The government must show PC and exigent circumstances for an entry into the home. The three justice opinion in Segura urged by the government is not followed because it makes no sense and is now often criticized. United States v. Jones, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110251 (M.D. Fla. October 8, 2009):
To support its argument that it was not necessary to establish exigent circumstances, the Government cites to Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1983). The Government claims Segura distinguished between a search of a dwelling and a seizure of a dwelling to preserve the status quo and held that “securing a dwelling on the basis of probable cause, to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence while a search warrant is being sought is not itself an unreasonable seizure of either the dwelling or its contents.” (Doc. 67, p.15). Interestingly, the portion of the Segura decision cited by the Government is in a section of the opinion joined in by only two Justices. Additionally, this Court notes that the portion of Segura relied upon by the Government has been sharply criticized. See United States v. Wright, 696 F.Supp. 164, 170, n.8 (E.D. Va. 1988) (citing Dressler, A Lesson in Incaution, Overwork, and Fatigue: The Judicial Miscraftsmanship of Segura v. United States, 26 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 375, 422 (1985) (“Segura is a disaster as a written opinion”); Note, The Securing of the Premises Exception: A Search for the Proper Balance, 38 Vand.L.Rev. 1589 (1985) (“The most distressing feature of Segura is that the Chief Justice has created an exception [to the warrant requirement] without identifying any corresponding need”)); see also 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 6.5(c), pp. 417-424 (4th ed. 2004).
In Search and Seizure, Professor LaFave suggested that the Segura Court did not really approve of warrantless entry absent exigent circumstances. Id. at 419. He noted that the majority “parse[d] the police conduct in Segura into its ‘seizure’ and ‘search’ components, and with respect to the ‘seizure’ part [was] not really taking into account the fact of entry.” Id. To support this proposition, LaFave quoted the following passage in Segura:
Securing of the premises from within, however, was no more an interference with the petitioners’ possessory interests in the contents of the apartment than a perimeter “stakeout.” In other words, the initial entry-legal or not-does not affect the reasonableness of the seizure. Under either method-entry and securing from within or a perimeter stakeout-agents control the apartment pending arrival of the warrant; both an internal securing and a perimeter stakeout interfere to the same extent with the possessory interests of the owners.
Id. at 419-20 (quoting Segura, 468 U.S. at 811, 104 S.Ct. at 3389). LaFave noted that the Segura Court “only said that the seizure aspect (which, were it to exist in isolation, would mean maintaining control without entry) is permissible on probable cause even if there are not exigent circumstances.” Id. at 420. LaFave elaborated that the four dissenters appeared to agree on that point as they stated they assumed “impoundment would be permissible even absent exigent circumstances if it occurs ‘from the outside’ — when the authorities merely seal off premises pending the issuance of a warrant but do not enter.” Id. (quoting Segura, 468 U.S. at 824, n. 15, 104 S.Ct. at 3396).
This Court is persuaded by the analysis provided by LaFave. Moreover, given the criticism of Segura, and the fact that this Court was unable to locate (and the Government did not cite) any Eleventh Circuit cases adopting the holding cited by the Government, the Court finds the Government must show both probable cause and exigent circumstances existed at the time the officers entered the homes at 228 and 230 San Jose. As such, the Court must next determine whether exigent circumstances supported the officers’ decision to enter the two homes.
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The Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over Bivens claims against individual officers. [The Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction over what happens in the criminal justice system.] Taylor v. United States, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 462 (October 29, 2008):
Nothing in plaintiffs’ complaint raises the specter of an unreasonable search and seizure by defendant. More fundamentally, for purposes of this court’s jurisdictional analysis, the Fourth Amendment is not a money-mandating constitutional provision. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 500, 507 (2006) (“As a matter of law, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure … [is] not money-mandating.”); Hanford v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 111, 119 (2004) (“‘[V]iolations of 4th [A]mendment search and seizure’ are ‘excluded’ from the jurisdiction of this court because the Fourth Amendment is not a money-mandating constitutional provision.” (quoting Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 192 (2003))). Furthermore, although the Supreme Court held in Bivens “that a party may, under certain circumstances, bring an action for violations of constitutional rights against Government officials in their individual capacities[,] … [t]he Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over suits against the United States, not against individual federal officers.” Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to entertain these claims.
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Only in Arkansas: A convicted felon with a drug dog business was helping Mayflower AR police and carrying a sidearm with the permission of the Chief. On Law and Baseball see Traffic Stop: Fake Cop; Fake Dog. The Chief was suspended, and likely under investigation for being an accessory to both a FIPF charge and impersonating an officer. From the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette article linked above:
Sgt. Robert Alcon, Mayflower’s acting police chief, said Tuesday that the sheriff’s office “is conducting afull investigation into what happened.”
“The chief is kind of the focus of that investigation,” Alcon added.
But Alcon said, “in no way, shape or fashion was he [Brinkley] ever employed by the Mayflower Police Department. He was an independent contractor. He and the chief had some arrangement to use his services” for dogs in narcotics cases. “Things got a little out of control.”
Alcon declined to be more specific.
Mayflower, a town of about 2,230 residents, has five full-time police officers, including Shaw, and two part-time ones.
The search warrant for defendant’s property did not specifically say to seize computers, but it sufficiently referred to computer related data and stuff that it was more than reasonable to conclude under the good faith exception that computers were included. United States v. Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108911 (M.D. Fla. November 5, 2009) (USMJ’s R&R):
4) Data records related to the above computer related items, whether stored on paper (including computer printouts), on magnetic media such as tapes, cassettes, disk or memory devices such as optical disks, electronic address books, or any other storage media.
5) Any documents or other papers which contain set or sets or numbers or characters which may represent access codes or passwords for the computer, stored computer records, any on-line services, or other long distance carriers, and/or authorized credit agencies.
6) Computer printouts
7) Back-up copies of data and programs on floppy diskettes and other storage media. (Because computer stored data is so vulnerable, most computer users keep back-ups so if data is erased or deleted from the system itself, it may be recoverable on the back-up copies).
8) Data contained on all storage devices, including, but not limited to graphic and text files.
. . .
However, the list for the items to be searched contains many references to items relating to and found within computers including but not limited to storage devices for graphic and text tiles, data records relating to a computer, magnetic media, cassettes, disk or memory devices, and backup files. It was reasonable for the officers to seize the computers based upon the items listed in the Search Warrant. By seizing the computers the officers were within the terms of the search warrant and affidavit and were not conducting a general search.
The District Court adopted the R&R, United States v. Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108910 (M.D. Fla. November 19, 2009), adding:
The Court rejects defendant’s argument (Doc. # 46, p. 2) that the state Search Warrant had to comply with the federal definition of computer in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e). The Court also rejects defendant’s argument (Doc. # 46, pp. 2-4) that allowing seizure of the computers as an authorized item would mean that the February 24, 2009 search warrant was unnecessary. A law enforcement officer’s authority to possess an object is distinct from his or her authority to examine its contents. E.g., Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009). The second search warrant may or may not have been necessary, but its issuance does not detract from the validity of the first search warrant.
The Court agrees with the Report and Recommendation’s alternative finding (Doc. # 41, pp. 11-12) that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, as articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), is satisfied in this case. The good faith exception applies to this type of issue, Travers, 233 F.3d at 1330, and the facts support its application to this case.
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On Privacy Digest is Copying as a Search and Seizure discussing a 2001 case where copying data was not an interference with possessory rights so it was not a seizure. Copying papers would be a “search,” wouldn’t it? A search is looking.
A case is coming to trial involving a prison recording a priest-penitent confession in a prison as violating the First and Fourth Amendments. See Adoro te Devote, linking to What Does The Prayer Really Say?. It happened in 1996.
Does bringing KSM to S.D.N.Y. create Fourth Amendment rights?
It was reasonable for the USMJ to conclude that there was a nexus between defendant’s grow operation and his car and his house. He had to get to the grow operation somehow. United States v. Danielson, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107257 (D. V.I. November 17, 2009).*
Defendant driving someone else’s truck with permission had standing, and the videotape helped support it. United States v. Sanchez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106954 (D. Kan. November 16, 2009).*
Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the search warrant on state law grounds in a federal case since it was irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment. Norman v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106898 (M.D. Ala. October 21, 2009).*
There was probable cause for defendant’s arrest, and the search of his backpack was justified as a search incident. He was also seen ditching something as he ran while holding the backpack. United States v. Watkins, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106855 (D. Mass. November 17, 2009).*
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A potential exclusionary rule case, dressed in RS’s clothing:
Docket: 09-102
Title: Virginia v. Rudolph
Issue: Did the Supreme Court of Virginia properly find, on the facts of this case, that an investigative stop was unjustified under the Fourth Amendment?
From the state court opinion, after finding no reasonable suspicion:
When applied to evidence recovered pursuant to an investigatory stop, the exclusionary rule is best equipped to deter stops made not because of legitimate suspicion, but because the stop was motivated by some pernicious reason (such as racial profiling, personal animus, or the like), or by arbitrariness evidencing a genuine abuse of police power. Such a wrongful basis for the stop warrants the application of the exclusionary rule’s severe penalty.
But not all investigatory stops arise from such base motivations. Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that conduct observed by police may be “ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation” and yet still justify an investigatory stop, allowing the officers to “detain the individuals to resolve the ambiguity.” …
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In the NYTimes yesterday A Constitutional Case in a Box of Cash by Joe Sharkey. A man carrying cash and interrogated by TSA screeners about it in St. Louis. He used his iPhone to record the interrogation in an interrogation room.
Unfortunately for the interrogators, Mr. Bierfeldt was carrying an audio recorder. “As I was being led into the room, I thought, ‘This is going to be a bigger deal than I thought,’ so I took out my iPhone in plain sight, played a little with it, pushed record and put it back in my pocket,” Mr. Bierfeldt said.
The transcript of Mr. Bierfeldt’s recording shows that the officers, evidently unaware that Mr. Bierfeldt was recording the session, threatened Mr. Bierfeldt with federal arrest for declining to account for the cash. Mr. Bierfeldt kept asking politely whether he was legally required to answer. This intransigence irritated the officers.
In May 2006, the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency launched “Operation Return To Sender.” The goal: track down, arrest and deport undocumented immigrants, particularly felons, gang members and other dangerous types.
Since then, ICE agents have conducted scores of raids on homes and workplaces. Advocacy groups and lawyers say some agents have been overly zealous, and the advocates have regularly gone to court to try to void arrests and block deportations. But in what seems to be a small, but significant trend, some have also gone on the offensive, filing civil lawsuits against ICE and its agents.
The most recent example is in Connecticut, where a Yale School of Law legal clinic has filed suit on behalf of 10 undocumented immigrants whose homes were raided in June 2007. Immigration attorneys differ on whether the claim has much chance of success. But most agree that litigation is an interesting strategy that could buy time in America for the clients and give ICE officials reason to reconsider tactics.
Defendant was arrested for theft and conspiracy, and the affidavit for the search warrant did not allege any nexus between defendant’s home and the crime. A home may not be searched on arrest “as a matter of course.” Just because the object of the theft had not been recovered does not automatically justify a search. The GFE did not apply. Campbell v. State, 2009 Ark. 540 (November 5, 2009):
The Affidavit in the present case does not even assert that the items to be seized would be in the home, the vehicles, or on appellant’s person. It is clear from the Affidavit For Search and Seizure Warrant that the law enforcement affiant is asserting that when a person is arrested, his or her home, vehicles, and person may be searched as a matter of course. This is directly contrary to law. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.1(b).
The State asserts that even if there was a problem with the Affidavit, the good-faith exception saves the warrant. However, “[w]here the officers’ affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief as to its existence unreasonable,” the good-faith exception does not apply. Kelly v. State, 371 Ark. 599, 606, 269 S.W.3d 326, 331 (2007) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). The Affidavit fails to assert there is probable cause, let alone set out particular facts tending to show that the items to be seized are in the places to be searched. Instead, the Affidavit errantly relies on the arrest for crimes as the basis to search the home, the vehicles, and the person. The circuit court erred in failing to grant Campbell’s motion to suppress evidence seized in the execution of the search warrant.
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A protective weapons search of defendant’s console area was justified by his movements before he was stopped. The search was limited in scope and was reasonable. More than furtiveness was not required here. State v. Petrie, 2009 Iowa App. LEXIS 1393 (October 7, 2009):
We believe the search of the console area in Petrie’s vehicle in this case was justified by the deputy’s observance of Petrie reaching down to the center console area. It was limited to that area. The deputy was rightfully concerned that Petrie had been reaching for a weapon. If additional suspicious circumstances are necessary, we note that Petrie did not immediately stop when the deputy activated his lights, Petrie acted as though he was going to purchase gas while smoking a cigarette, and he attempted to vacate his car as the deputy approached. These circumstances lend credence to a conclusion that Petrie was nervous when stopped. Nervousness is one factor to consider in determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion that weapons are present. See State v. Bergmann, 633 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Iowa 2001).
Plaintiff claimed that he did not discover until 2007 that a search warrant was executed on his property in 1995. He failed to show the statute of limitations was tolled in an action for money damages. Leonard v. Woltman, 2009 Iowa App. LEXIS 1516 (November 12, 2009).*
Taillight stop led to officer smelling alcohol and defendant admitting he had been drinking. The stop was reasonable. State v. Shaw, 2009 Iowa App. LEXIS 1432 (October 21, 2009).*
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For those interested in the intricacies of FISA and tracing of e-mails, is this piece: The “techie” side of “Getting It Right”. If one is interested in how e-mails can be traced in criminal investigations, it helps to understanding.
An angry aide to Rep. Ron Paul, an iPhone and $4,700 in cash have forced the Transportation Security Administration to quietly issue two new rules telling its airport screeners they can only conduct searches related to airplane safety.
In response, the American Civil Liberties Union is dropping its lawsuit on behalf of Steve Bierfeldt, the man who was detained in March and who recorded the confrontation on his iPhone as TSA and local police officers spent half an hour demanding answers as to why he was carrying the money through Lambert-St. Louis International Airport.
The new rules, issued in September and October, tell officers “screening may not be conducted to detect evidence of crimes unrelated to transportation security” and that large amounts of cash don’t qualify as suspicious for purposes of safety.
“We had been hearing of so many reports of TSA screeners engaging in wide-ranging fishing expeditions for illegal activities,” said Ben Wizner, a staff lawyer for the ACLU, pointing to reports of officers scanning pill-bottle labels to see whether the passenger was the person who obtained the prescription as one example.
Officers had probable cause to search the trunk of defendant’s car for weapons when none were seen in the backseat. United States v. Ross, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111620 (M.D. Fla. August 6, 2008).*
Defendant’s consent was valid. She was a nurse and highly educated, and she had previously refused to consent to a search, so she knew what she was doing. “Based on the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that Ms. Mabie’s consent was freely and voluntarily given, even if Detective Anderson did actually tell her that they would get a search warrant and ‘trash’ her house.” United States v. Mabie, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104009 (E.D. Mo. October 15, 2009).*
Officers had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant when he was found in a room with 1,200 credit cards and equipment to make counterfeit credit cards. United States v. Medina, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104158 (S.D. Fla. October 24, 2009).*
Consent to search wallet was a product of defendant’s illegal detention. United States v. Duarte, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104155 (S.D. Fla. November 4, 2009)*:
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that Defendant Medina was still detained when he consented to the search of his wallet. From the testimony above, it is clear that the officers were in the process of letting him go, but he was not yet released. This fact alone distinguishes this case from Delancy. In Delancy, the homeowner was not detained at the time consent was given. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit noted that there was no detention whatsoever in Delancy. Delancy, 502 F.3d at 1311.
Even if there had been a short break between the detention and the consent for search (which there was not), Delancy should still be distinguished. Delancy involved a search after an illegal protective sweep of a home. In finding that timing was not as important a factor, the court focused specifically on the facts of that case. Delancy, 502 F.3d at 1311 (“on these facts, however, timing is not the most important factor”). Here, the duration of Defendant’s detention was the factor that made it unreasonable and, therefore, illegal. Thus, based on the facts of the instant case, timing is certainly an important factor.
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Defendant’s probation search was not shown to be a pretext for a police search. State v. Loper, 2009 Ohio 5920, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4976 (5th Dist. November 5, 2009).*
911 calls with three hangups, no response to calls back, and shouting in background about son shooting up heroin in the bathroom justified entry on exigent circumstances. State v. Davis, 2009 Ohio 5888, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4953 (5th Dist. November 3, 2009).*
Defendant’s furtive movement when he was under surveillance for drug dealing justified a vehicle “frisk” under Long, and Gant was inapplicable. State v. Moore, 2009 Ohio 5927, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4956 (12th Dist. November 9, 2009).*
Similarly, defendant’s having left an open air drug market with his evasiveness when spoken to justified a vehicle “frisk.” “Considering the aforementioned facts, viewed in conjunction with Officer Jordan’s testimony that weapons often accompany drugs, it was reasonable for Officer Jordan to be concerned for his safety. Such concerns substantiated the search of appellant’s vehicle under Michigan v. Long.” State v. Kelley, 2009 Ohio 5924, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4992 (12th Dist. November 9, 2009).*
The trial court erred in making an inference on an inference to conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion for defendants stop. State v. Fields, 2009 Ohio 5909, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4973 (3d Dist. November 9, 2009).*
Defendant’s stop was with reasonable suspicion, and the officer smelled marijuana. State v. Wingfield, 2009 Ohio 5833, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4906 (8th Dist. November 5, 2009).*
The possibility defendant might have a carry permit did not nullify the reasonable suspicion for a patdown. State v. Taylor, 2009 Ohio 5822, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4907 (8th Dist. November 5, 2009).*
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"If it was easy, everybody would be doing it. It isn't, and they don't." —Me
"Life is not a matter of holding good cards, but of playing a poor hand well." –Josh Billings (pseudonym of Henry Wheeler Shaw), Josh Billings on Ice, and Other Things (1868) (erroneously attributed to Robert Louis Stevenson, among others)
“I am still learning.” —Domenico Giuntalodi (but misattributed to Michelangelo Buonarroti (common phrase throughout 1500's)).
"Love work; hate mastery over others; and avoid intimacy with the government."
—Shemaya, in the Thalmud
"It is a pleasant world we live in, sir, a very pleasant world. There are bad people in it, Mr. Richard, but if there were no bad people, there would be no good lawyers."
—Charles Dickens, “The Old Curiosity Shop ... With a Frontispiece. From a Painting by Geo. Cattermole, Etc.” 255 (1848)
"A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if one's attention is confined to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced." —Williams v. Nix, 700 F. 2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983) (Richard Sheppard Arnold, J.), rev'd Nix v. Williams, 467 US. 431 (1984).
"The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." —Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
"Any costs the exclusionary rule are costs imposed directly by the Fourth Amendment."
—Yale Kamisar, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 36 n. 151 (1987).
"There have been powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand. That hydraulic pressure has probably never been greater than it is today." — Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property." —Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.St.Tr. 1029, 1066, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765)
"It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment." —United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
"The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not–to put it mildly–run smooth." —Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." —Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." —Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)
“Experience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.” —United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1925) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
“Liberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the piranha can be as deadly as the shark.” —United States v. $124,570, 873 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1989)
"You can't always get what you want / But if you try sometimes / You just might find / You get what you need." —Mick Jagger & Keith Richards, Let it Bleed (album, 1969)
"In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me–and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."
—Martin Niemöller (1945) [he served seven years in a concentration camp]
“Children grow up thinking the adult world is ordered, rational, fit for purpose. It’s crap. Becoming a man is realising that it’s all rotten. Realising how to celebrate that rottenness, that’s freedom.” – John le Carré, The Night Manager (1993), line by Richard Roper
"The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." —Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
The book was dedicated in the first (1982) and sixth (2025) editions to Justin William Hall (1975-2025). He was three when this project started in 1978.
