N.D.Cal.: “Least intrusive means” for a search isn’t the 4A question; reasonableness is.

“Least intrusive means” for a search isn’t the Fourth Amendment question—reasonableness is. Anyone can imagine a lesser intrusive measure and that would lead to choas. United States v. Crenshaw, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220617 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2020):

Crenshaw’s suggestion the officers should have used a “less intrusive” means of proceeding, such as ticketing the car while it was parked rather than stopping it later, is of no moment. The Supreme Court has “repeatedly refused to declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 763 (2010) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995)). To hold otherwise “could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers because judges engaged in post hoc evaluations of government conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the government might have been accomplished.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). In addition, a car stop along the lines of what happened here is a well-established method of responding to a traffic violation. See, e.g., United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 714-15 (9th Cir. 2005).

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