Parallel FBI investigation that would have led to a federal search warrant was independent source

Police adequately corroborated informant by reviewing chat logs to determine that there might be evidence on defendant’s computer. Therefore, the warrant was issued with probable cause. In addition, the independent source doctrine would apply because the FBI was conducting its own investigation, and it would have obtained a search warrant, too. United States v. Shuler, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69114 (N.D. Iowa September 17, 2007):

By the time Special Agent Kitsmiller contacted Cedar Rapids law enforcement in May 2007, they had already obtained and executed the March 16, 2007, state court Search Warrant. Special Agent Kitsmiller testified at the instant Hearing that if the computers and related materials had not previously been seized by the Cedar Rapids Police Department, then he would have sought a search warrant based on the information gathered on the Bettendorf complaint. Bettendorf authorities had been provided copies of the child pornography which originated at Defendants’ home, and the Court believes that there would have been probable cause to support a search warrant based on the Bettendorf information.

In summary, the Court concludes that even if the state court Search Warrant obtained by the Cedar Rapids Police Department was not supported by probable cause, the computers and related materials would have been obtained by the FBI pursuant to its independent investigation of a separate complaint. That is, the actions by the FBI in seeking a search warrant based on the Bettendorf information would be independent of any information obtained by the state court Search Warrant. Since probable cause existed for a second search warrant, independent of the information obtained in the first search warrant, the independent source doctrine applies.

An official’s refusal to return property lawfully seized does not make a reasonable seizure unreasonable. Certified v. Stetler, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69255 (N.D. Ill. September 14, 2007):

Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has rejected the idea that a state actor’s refusal to return once lawfully obtained property can amount to an unreasonable seizure (i.e, that the refusal can transform the seizure from reasonable to unreasonable). See Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Soldal‘s ‘meaningful interference with a possessory interest’ definition is limited to an individual’s interest in retaining his property”; “once an individual has been meaningfully dispossessed, the seizure of property is complete, and once justified by probable cause, that seizure is reasonable.”). Thus, the fact that Director Creedon failed to return the Rio–in fact, turned it over to Pugi–does not give rise to a constitutional violation. In fact, given the police report, the defendants were under no obligation to investigate Mr. Kramer’s claim that Certified, not Pugi, was lawfully entitled to possession of the Rio. See Reynolds, 488 F.3d at 766; Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 524.