CA7: Old man could consent; his lack of memory at suppression hearing didn’t mean he wasn’t fine when he consented

Just because the consenter was an old man who didn’t have good recollection at the suppression hearing doesn’t mean that he couldn’t consent. Nothing about his interaction with the officers suggested that he wasn’t about himself; he just had difficulty walking. United States v. Richards, 741 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2014):

Richards attacks Rawls’ capacity to freely and voluntarily consent based only on the first factor—age, education, and intelligence—because he contends that Rawls was an “old man out of touch with reality.” This argument is not persuasive.

To guide our determination of whether Rawls voluntarily consented to the search, we consider the information known to the officers when they arrived at Rawls’ house on the day in question. It was readily apparent to the officers that Rawls was an older gentleman because he clearly had difficulty walking. However, nothing occurred to put the officers on notice that Rawls lacked the intelligence or the capacity to voluntarily consent to the search of his home. When Officers Ealing and Llewellyn first talked to Rawls, Rawls confirmed that he was the homeowner and invited the officers to search for Wilson. Rawls was accompanied by two other men during this conversation, and neither of them expressed any concerns about Rawls’ mental condition. Officer Ealing testified that he did not observe any signs of dementia during his interaction with Rawls. Officer Llewellyn testified that he did not notice any signs that Rawls suffered from mental problems either. Rawls did not make any inappropriate comments or act in a way that would lead the officers to believe he was confused, delusional, or unable to consent. We find nothing that would have put a reasonable officer on notice that Rawls’ mental state was so impaired that he could not provide voluntary consent to the impending warrantless search.