CA3: Younger abstention applies to bar federal litigation of red-flag gun seizure case

Greco v. Bruck, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 13074 (3d Cir. May 13, 2022), prior opinion Greco v. Bruck, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33660 (3d Cir. Nov. 12, 2021) (posted here) reaffirms that state court proceedings bar federal litigation in a red-flag gun seizure case, a quasi-criminal proceeding:

For these reasons, the state-court proceeding is a quasi-criminal civil enforcement action that meets the Middlesex factors. That satisfies both stages of the Younger abstention analysis, and therefore the District Court correctly dismissed this case on that basis. See Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72; PDX, 978 F.3d at 882-83.

Nothing about this ruling prevents Greco from pursuing his constitutional challenges in state court. To the contrary, if he could not bring his claims in state court, then Younger abstention would be inappropriate. See Moore, 442 U.S. at 425-26 (explaining that abstention is inappropriate if “state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims”); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577-79, 93 S. Ct. 1689, 36 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1973) (affirming district court’s decision not to abstain because the state tribunal was constitutionally disqualified to adjudicate the dispute due to bias). Rather than dispute his ability to pursue his constitutional challenges in state court, Greco raises two other challenges to Younger abstention. Neither succeeds.

Greco first contends that the District Court violated law-of-the-case principles by abstaining under Younger after it had ruled on his preliminary injunction and class certification motions. But law-of-the-case principles apply only “when a court decides upon a rule of law.” ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S. Ct. 2166, 100 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1988)). And in denying Greco’s preliminary injunction and class certification motions, the District Court did not address Younger. Such silence was not a decision that the District Court was later bound to follow.

Greco next argues that Younger abstention was improper because he brings a facial challenge to the ERPO Act under the Fourth Amendment. Although some “extraordinary circumstances” may permit a federal court to enjoin an ongoing state proceeding, that limited exception to Younger abstention does not include facial challenges to the constitutionality of a state law. Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54. A facial constitutional challenge requires establishing “that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1987). Such a challenge does not present an extraordinary circumstance in the context of Younger abstention: state courts can identify and enjoin state laws that have no lawful application under the federal constitution. See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 610-11 (rejecting an argument in effect “urging [the Court] to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not be faithful to their constitutional responsibilities”).

Because the concurrent state-court proceedings satisfy the requirements for Younger abstention, we will affirm the order of the District Court.