CA6: Arrest of school teacher for sex abuse of student was not based on “reasonably trustworthy” information; false arrest case can proceed

School teacher’s arrest for anally sodomizing a student at school arguably lacked probable cause, and the student’s claims were not properly and fully investigated before the arrest after the story became more and more implausible. The student gave an implausible account of where and how often it happened and his story repeatedly changed. Eyewitness accounts are reliable only if they are “reasonably trustworthy” and these were not. The false arrest case can proceed. Wesley v. Campbell, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3239 (6th Cir. March 3, 2015):

Although there is some tension between these cases, we need not resolve it here because, even under the Ahlers line of cases, J.S.’s uncorroborated allegations were legally insufficient to create probable cause. While adopting a presumption of reliability for eyewitness allegations, those cases also contain an important limiting factor: Probable cause is created only by eyewitness allegations that are “reasonably trustworthy,” Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d 334, 342 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 91) (emphasis added), and thus probable cause does not exist where “there is an apparent reason for the officer to believe that the eyewitness was lying, did not accurately describe what he had seen, or was in some fashion mistaken regarding his recollection.” Ahlers, 188 F.3d at 370 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way, the presumption of veracity applies only where the witness is “someone with respect to whom there is no apparent reason to question the person’s reliability.” Logsdon, 492 F.3d at 343 (emphasis added).

Here, as the district court noted, probable cause for Wesley’s arrest was “based solely on [J.S.]’s statements.” Wesley, 913 F.Supp.2d at 321. Hence, Wesley’s complaint stated a claim for false arrest under Rule 12(b)(6) as long as he alleged facts allowing the fact-finder to infer some “apparent reason to question [J.S.]’s reliability.” Logsdon, 492 F.3d at 343.

Wesley’s complaint meets that burden. It contains the following factual allegations bearing on J.S.’s reliability as a witness: (1) J.S. was a young child; (2) Wesley’s office (where the alleged abuse occurred) was located at the center of the school’s “administrative hub,” within the line of sight of other adult staff members; (3) J.S.’s allegations about the abuse were inconsistent; (4) J.S. suffered from a history of serious psychological and emotional disturbances; (5) Rigney required J.S. to undergo a medical examination and that examination showed no evidence consistent with his allegations of sexual abuse; and (6) Rigney’s investigation failed to uncover any evidence corroborating any aspect of the abuse J.S. alleged. Taken together, the “totality of the[se] circumstances,” Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 318, raises doubts about J.S.’s reliability that are clearly “above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. We discuss these factual allegations in turn.

. . .

For the reasons explained above, we conclude that Wesley plausibly alleged that Rigney effected his arrest without probable cause. Taken as true, Wesley’s allegations also plausibly show that Rigney is not entitled to qualified immunity, because her application for an arrest warrant contained omissions that were “deliberate … or showed reckless disregard for the truth” and were “material to the finding of probable cause.” Gregory, 444 F.3d at 758; accord Vakilian, 335 F.3d at 517.

As a threshold matter, it seems clear that Rigney’s decision to withhold evidence of J.S.’s unreliability was material, because it is clearly established that witness allegations fail to sustain probable cause when there is “apparent reason to question the person’s reliability.” Logsdon, 492 F.3d at 343. If the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant had known that there were, in fact, several “apparent reason[s] to question” J.S.’s reliability, precedent would have precluded a finding of probable cause, and the warrant would not have issued.

In addition, Rigney’s omissions demonstrate “deliberate[ness]” or a “reckless disregard for the truth,” given that any reasonable officer would have recognized the importance of J.S.’s reliability on the question of probable cause. Put another way, any reasonable officer would have known that the gaps in J.S.’s credibility would be “the kind of thing the judge would wish to know.” See Peet, 502 F.3d at 570 n.3 (Holschuh, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 2000)). Hence, qualified immunity was inappropriate, because it is clearly established that “[p]olice officers cannot, in good faith, rely on a judicial determination of probable cause when that determination was premised on an officer’s own material misrepresentations to the court.” Gregory, 444 F.3d at 758 (citing Yancey v. Carroll Cnty., 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989)).