IL: Refusal of consent to DNA or drug test admissible to show consciousness of guilt, analogizing DUI refusal

State’s argument that defendant refused to submit to a DNA and drug test was not irrelevant nor more prejudicial than relevant. The court analogizes its holdings on refusal in the face of implied consent laws in DUI cases as being admissible to show consciousness of guilt. People v. Ealy, 2015 IL App (2d) 131106, 2015 Ill. App. LEXIS 991 (Dec. 29, 2015):

[*P66] We note that our holding is consistent with the rule that, when a motorist refuses to submit to a test designed to determine the person’s blood-alcohol content during a DUI stop, evidence of the refusal is admissible and may be used to argue the defendant’s consciousness of guilt. See People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 140 (2005); People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 101 Ill. 2d 137, 141 (1984) (because a motorist has no constitutional right to refuse a breath test and may be compelled by the State to take such a test, evidence of the driver’s refusal to take such a test does not violate the self-incrimination privilege and may properly be admitted at trial); People v. Garriott, 253 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1052 (1993) (section 11-501.2(c) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(c) (West 1992)) provides that evidence of a refusal shall be admissible at trial for DUI and, thus, the legislature has determined that evidence of such a refusal is relevant as circumstantial evidence of the driver’s consciousness of guilt); see also People v. Kane, 223 Ill. App. 3d 377, 385 (1991) (a trier of fact may infer that a motorist refused Breathalyzer testing because he knew the test would confirm he was driving under the influence); People v. Roberts, 115 Ill. App. 3d 384, 387 (1983) (evidence of a driver’s refusal exposes him to an inference regarding his state of mind about the likely results of that test). In such an instance, the motorist acquiesces to that possibility by exercising his driving privileges, unlike in this case, where consent was the only possible basis for the search when the police proposed the test. See People v. Webber, 2014 IL App (2d) 130101, P 3 (“Under section 11-501.1, the so-called ‘implied consent law,’ a motorist operating a vehicle on a public highway in Illinois is deemed to have consented, if arrested for DUI, to chemical testing to determine his or her blood alcohol level.”).