N.D.W.Va.: “[T]he purpose of a motion to suppress is not to challenge the sufficiency or admissibility of evidence.” That’s for a motion in limine

“[T]he purpose of a motion to suppress is not to challenge the sufficiency or admissibility of evidence. See U.S. v. Musgrave, 726 F. Supp. 1027 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (‘As the Government contends … evidentiary issues are better addressed at trial through a motion in limine rather than a motion to suppress.’); U.S. v. Pavlock, 2010 WL 4789156, *3 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 25, 2010) (explaining that non-constitutional challenges to the propriety of evidence are more properly presented via a motion in limine rather than a motion to suppress).” United States v. Glover, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34293 (N.D.W.Va. Feb. 9, 2024), adopted, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33645 (N.D.W.Va. Feb. 27, 2024).

Defendant’s patdown after a traffic stop lacked reasonable suspicion. United States v. Samuel, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34213 (D.V.I. Feb. 28, 2024).*

The officer conducting a traffic stop here had reasonable suspicion on the totality. There were two cars in tandem with California plates in Kansas, the second one following way too close, he suspected to keep the gap close. The cars were rentals due in San Diego that day. The travel plans made no sense, and they were heading in the wrong direction. The occupants were nervous. Finally, there was a Santa Muerte statue in one car, and the officer said he’d never seen one in a nondrug trafficker’s car. United States v. Mendez, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34236 (D. Kan. Feb. 28, 2024).*

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