CA4: GPS monitoring for first six months of supervised release was not abuse of discretion [subtext: seems reasonable]

Six months of GPS monitoring of defendant on supervised release was tailored to him and not an abuse of discretion. It was a burden, but those on supervised release have far diminished expectations of privacy. United States v. Ellis, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 20493 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024):

Also, the district court tailored the condition specifically for Ellis. Following an extensive colloquy, the court imposed only six months of location monitoring. Six months is half the length of time that Ellis has previously been subject to location monitoring following revocations. In fact, the district court explicitly imposed this condition as a “transitionary provision” to help Ellis continue to make progress in abiding by his conditions. J.A. 161-62. The court felt that during this transition, the probation office needed to “closely monitor” Ellis’ activity. J.A. 161. The district court recognized Ellis’ progress but wanted him to “cross that threshold to where that progress includes not doing anything that violates” his “conditions of … supervision” or the law. J.A. 163. Reasonable minds might have handled the situation differently. But the district court’s thoughtful consideration of Ellis’ history and current situation was not an abuse of discretion.

To be sure, wearing and maintaining a location-monitoring device imposes a burden on Ellis. As Ellis points out in his brief, GPS monitoring may constitute a severe intrusion into the private life of an ordinary citizen. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 310-11 (2018). However, Ellis—as an individual on supervised release—does not have the typical expectation of privacy of an ordinary citizen. See United States v. Russell, 45 F.4th 436, 440 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“But Russell does not have a typical ‘expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.'” (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006))); United States v. Williams, No. 21-4508, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 25845, 2023 WL 6366688, at *4 (4th Cir. Sep. 29, 2023) (“[T]he Supreme Court has acknowledged that ‘a condition of release can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth Amendment.'” (quoting Samson, 547 U.S. at 847)). And as a result, “courts administering probation ‘may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.'” United States v. Lara, 850 F.3d 686, 690 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001)). Indeed, Ellis’ other supervised release conditions impose great intrusions on his privacy, as he must, among other things, permit probation officers to visit his home at any time, allow them to search his home without a warrant and provide them with any requested financial information.