CA11: 911 tipster about a specific car was reliable and not anonymous

Defendant’s claim of lack of reasonable suspicion for his stop was changed between the district court’s denial and the appeal. Nevertheless, there was reasonable suspicion for the stop based on a tip applying to a specific car. The 911 tipster was not anonymous. United States v. McCall, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 7286 (11th Cir. April 18, 2014):

The district court did not err, much less plainly err, in failing sua sponte to question the reliability of Fisher’s 911 call. Reasonable suspicion may be based on information supplied by another person, as long as the information bears sufficient indicia of reliability. Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47, 92 S. Ct. at 1923-24. McCall likens Fisher’s 911 call to the anonymous tip in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000), but J.L. is distinguishable. “The reliability of a tip … [involves] consideration of whether the officer can track down the tipster again,” Heard, 367 F.3d at 1279, and unlike the anonymous tipster in J.L., Fisher exposed himself to scrutiny by the police. Fisher identified himself and his location to the police and expected police officers to visit him as part of their investigation. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 120 S. Ct. at 1378 (distinguishing anonymous tips from “a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated”); Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47, 92 S. Ct. at 1923-24 (noting that a tip was reliable, at least in part, because the informant “might have been subject to immediate arrest for making a false complaint had [the] investigation proved the tip incorrect”). And Fisher reported that the robbers were armed and dangerous, which demanded the immediate attention of the police. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 145, 92 S. Ct. at 1923 (“The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.”). Calls to 911 “are distinctive in that they concern contemporaneous emergency events, not general criminal behavior,” and “[i]f law enforcement [cannot] rely on information conveyed by … 911 callers, their ability to respond effectively to emergency [or exigent] situations [will] be significantly curtailed.” United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2002). Fisher does not cite, nor has our research revealed, any decisions requiring police officers to gather corroborating evidence before acting on an emergency call made by an identifiable victim of a crime.