MA: Automobile search required no warrant even though officers delayed arrest and search to catch another person

“[W]hen an automobile is stopped in a public place with probable cause, no more exigent circumstances are required by art. 14 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] beyond the inherent mobility of an automobile itself to justify a warrantless search of the vehicle.’ Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 124, 676 N.E.2d 795 (1997). In this case, we conclude that this principle applies even when the police had ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, provided that there has been no unreasonable delay.” Delaying an arrest so another person would be implicated and be subject to arrest was reasonable. Commonwealth v. Eggleston, 453 Mass. 554, 903 N.E.2d 1087 (2009).

General police knowledge of use of firearms in the vicinity is not reasonable suspicion as to this defendant who was seen in the area. There was nothing about the defendant that gave reasonable suspicion either, so the stop was unreasonable and suppressed. Commonwealth v. Gomes, 453 Mass. 506, 903 N.E.2d 567 (2009).*

A protective sweep of the house in this case was unjustified. An officer responded to a call about a suicidal woman, and he got to the scene and found her and a man outside. One thing led to another and the man got tasered by the officer while the woman was egging him on. By then, the defendant’s brother was also on the scene, but there was nothing to indicate that there was another person in the house. Entering the house for a protective sweep that led to the discovery of evidence was unjustified. Brand v. State, 204 P.3d 383 (Alas. App. 2009).

Defendant was suspected of a murder of a child, and his DNA was taken in connection with that case, which was affirmed a week earlier. State v. Cope, 2009 S.C. App. LEXIS 94 (April 2, 2009). That DNA connected him to a burglary and attempted rape where he was stabbed with a screwdriver by the victim. The blood draw in the other case was usable here, and no additional search warrant or court order was required to compare it. State v. Sanders, 387 S.C. 608, 693 S.E.2d 409 (2009):

A blood sample validly obtained in connection with one crime may be used in a subsequent unrelated case. See State v. McCord, 349 S.C. 477, 484, 562 S.E.2d 689, 693 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding no improper search or seizure where defendant’s blood, voluntarily submitted in an unrelated case, is used in a subsequent case); see also Washington v. State, 653 So.2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1994) (“[O]nce the samples were validly obtained, albeit in an unrelated case, the police were not restrained from using the samples as evidence in the murder case.”); Bickley v. State, 227 Ga. App. 413, 489 S.E.2d 167, 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (holding the DNA evidence should not be “suppressed on the basis that additional testing of defendant’s blood … required an independent warrant”); Patterson v. State, 744 N.E.2d 945, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (“[U]nder the facts of this case, society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable an individual’s expectation of privacy in a blood sample lawfully obtained by police.”); Wilson v. State, 132 Md. App. 510, 752 A.2d 1250, 1272 (Md. Ct. App. 2000) (holding Fourth Amendment claims are no longer applicable once a person’s blood sample has been lawfully obtained).