MN: Exigency for entry unproved; inevitable discovery doesn’t apply to statements after an unlawful search

The state didn’t make its burden in proving that the emergency aid exception applied to the entry into defendant’s home because there was no positive link to it and an assault where the victim was in the hospital being treated elsewhere. The inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule is limited to physical evidence and does not apply to statements obtained after an unlawful search. State v. McClain, 2015 Minn. App. LEXIS 22 (May 4, 2015):

Under the emergency-aid exception, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect one from imminent injury. State v. Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d 783, 787-88 (Minn. 2007). The state has the burden of proof to show that the circumstances meet the emergency-aid exception, and courts apply an objective standard to determine whether the officers reasonably believed that there was an emergency. Id. at 788. In determining the reasonableness of entry, we consider whether the officers have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for police assistance for the protection of life or property. Id. We also consider whether there is a reasonable basis, close to probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. Id. Finally, we consider whether the officers’ search is primarily motivated by the intent to arrest and seize evidence. Id. at 788, 790. In other words, we need to consider whether the officers are motivated to enter as criminal investigators or in the officers’ role as community caretakers. See Licari, 659 N.W.2d at 258 (Gilbert, J. dissenting). However, if there is no objectively reasonable emergency justifying the entry, we need not consider the subjective intent of the officers. See Lemieux, 726 N.W.2d at 790 (stating that an objectively reasonable emergency is necessary to justify the emergency-aid exception for a warrantless search conducted during a criminal investigation).

The officers were not justified in entering 1027 East Third Street based on the emergency-aid exception. The police were operating under two facts that connected the residence to the stabbing: (1) the victim was associated with 1027 East Third Street in the past, and (2) Officer Neitzel found blood on the sidewalk leading to 1027 East Third Street while investigating the location. These two facts suggest that potential criminal acts had occurred, but without evidence of an injured occupant of the residence or an occupant in danger of imminent injury, such facts do not provide a reasonable basis for the police to execute a warrantless entry based on the emergency-aid exception. At that point, the victim was receiving medical treatment elsewhere and the police were investigating a crime.

Other facts confirm that the police did not have a reasonable basis to believe there was an emergency at hand and execute a warrantless entry. First, there were no lights on at 1027 East Third Street indicating that someone was at home or awake in need of help. Second, there was no evidence in the immediate vicinity of the house indicating that someone needed medical treatment or that someone was in imminent danger. While there was blood on the sidewalk leading up to 1027 East Third Street, pictures show that there was no blood on the steps leading to the house, in the foyer, or on the house itself. Third, Officer Neitzel testified that the blood trail looked like it belonged to one person, which undermines his expressed concern about another possible victim. Fourth, as appellant notes, the police waited for more officers to arrive in order to effectuate the warrantless entry, which is inconsistent with a belief in a true medical emergency.

Finally, in contrast to cases where the police were directed to a house by witnesses or victims, the officers did not have a statement from the victim or a witness at the time of forced entry. See State v. Anderson, 388 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Minn. App. 1986) (relying on a call from a witness saying a suspect was throwing people around and the appearance of the front room which was strewn with papers, toys, and clothes); State v. Halla-Poe, 468 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. App. 1991) (relying on a statement from a neighbor that the neighbor had helped a person in need of medical assistance into an apartment).

Officer Neitzel had a hunch about the house being the location of an altercation involving the victim, but his suspicion did not give the police an objectively reasonable belief that anyone inside was in immediate need of police assistance for the protection of life. See Cnty. of Hennepin v. Law Enforcement Labor Servs., Inc., Local No. 19, 527 N.W.2d 821, 826 (Minn. 1995) (stating that facts giving rise to the emergency-aid exception occur in “rare cases”).