N.D. Cal. applies Heck to civil penalties

The N.D. Cal. holds that Heck v. Humphrey should logically apply to state civil penalty actions as well, although no case could be found on point. Mk Ballistics Sys. v. Simpson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53142 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2007):

An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages for an alleged illegal search and seizure of evidence upon which criminal charges are based is barred by Heck until criminal charges have been dismissed or the conviction has been overturned. Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2000). This rule “avoid[s] the potential for inconsistent determinations on the legality of a search and seizure in the civil and criminal cases” and is consistent with the strong judicial policy, emphasized by the Heck court, in favor of preserving consistency and finality and preventing collateral attacks on convictions. Id. at 1015. However, as plaintiffs point out, there have been no criminal convictions in the underlying case, nor are there criminal charges pending, as the underlying action is for civil penalties under the California Health and Safety Code and the California Business and Professions Code.

Although neither the court nor the parties were able to find case law applying Heck in a civil context, it seems logical that Heck’s rationale would extend to these circumstances. Even assuming that Heck is not directly applicable, the court finds it appropriate to stay the present action so as not to risk a result that would be inconsistent with the decision of the state court in the underlying action.

Driver of a rental vehicle has to show standing by showing that he or she was given permission to drive the vehicle by the renter. United States v. Taylor, 496 F. Supp. 2d 852 (S.D. Ohio 2006):

Based upon the foregoing discussion of authority, it is apparent that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle, merely because he is its driver. Rather, the driver must demonstrate that he obtained possession from the owner of the vehicle or someone authorized by the owner to give him possession of the vehicle. In addition, the driver of a rental car, who has neither rented the vehicle nor is listed as an authorized driver, must have had a significant relationship with an authorized driver and the rental company. Herein, Robinson failed to present any evidence that he had any type of relationship with the owner of the Lincoln Navigator. Therefore, this Court is compelled to conclude that Robinson has failed to meet his burden of proving, by the preponderance of the evidence, that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that vehicle.

In contrast, the Connecticut Court of Appeals held that a defendant who claimed he was in possession of a car with permission had standing, but he lost on the merits by inevitable inventory. Even if the officer’s entry into the car was unlawful, a lawful inventory would occur as the police were trying to locate the owner. State v. Vallejo, 102 Conn. App. 628, 926 A.2d 681 (2007).

Comment: These two cases reflect a reality in standing and cars: If it is a rental car, the burden effectively seems to be higher to show standing than in a car owned by an individual. This is likely because of the likelihood that a car was rented through a strawman or a patsy to use for drug running. The cases do not say this, but one has to believe that the judges are thinking that.