The cell phone in this case was expressly tied to the offense, and the investigation was far enough along that inevitable discovery applied to it. AFOSI had a warrant for defendant’s person for the cell phone but found it elsewhere. United States v. Allen, 2014 CCA LEXIS 216 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. March 28, 2014):

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Wall St. Cheat Sheet: Backdoor Exploitation of Surveillance Rules Shows Need For More Reform by Anthea Mitchell:

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WaPo: US appeals ruling to let lawyers see secret files by AP:

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The Recorder: Stanford’s Jeffrey Fisher and Riley v. California by Scott Graham:

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Virginia law provides a defense to possession of a handgun on one’s own curtilage, but curtilage isn’t defined. The court looks to the common law, and provides us a valuable discussion. Foley v. Commonwealth, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 107 (March 25, 2014):

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NYT: Letter Tells of U.S. Searches for Emails and Calls by Charlie Savage:

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Atlantic: What I Learned About Stop-and-Frisk From Watching My Black Son by Christopher E. Smith:

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Politico: Feds mull DNA testing by Josh Gerstein:

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SCOTUSBlog: Petition of the day

The petition of the day is: Heien v. North Carolina. Issue: Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.

NJLJ: Court Weighs Duty To Indemnify for Lost Evidence in Dead Criminal Case by Michael Booth:

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The affidavit for the search warrant here was totally lacking in probable cause. It alleged only that defendant’s house used more electricity than his neighbors, that he was believed to have transported marijuana at an unknown time, and he was arrested for theft 11 years earlier. Therefore, the good faith exception did not apply, either. State v. Kosla, 2014-Ohio-1381, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1229 (10th Dist. March 31, 2014). [Note: Four remarkable things about this case: (1) The magistrate issued the pitiful attempt at a search warrant, thereby proving that he or she is purely a rubber stamp for the police, so defense lawyers should scrutinize every one that this judge issues; (2) How did this case get past a filing decision? (3) Since it did, why didn’t the prosecutor fold when the motion to suppress pointed it out? (4) Once the motion to suppress was granted, why did the state appeal such a woefully inadequate warrant application? They must really want Mr. Kosla in jail, to the point of failing their duty to the system of justice. They clearly disregard the Fourth Amendment.]

Defendant voluntarily consented to the taking of his DNA. State v. Vansickle, 2014-Ohio-1324, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1241 (12th Dist. March 31, 2014).*

Probable cause existed for defendant’s arrest. The victim reported a break-in while he was asleep, and a door was ajar. The police with a tracking dog followed unique footprints in the snow to defendant’s apartment. There defendant stood, with pants wet from the snow. Nearby were shoes matching the footprints. State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-1305, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1285 (6th Dist. March 28, 2014).*

Officers observed one of their regulars doing a likely hand-to-hand sale with a car that pulled up in front of him, and they followed him. Next, Clark was running down the street at them, and they stopped him. Protruding from his pocket was a baggie of marijuana which was in plain view. Clark v. State, 2014 Ind. App. LEXIS 136 (March 31, 2014).*

No motion to suppress was filed because it would have been denied, and this was not IAC. United States v. McGrew, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5945 (5th Cir. March 31, 2014).*

The Hawai’i implied consent law is not unconstitutional under McNeely. State v. Won, 2014 Haw. App. LEXIS 147 (March 28, 2014):

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WaPo: The drug war exception to the Fourth Amendment by Radley Balko:

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Defendant was stopped for no headlights, and the officers could smell marijuana and suspected he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. When he was handcuffed and arrested, the car was subject to search incident for the source, and the automobile exception also applied. The search incident or automobile search of his cell phone, however, violated Wurie (CA1) and Smith (Ohio) and would be suppressed because of the private nature of a cell phone. Also, Gant made a search incident of a cell phone unsustainable under Robinson. [After all, is Robinson’s cigarette pack remotely comparable to a smartphone? Hardly. Note that California state courts are contra with Riley granted cert with Wurie. Note also the suppression hearing was after the cert grant in Wurie and Riley.] United States v. Phillips, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42294 (E.D. Cal. March 25, 2014):

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Defendant was driving an ATV on the road, and an officer pursued. Defendant eluded the officer, but the officer found the ATV behind a house. The officer went to the door, a woman named Parrot answered, and the officer came in and arrested defendant. He had [showed] no standing in Parrot’s house to complain of his own arrest there. “We agree with the trial court—Guinn had no standing to challenge the search of Parrot’s house because he did not claim to own or live there at the time of the search and, thus, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the home. Mackey v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.3d 554, 557-556 (Ky. 2013).” Guinn v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky. App. LEXIS 53 (March 28, 2014).

Defendant’s appellate argument that the search was illegal wasn’t made below so it can’t be appealed. Crouse v. State, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3422 (Tex. App. – Dallas March 27, 2014).*

Apparent hand to hand exchange of cash for something else in a high crime area where it happens all the time and this officer had made hundreds of arrests was reasonable suspicion for a stop. The officer talked to defendant, and that led to a patdown. The lawfulness of the patdown is moot because no evidence was obtained. When defendant advised the officer he had a concealed carry permit and a gun, that permitted the officer to remove him from the car and conduct a protective search for the gun. [In other words, no actual threat required.] State v. Bly, 2014-Ohio-1261, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1132 (10th Dist. March 27, 2014):

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The odor of alcohol in a vehicle is not enough to justify a search. Here, it was spilled on the interior, and a search produced drugs. State v. Stevenson, 2014 Kan. LEXIS 117 (March 28, 2014), revg 46 Kan. App. 2d 474, 262 P.3d 689 (2011):

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“Here, the warrant directs officers to seize ‘[i]mages of child pornography and files containing images of child pornography in any form[,] wherever it may be stored or found.’ … It then, as in both $92,422.57 and Tracey, sets forth a broad list of computer-related devices that might store such images or files. We thus conclude, for the reasons expressed in $92,422.57 and Tracey, that the search warrant, though broad, was not general.” United States v. Gumbs, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5740 (3d Cir. March 28, 2014).

Defendant’s computer was seized from a third person working on it for suspicion of child pornography on it which was to be deleted. The officers reasonably believed that exigent circumstances existed that he evidence would be lost. In re J. C. L., 2014 Ore. App. LEXIS 361 (March 26, 2014).*

Defendant objected to 404(b) evidence of a stop in North Carolina but only when the state offered it at trial and not before. His argument that the state failed to prove it was lawfully seized fails because he failed to file a motion to suppress. Hernandez v. State, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 250 (March 28, 2014):

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