Emergency justification for entry into defendant’s apartment fails. Conviction reversed, search and statements suppressed. United States v. Timmann, 741 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2013):

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“[V]irtually the only suspicious activity the officer articulated was ‘blading’ his body away from the officer’s view. We find this testimony insufficient to conclude the stop of appellant was proper.” State v. Caplinger, 2013-Ohio-5675, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 5940 (5th Dist. December 10, 2013).*

Pre-Jones GPS tracking will not be excluded under Davis. Indeed, in this case, the defense at first conceded it was valid under circuit precedent and didn’t pursue the argument until Jones came down. United States v. Smith, 741 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2013).

Probable cause for the search warrant of defendant’s property was shown based on the product of wiretaps and then three CIs who were corroborated. United States v. Boon, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179674 (W.D. N.Y. December 12, 2013).*

It was not clearly established for qualified immunity purposes that a person lawfully arrested has a constitutional right to be immediately released on finding that the conditions for the arrest weren’t all true. Here, plaintiff was arrested for possession of a firearm under a protective order, but, in this situation, this wasn’t a crime because the order didn’t involve an “intimate partner.” Panagoulakos v. Yazzie, 741 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2013):

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Defendant had the cell phone but it was issued under the name of another because, he claimed, he couldn’t get one on his own. The government argued no standing. The defendant, however, had standing in the cell phone to question the historical cell site location information because he possessed and used the phone and acknowledged it was his. The information was obtained by court order and was otherwise valid under the order or the good faith exception. United States v. Herron, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26989 (E.D. N.Y. March 3, 2014):

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During a traffic stop, the defendant’s grabbing for a fannypack was a furtive movement indicating a likely weapon. United States v. Cardona-Vicente, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185574 (D. P.R. November 18, 2013).*

“Moreover, Borbon fails to identify any evidence that law enforcement would not have recovered but for Borbon’s arrest or how the suppression of that evidence would have resulted in his acquittal.” Therefore, no Strickland prejudice. United States v. Cardenas-Borbon, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26654 (M.D. Pa. March 3, 2014).*

2255 petitioner’s search arguments are essentially a version of the argument already made and rejected in the case, so it’s denied. United States v. Lopez, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26648 (M.D. Pa. March 3, 2014).*

The CI’s information was adequately corroborated to show probable cause. “The defendant argues that Officer Branch was required to conduct a trash pull, perform a controlled delivery, or survey the residence to corroborate the CI’s information. However, Officer Branch was not required to perform these tasks. The record shows that the officer based the affidavit on information from multiple sources, not just the CI’s information.” United States v. Williams, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26774 (D. Neb. March 3, 2014),* R&R 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26757 (D. Neb. January 13, 2014).*

Defendant was stopped for not having a bumper. The officer never asked for a DL or checked the license, and instead went right into asking about drugs. The stop was unreasonably extended. Bennett v. State, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 93 (March 3, 2014).*

On a road 45 miles from the border, Border Patrol agents saw two vehicles in tandem. They followed. When one slowed they went after the other. The drivers of both were talking on cell phones, and the officers surmised it was to each other. Applying the usual factors (“(1) characteristics of the area; (2) proximity to the border; (3) usual patterns of traffic and time of day; (4) previous alien or drug smuggling in the area; (5) behavior of the driver, including obvious attempts to evade officers; (6) appearance or behavior of passengers; (7) model and appearance of the vehicle; and, (8) officer experience.”) On the totality, “Giving due weight to the collective knowledge of the agents involved along with the reasonable inferences drawn by the officers, the Court finds that there was reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was engaged in illegal activity. The stop comported with the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Rodriguez-Rubio, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26835 (D. Ariz. January 21, 2014),* adopted 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26030 (D. Ariz. Feb. 27, 2014).

A broken taillight lens that shows both red and white light was sufficient cause for a stop under Arkansas law. Robinson v. State, 2014 Ark. 101 (March 6, 2014) (4-1-2).*

Officers were justified in approaching defendant as an apparent trespasser with reasonable suspicion, and the pill bottle in his hand was in plain view. State v. Marshall, 2014 La. LEXIS 443 (February 26, 2014).*

The passenger made no attempt to show any possessory interest in the vehicle he was in, and the 4.9 pounds of methamphetamine hidden in the dashboard was not suppressed. United States v. Manzo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27244 (D. Kan. March 4, 2014).*

Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Future of Privacy Forum: A Theory Of Creepy: Technology, Privacy And Shifting Social Norms, 16 Yale J. L. & Tech. 59 ((March 5, 2014).

Abstract:

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The military trial judge applied the wrong legal test on admissibility of a confession, and that drove an incorrect analysis of whether defendant consented to the taking of buccal swabs for DNA. So, the case is remanded. United States v. Maza, 73 M.J. 507 (N.-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2014):

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The record keeping requirement of the pornography production statutes do not violate the First and Fourth Amendment. As to the Fourth, the government satisfied the “closely regulated business” rationale of Burger for the records, except for records inspections in the producers’ homes. Free Speech Coalition v. Holder, 957 F. Supp. 2d 564 (E.D. Pa. 2013):

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The majority rule is that cell site location data requires probable cause, but the warrant was not issued on that. Nevertheless, the good faith exception saves the tracking order information. United States v. Espudo, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2013):

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The standard for a protective sweep is reasonable suspicion to think it’s necessary. “The inquiry is an exceptionally fact-intensive one in which we must analyze myriad factors including, among other considerations, the configuration of the dwelling, the general surroundings, and the opportunities for ambush. … An ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is just such a situation in which an officer might need to perform a protective sweep. Buie, 494 U.S. at 333 …. [¶] In this case there were many other substantial, particularized factors that would allow a reasonable officer to conclude that he, his fellow officers, or another bystander might face danger.” Quibbling about the details doesn’t make it unreasonable. United States v. Starnes, 741 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2013):

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“Although the dog was located in the patrol car, Struble waited to employ it until a second officer arrived, explaining that he did so for his safety because there were two persons in Rodriguez’s vehicle. The resulting seven- or eight-minute delay is similar to the delay that we have found to be reasonable in other circumstances. See Morgan, 270 F.3d at 632 (‘We do not believe that the few minutes difference between the time in this case and $404,905 [2 minutes] has constitutional significance.’). We thus conclude that it constituted a de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez’s personal liberty.” United States v. Rodriguez, 741 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2014). [Since I practice in the Eighth Circuit, I call $404,905‘s de minimus rule “Loken’s revenge” against the Fourth Amendment. Reportedly he hoped this case would help him get to SCOTUS with his friend Alito. Whether that’s really true, I have no idea.]

The stop was justified by a traffic offense, and the consent was voluntary. United States v. Sifuentes-Botello, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184525 (M.D. Fla. December 17, 2013).*

The stop was reasonable for following too close. “The facts that evolved during the course of the stop, then, gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Mr. Pittman was involved in illegal activity regardless of whether Officer Stein should reasonably have completed the citation process earlier in the stop. In such circumstances, the Tenth Circuit has routinely upheld detentions that stretch well beyond the time required to run a license check and write a citation.” United States v. Pittman, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11809 (D. Kan. January 31, 2014).*

Just because the consenter was an old man who didn’t have good recollection at the suppression hearing doesn’t mean that he couldn’t consent. Nothing about his interaction with the officers suggested that he wasn’t about himself; he just had difficulty walking. United States v. Richards, 741 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2014):

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Consent to blood and urine tests in a DUI-negligent homicide case is not coerced merely by reading the implied consent warning to the defendant. State v. Moore, 354 Ore. 493 (December 12, 2013).

Defendant was arrested by a Milwaukee police officer working a prostitution detail for loitering for prostitution when he threatened to “beat her ass.” The arrest was with probable cause. United States v. Tharp, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174052 (E.D. Wis. December 12, 2013).*

Defendant was questioned with officers on his porch about sexual contact with a 15 year old cousin. He consented to a search of his house. State v. Hillman, 417 S.W.3d 239 (Mo. 2013).*

NYT: Street Stops Still a ‘Basic Tool,’ Bratton Says by Joseph Goldstein:

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ACLU: Police Hide Use of Cell Phone Tracker From Courts Because Manufacturer Asked by Nathan Freed Wessler:

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Even when a defendant has a claim for his property under Rule 41(g), it may be subject to a restitution order. The manner of seizure under the Fourth Amendment is distinct from the restitution question. United States v. Dang, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3902 (10th Cir. March 3, 2014):

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