Detention incidental to execution of arrest warrant against another not a Fourth Amendment violation

The detention incidental to execution of arrest warrant against another was not a Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Smith, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86368 (E.D. Wis. November 19, 2007):

Similarly, a person who is detained during the execution of a search warrant is ordinarily not in custody for Miranda purposes. United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Burns, 37 F.3d 276, 281 (7th Cir. 1994). The Seventh Circuit noted that

[m]ost detentions that occur during the execution of a search warrant, like most Terry stops, are comparatively nonthreatening. They are often short in duration. … Furthermore, detention in a person’s own residence or hotel room could only add minimally to the public stigma associated with the search itself and would involve neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled visit to the police station.

Burns, 37 F.3d at 281 (internal quotations omitted).

In Burns, the defendant sought suppression of certain statements she made during the execution of a search warrant at her hotel room. Id. at 278. The defendant asked to leave the hotel room numerous times, but she was detained and told to sit on the bed as two law enforcement officers searched the hotel room. Id. During the search, an officer asked Burns what she was doing in Milwaukee, to which she responded that she was visiting friends. However, later she said she did not have any friends in Milwaukee when the officer asked her who her friends were. Id. When an officer discovered a kilogram of cocaine in a dresser drawer wrapped in a hotel towel, the defendant disavowed ownership of the item. Id.

The Seventh Circuit held that the defendant was not in custody while she was detained during the execution of the search warrant, and therefore the Miranda warnings were not required. Id. at 281. The court explained its decision by stating that the defendant

was detained for less than ten minutes prior to her arrest. She was not handcuffed or physically restrained in any way until she was formally placed under arrest. Only two law enforcement officers conducted the search, and they did not brandish weapons. Finally, the officer’s questioning was limited in scope and duration.

Id.

. . .

Although the present case involves an arrest warrant rather than a search warrant, the distinction is inconsequential for present purposes. The rule the Supreme Court has enunciated in Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981), that a search warrant “implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted,” applies equally to instances where officers enter a residence pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980). Whether entering pursuant to a search warrant or an arrest warrant, officers may reasonably fear that the buildings’ occupants may obtain weapons which may be used against them or destroy evidence.

Search warrant for defendant’s child porn was valid at least by the good faith exception, without even considering the probable cause question. United States v. Watson, 255 Fed. Appx. 876 (5th Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).

Being compelled by the state to return one’s teaching certificate is not a Fourth Amendment seizure. Smith v. California Comm’n on Teacher Credentialing, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86251 (E.D. Cal. November 21, 2007).*