S.D.N.Y.: NYC’s stop and frisk policy held unconstitutional

NYC’s stop and frisk policy held unconstitutional. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. N.Y. 2013) (Part I (Findings and Conclusion) here (198 pages); Part II (remedies) here (39 pages))

NYT: Stop-and-Frisk Practice Violated Rights, Judge Rules:

In a repudiation of a major element in the Bloomberg administration’s crime-fighting legacy, a federal judge has found that the stop-and-frisk tactics of the New York Police Department violated the constitutional rights of minorities in New York, and called for a federal monitor to oversee broad reforms.

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MA: Disavowing ownership and possession of cell phone means no privacy interest in it

Defendant who placed a cell phone on a window sill expressly disavowing ownership and any desire for further possession of it had no reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 4 N.E.3d 1236 (2014).

There was a corporate entity of defendant involved in defendant’s alleged tax fraud scheme, and it was the target of a search. The court doubts his standing to challenge the search, but finds the warrant and its execution reasonable in any event. United States v. Sotolongo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25336 (M.D. Fla. February 26, 2014).*

2255 petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in the main proceeding so he can’t on post-conviction. United States v. Punzalan, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24203 (D. Guam February 24, 2014).*

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Liberty Voice: California Law Enforcement Secretly Collecting Cellphone Data

Liberty Voice: California Law Enforcement Secretly Collecting Cellphone Data by Alana Marie Burke:

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D.Mont.: Google reporting CP under § 2258A is not a government actor

Google has an internal protocol to report child pornography in its system to NCMEC. The file in this case started with Pennsylvania and ended in Montana. When the file was reviewed there, Montana authorities issued a search warrant. They were required to report under § 2258A, but none of this made Google a government actor. United States v. Drivdahl, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29233 (D. Mont. March 6, 2014):

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CA6: RS developed for stopping vehicles driving in tandem; RS on totality

Police received a tip that a big load of marijuana was coming to a suspected chop shop that they’d been investigating for two years. A tractor trailer unloaded inside the gate at night in inclement whether. Two sets of two vehicles left the lot and the groups were followed, clearly driving in tandem, in different directions. There were no traffic offenses, but when officers initiated a stop based on reasonable suspicion, they could smell the raw marijuana, and that led to a probable cause search and the finding of a large quantity of marijuana. The stop and seizure was valid. United States v. Carrillo-Alvaro, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 4343, 2014 FED App. 0178N (6th Cir. March 6, 2014):

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NC: While stop may not have been justified, a furtive movement on seeing the officer toward a likely gun made it justified

While North Carolina law permits concealed carry, statute provides that one carrying a weapon with a permit is required to disclose to an officer addressing him. If the person hasn’t disclosed and makes a furtive movement, the officer can reasonably assume the person is armed. While the stop wasn’t necessarily valid, the furtive movement escalated things, and a frisk was permitted. State v. Sutton, 2014 N.C. App. LEXIS 261 (March 4, 2014)*:

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WA: SW need only be left behind; it doesn’t need to be shown at beginning of search

A search warrant need only be left as the officers depart the premises. Pre-search showing of the warrant is not required. State v. Ollivier, 178 Wn.2d 813, 312 P.3d 1 (2013).

OH12 applies Davis good faith to placement of a GPS device pre-Jones. State v. Johnson, 2013-Ohio-4865, 1 N.E.3d 491 (12th Dist. 2013).

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N.D.Ga.: Consent to search a vehicle included the contents of boxes and compartments found inside

“Defendant argues the environment was coercive in that agents secured his consent by creating a rapport and seeing to any medical needs that he might have. Under the facts of this case, however, there is no indication that Defendant’s will was overborne by the law enforcement agents’ thoughtfulness or that Defendant’s capacity to enter into his own free choice was particularly susceptible to the influence of the agents simply because they ensured that he was healthy or conversed with him. Defendant clearly understood that he had the right to refuse consent because Agent Pagan twice read Defendant the Consent to Search form in Spanish which indicated not only that he was giving his permission to search voluntarily, but also that he has been advised of his right to refuse consent.” Consent to search a vehicle included the contents of boxes and compartments found inside. United States v. Najera-Perez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185792 (N.D. Ga. November 15, 2013).*

Defendant didn’t show at a hearing that the statements in the affidavit for search warrant were made with reckless disregard for the truth, so he gets no Franks hearing. United States v. Groves, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29593 (S.D. Ohio February 24, 2014).*

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WV: Shots fired call from a particular house known for that justified emergency search

A shots fired call from a particular intersection justified a search of the house for the gun under either exigent circumstances or a protective sweep theory. There was one house at the intersection, and defendant was known to fire his guns there. State v. Kimble, 2014 W. Va. LEXIS 164 (March 6, 2014).

There was probable cause and the search warrant authorized police to search the entire premises for computers possibly used in child pornography offenses. The good faith exception also applies. United States v. Ramirez, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28095 (S.D. Fla. March 4, 2014).*

Defendant who was neither the renter nor the authorized driver of a rental car showed no standing in the rental car, which was validly searched under the automobile exception. United States v. Mitchell, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28508 (W.D. Mo. March 6, 2014),* R&R 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29456 (W.D. Mo. January 21, 2014).*

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KS: Columbo-“one-more-thing” routine at the end of the stop still going on in Kansas; consent valid

The Columbo-“one-more-thing” routine at the end of the stop still going on in Kansas. Consent was valid. United States v. Vargas, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27971 (D. Kan. March 5, 2014):

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PA: Flash drive could have been searched under original warrant; second warrant unnecessary; email warrant overbroad, but second warrant cured

This is the case against Senator Orie in Pennsylvania for election crimes and forgery and tampering with evidence. Multiple search warrants were issued, and computers, hard drives, flash drives, and email were seized. A flash drive was seized under a warrant and searched under another more detailed warrant. The process was valid, but it probably wasn’t necessary to use the second warrant. The first email warrant was overbroad, but a master had the material, and a second more narrow warrant was issued to look, and this was proper. Commonwealth v. Orie, 2014 PA Super 44, 2014 Pa. Super. LEXIS 116 n.42 (March 6, 2014):

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OH9: Nexus shown from defendant leaving to do drug deals

PC was shown for a search of defendant’s house based on the fact he left the house after phone calls to make drug transactions. State v. Russell, 2013-Ohio-4895, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 5086 (9th Dist. November 6, 2013).

Two warrants were issued on defendant 30 days apart and the second warrant had the information from the first one plus new information. The new information made the second warrant not stale. Given that the lapse could make the prior information stale, the new information with the old information was probable cause. State v. Winningham, 2013-Ohio-4872, 1 N.E.3d 501 (1st Dist. 2013).

Defendant made no effort to preserve his search issue for appeal via a conditional plea. Therefore, the result of the suppression hearing was considered a part of the plea. Bland v. State, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1651 (November 6, 2013).

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New Law Review Article: The Purpose of the Fourth Amendment and Crafting Rules to Implement that Purpose

Thomas K. Clancy, The Purpose of the Fourth Amendment and Crafting Rules to Implement that Purpose, 48 Richmond L. Rev. 479 (2014):

Abstract:

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TN: Evidence from an accomplice was enough to arrest defendant for the crime

Evidence from an accomplice was enough to arrest defendant for the crime. State v. Bishop, 2014 Tenn. LEXIS 189 (March 6, 2014).

In this trust dispute, the trustee was ordered by the court to inventory stuff in a storage unit. The person with the storage unit claimed a Fourth Amendment violation. This was decided as a private search and lack of damages issue. Johnston v. Johnston, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 124 (March 6, 2014) [what about the court order being issued with “probable cause” satisfying the warrant requirement?]*

Defendant’s patdown was valid where he was the passenger in a car where the driver was subjected to a felony stop for drugs, and the police already had information that defendant had allegedly participated in prior drug sales with the driver. State v. Lemert, 2014 Minn. LEXIS 98 (March 5, 2014), aff’g State v. Lemert, 829 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. App. 2013).*

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GA: The owner of a house may consent to a search of the room of a guest

The owner of a house may consent to a search of the room of a guest. Just because defendant’s landlord said he paid rent didn’t mean that the trial court had to credit that testimony as a whole in the case. “In this case, some evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Payon was a guest rather than a tenant.” “Since the trial court found that Payton was a guest in Odom’s house, Odom, as the resident homeowner, was authorized to consent to the search of Payton’s bedroom, regardless of whether Payton was an adult, locked his door, or kept Odom out of his bedroom.” Payton v. State, 2014 Ga. App. LEXIS 98 (March 4, 2014).

There is no evidence that the defendant abandoned her cell phone, and the government’s argument is rejected. The search warrant for the cell phone was based on probable cause. United States v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185662 (D. Minn. December 13, 2013),* adopted 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25395 (D. Minn., Feb. 26, 2014)* (rejected as to another part not involving the search issue). [If there was PC, why go into the abandonment argument at all? It’s not that hard to show PC.]

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Meaningless gesture of the day: “Republican Lawmaker Files Bill To Drug Test Florida’s Elected Officials”

HuffPo: Republican Lawmaker Files Bill To Drug Test Florida’s Elected Officials by Janie Campbell:

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Politico: Judge strikes down small drones ban

Politico: Judge strikes down small drones ban by Kevin Robillard:

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MD: The ultimate question is reasonableness, not whether the “least intrusive” means were used by the police

The question is not whether the “least intrusive” means were used by the police; it’s whether it was reasonable on the totality. Barnes v. State, 2014 Md. LEXIS 141 (March 5, 2014):

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D.N.H.: Pattern of sexual abuse allegations support SW for house for photographic evidence of it

Defense counsel essentially concedes that there is probable cause to believe that defendant might have committed sexual abuse offenses, but not that evidence would be found at his house because none of the prior acts buttressing the PC occurred there. The court finds that there still was PC for the house that there might be evidence there of sexual abuse of children, even several years later. United States v. Joubert, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27422 (D. N.H. March 4, 2014):

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CA1: Miranda warnings do not apply to Terry stops

Officers had reasonable suspicion of credit card fraud from three men in an SUV who came into the store one at a time. The first used a credit card successfully for a video game system, but the second had a card in the same name that was declined. The third came in asking about video game systems, and the store employee sent them to another store. Police got the call and found them at the other store. When confronted by the police, two of the defendants disavowed any privacy interest in it, so they lacked standing. Finally, Miranda warnings do not apply to Terry stops. United States v. Campbell, 741 F.3d 251 (1st Cir. 2013):

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