Arkansas Contact: forhall @ aol.com / The Book www.johnwesleyhall.com
"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced."
—Williams
v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold,
J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws,
or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that
bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the
police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater
than it is today."
— Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their
property."
—Entick
v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And
so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his
case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment."
—United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated
here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth."
—Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable."
—Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."
—Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to
protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”
—United
States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted
intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by
government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose
it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”
—United
States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists,
and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for
the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came
for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration
camp]
“You know, most men would get discouraged by now. Fortunately for you, I am not most men!” ---Pepé Le Pew
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)