NYT: Op-Ed: Has Privacy Become a Luxury Good? by Julia Angwin:

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NYT: Justices Unite on Key Point in Chase Ending in Fatal Police Shooting by Adam Liptak:

WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court seemed to have little trouble concluding during an unusually one-sided argument on Tuesday that Arkansas police officers who had used deadly force to end a high-speed car chase could not be sued by the family of the driver.

SCOTUSBlog: Argument analysis: To decide, or not by Lyle Denniston

The more questions the Supreme Court Justices asked on Tuesday about the facts in a high-speed police chase case, the more they showed a willingness — maybe even an eagerness — to rule for the police. But the more they looked for a legal principle, the more they were talking themselves out of ruling at all. Those odd cross-currents marked the argument in the case of Plumhoff v. Rickard.

WaPo: Supreme Court justices grill plaintiff’s lawyer in suit over police chase that ended in 2 deaths by Robert Barnes:

The nine justices of the Supreme Court appeared more like an ad hoc jury Tuesday as they considered the case of a wild high-speed chase that ended with police officers shooting and killing the two occupants of a car.

Disclaimer: No comment; I was on the petitioner’s brief and worked on all the argument. And getting back at 8 pm was why there was one post yesterday.

The videos are available on YouTube, apparently, but I just looked and couldn’t find them. I have a private posting link, but only for the parties.

Officers had reasonable suspicion from a tip of a gun in defendant’s car at 3 a.m. in an area known for that. When the officers saw him there were furtive gestures. United States v. Mosley, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3901 (10th Cir. March 3, 2014):

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State did not prove valid inventory, and no inventory policy was admitted by the state to support it. Reversed. Shaw v. State, 324 Ga. App. 670, 751 S.E.2d 478 (2013). Lexis overview:

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Officers at a knock and talk who saw a bubbling bottle in the “shake and bake” method manufacturing methamphetamine was in plain view. State v. Lee, 124 So. 3d 1282 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2013).*

The harmless error rule does not apply to conditional guilty pleas. Defendant moved to suppress and lost, and should have had the whole case reconsidered. “The harmless error rule was ‘formulated to review trial verdicts’ (People v Grant, 45 NY2d at 378).” People v Wells, 2013 NY Slip Op 7511, 2013 N.Y. LEXIS 3130 (November 14, 2013).

Defendant had no standing to challenge a state wiretap that wasn’t on his phones and never recorded his voice. Deleon-Alvarez v. State, 324 Ga. App. 694, 751 S.E.2d 497 (2013).*

The search warrant for defendant’s computer hard drive was executed by its seizure within the ten days as required by statute. It was not, however, searched until after the ten days. That is not material. Mastrogiovanni v. State, 324 Ga. App. 739, 751 S.E.2d 536 (2013):

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A reasonable officer would have to know (for § 1983 purposes) that pulling plaintiff out of his doorway to arrest him was an entry into the home. Standing in one’s door is not a “public place” under Santana. Therefore, no qualified immunity. Mitchell v. Shearrer, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 18756 (8th Cir. September 10, 2013).

Officers had a reasonable belief that defendant parolee was in the place he was found when they entered. “And given the relative interests involved, including defendant’s lesser expectation of privacy as a parolee and the State’s substantial interest in apprehending absconders from parole, the court finds that the KDOC warrant carried at least the same implied authority to enter a residence as was recognized by Payton.” United States v. Denson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128707 (D. Kan. September 10, 2013).*

A threat to arrest a public employee if he didn’t answer questions, assuming it to be true, doesn’t state a Fourth Amendment claim. Brown v. SEPTA, 539 Fed. Appx. 25 (3d Cir. 2013).*

Officers received reports of violence near certain Mardi Gras parades, and they were watching one. The juvenile’s actions were clearly indicative of moving and adjusting a firearm at his waistband. That was reasonable suspicion for a stop, and removal of the gun was proper. State in the Interest of D.F., 122 So. 3d 1193 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2013).*

Defendant was stopped because of a potential emissions sticker issue: was it valid or temporary? That couldn’t be determined without a stop, which is conceded as valid. Defendant was suspected of being under the influence during the stop. Reasonable suspicion had not been dispelled at that point, so the DUI arrest was valid. State v. Dalton, 165 N.H. 263, 75 A.3d 1140 (2013).*

Defendant was lawfully stopped because he was walking down the center of the street. He consented to a patdown, and an Advil bottle fell from his pocket when he removed his hands. He denied possession of the bottle, so it was treated as abandoned. State v. Williams, 119 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).*

eff.org: EFF Fights National Security Letter Demands on Behalf of Telecom, Internet Company

Legal Briefings Still Under Seal After Government Demands for Secrecy

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Defendant was stopped for not signaling 100′ from the intersection when he pulled out from a parking spot less than 100′ from the intersection. That was still PC for the stop, and his defense was just that, a defense, but it didn’t mean no PC. State v. Smith, 2014-Ohio-712, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 699 (10th Dist. February 27, 2014).*

The officer here had probable cause that defendant’s vehicle was involved in an act of violence. When defendant and the vehicle were finally matched up, both matched the description given by witnesses. The vehicle was legitimately towed, and the officer had probable cause before the towing to search the car. A gun was found, and defendant was a felon. United States v. Cook, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25411 (N.D. Iowa January 22, 2014).*

In the way defendant grabbed for his fannypack, it was obvious to the officer that he was carrying a gun in it. A frisk was justified. United States v. Cardona-Vicente, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26134 (D. P.R. February 26, 2014).*

Defendant was leaving a hotel room with a laptop bag and a rolling duffle bag when he was subjected to a felony arrest at gunpoint for armed robbery. After he was handcuffed, his laptop bag and dufflebag were pushed about a car length away and searched. The search was valid under the state constitution as incident to an arrest because defendant was wanted for a violent crime and there were others around in a public place. State v. MacDicken, 171 Wn. App. 169, 286 P.3d 413 (2012), affd State v. Macdicken, 2014 Wash. LEXIS 161 (February 27, 2014) (posted here)

The officer stopping defendant already had probable cause to believe that he was involved in drugs but used a traffic stop as a cover (“whisper stop”). Defendant refused to consent to a search, but the officer used a drug dog which alerted on the car. Since the officer already had at least reasonable suspicion, the detention for the sniff was reasonable. United States v. Son, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146107 (N.D. Ga. August 15, 2012)*:

n. 3 A “whisper stop” is used in investigations to avoid disclosure of the underlying drug investigation and, in this case, to protect the role of the confidential informant. Although the trooper is aware of facts related to the drug investigation, a traffic stop based on a violation of traffic laws is conducted.

“When Abraham MacDicken was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery, he was carrying a laptop bag and pushing a rolling duffel bag. The arresting officers moved the bags a car’s length away and searched them. MacDicken claims this search violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. But as this court recently held, officers may search an arrestee’s person and articles closely associated with his or her person at the time of arrest without violating either of those constitutional provisions. … Applying that rule here, we hold that the bags carried by MacDicken were closely associated with him at the time of arrest and thus subject to search without a warrant.” State v. Macdicken, 2014 Wash. LEXIS 161 (February 27, 2014), affg State v. MacDicken, 171 Wn. App. 169, 286 P.3d 413 (2012).

Dissent: “¶12 McCloud, J. (dissenting) — The majority upholds the search of the laptop and rolling duffel bags in this case under a ‘time of arrest’ rule. Majority at 6. I believe that the ‘time of arrest’ rule is inconsistent with United States Supreme Court precedent. For that reason, I respectfully dissent.”

The Hill: An end to warrantless email searches? by Kate Tummarello

More than 40 House lawmakers have signed onto legislation since November; now 181 co-sponsors

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Flight from a DWI stop that was based on reasonable suspicion into defendant’s garage enabled the police to follow in hot pursuit and make an arrest. Stutte v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 139, 2014 Ark. App. LEXIS 192 (February 26, 2014) (4-2):

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Wired.com: Feds Refuse to Release Public Comments on NSA Reform — Citing Privacy by David Kravets:

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NPR: As Police Monitor Social Media, Legal Lines Become Blurred by Martin Kaste:

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On the Media: Secrecy at the Border:

A look at the suspension of rights at the border, murkiness of border policies, and lack of answers from the federal government.

Scroll down and look at the whole page. Remarkable.

Police reading of text messages on defendant’s cell phone as they came in violated the Washington Privacy Act. It is broader than Title III. The mere possibility that somebody else would see or intercept the text message does not defeat the reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Roden, 2014 Wash. LEXIS 158 (February 27, 2014):

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Defendants were in a car parked behind a church at night, and the officer thought it might be a couple “necking” [a 50-60’s word that dates the judge]. Instead, he found four men that matched the description of people involved in a robbery on a BOLO. He called for backup. When they got out of the car they were excessively nervous. Because of the BOLO and nervousness, a frisk of the car for weapons was reasonable. Robinson v. State, 2014 S.C. LEXIS 53 (February 26, 2014).

“Despite the court’s lack of confidence in Officer Bovy’s estimate [of defendant driving 50-55 in a 30], the court finds that Officer Bovy still had an objectively reasonable belief that Defendant was speeding.” Therefore, the stop was justified. “The court finds that Defendant’s unduly nervous demeanor combined with the high crime area in which the stop occurred and Defendant’s inconsistent answers provided Officer Bovy with reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the stop. Accordingly, the stop was not unduly prolonged.” United States v. Gaffney, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25081 (N.D. Iowa February 27, 2014).*