The state’s CI used a buttonhole video camera to record a transaction in defendant’s home, and this did not violate the Fourth Amendment since he was invited in. The state constitutional claim that the state constitution should be interpreted different was waived. This arose as an IAC claim. People v. Meyer, 402 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 931 N.E.2d 1274, 342 Ill. Dec. 91 (2010).

Defendant had no constitutionally protected privacy interest in any activity that Meyers viewed in his home. This includes defendant’s possession of the handgun. Meyers simply obtained the most reliable evidence of events that he witnessed and could have testified to. Because any motion to suppress the video on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment would have failed, defendant’s counsel’s decision not to challenge the video on constitutional grounds was not deficient. Moreover, no prejudice arose because the video would not have been suppressed.

The officers were given consent to enter to make an arrest, and there was no articulable reason to conduct a protective sweep because of no showing of danger. State v. Davila, 203 N.J. 97, 999 A.2d 1116 (2010).

Defendant claimed she was staying with her brother for a few weeks prior to the search. He was on probation and signed a prior consent to a search of his premises. The PO searched under that consent and found drugs attributable to her. His consent to search was valid against her as to the whole premises. State v. McBeath, 2010 Ohio 3653, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3102 (2d Dist. August 6, 2010) [without any real analysis].

Plaintiff failed to show a pattern and practice of unconstitutional plain view searches by the defendant police department’s officers. No other example was shown. Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 2010).*

Defendant was found to have consented to a patdown and a search of his luggage, so the court does not have to decide whether plain feel applies to drugs duct taped to his ankles. United States v. Contreras, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79989 (D. Neb. August 6, 2010).*

Defendant was escorted away from a house by the police, and they received a call that he was back. They came again and handcuffed him without even asking questions. The frisk thereafter was not shown to be justified, and the gun in his sock was suppressed. [The state appealed the suppression grant, and the defense did not file a brief and still won on the credibility finding.] People v. Wells, 403 Ill. App. 3d 849, 934 N.E.2d 1015, 343 Ill. Dec. 412 (2010).*

A Tennessee General Sessions court judge cannot issue a search warrant in another county outside his jurisdiction, and this is a Fourth Amendment violation. United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 2010 FED App. 0276P (6th Cir. 2010):

Defendant’s sole challenge to the motion to suppress is that because the Tennessee general sessions judge who signed the search warrant application presided in a different county from Defendant’s residence, the judge had no authority under Tennessee law to authorize the warrant. It is uncontested by the government that the authorizing judge, Judge Faris, did not have jurisdiction under Tennessee law to authorize a warrant for property in a different county. The question becomes whether this lack of authority is relevant in a prosecution occurring in federal court. For the following reasons, we determine that it is.

. . .

The problem for the government in this case, however, is that the warrant is not invalid because of an additional protection provided by the state. Instead, the warrant is invalid because it does not comply with the Fourth Amendment. The jurisdictional limits placed on Judge Faris are not additional protections for a citizen but instead merely a reflection of the authority vested by the state in a general sessions judge. As we recognized in United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 2001), “when a warrant is signed by someone who lacks the legal authority necessary to issue search warrants, the warrant is void ab initio.” Here, it is undisputed that Judge Faris did not have the authority under Tennessee law to authorize the warrant for a search of Defendant’s property in Coffee County.

The government factually distinguishes Scott, but those distinctions do not compel a different outcome. In Scott, this Court granted a motion to suppress when the search warrant was signed by a retired judge. The judge occasionally substituted for active judges but was not working in that capacity when he signed the warrant. Therefore, when the judge in Scott approved the warrant, he had no authority to approve any warrants, while Judge Faris undoubtedly had authority to issue warrants for Franklin County.

However, the difference between the judge in Scott and Judge Faris are immaterial in determining the validity of a warrant. …

Defendant ATF agent had qualified immunity for a search of plaintiff’s gun store at the request of local police. Having an FFL means you are in a highly regulated industry and have a reduced expectation of privacy in your records. Giragosian v. Bettencourt, 614 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2010):

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B)(ii), the government may conduct compliance inspections of gun shop premises without either a warrant or reasonable cause, as long as it does not do so more than once in any twelve-month period. The Supreme Court has explicitly upheld the constitutionality of this provision under the Fourth Amendment. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 317 (holding that the “urgent federal interest” in regulating firearms traffic outweighs any threat to gun dealers’ privacy). Bettencourt’s 2007 compliance inspection of Giragosian’s gun shop was the first in twelve months — indeed, in ten years. It thus met all of the requirements of § 923(g)(1)(B)(ii).

The stop and subsequent search were valid, and any appeal would be frivolous (Anders brief). United States v. Pedraza-Bucio, 386 Fed. Appx. 822 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Whether defendant’s apartment entry way was a public place was briefed but did not have to be decided because the officers had exigent circumstances from defendant’s admission he had “something on him.” United States v. Martin, 613 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2010)*:

First, the arresting officer testified that, based upon his experience, when a suspect states that he has “something on him,” that usually means “he has a gun.” … No one seriously disputes as much. Before entering the building, then, the officers had come face to face with a man who had likely shot someone else earlier in the day, who claimed he had a gun on him, and who, after being told to place his hands on the wall, dropped his hands from sight. In these circumstances, the “officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that there was an immediate need to enter to protect [their] safety.” Reeves, 524 F.3d at 1169; see also Walker, 474 F.3d at 1251-53 (exigent circumstances permitting entry into home existed after man inside the house, in response to the officer announcing his presence outside, shouted, “Yeah, and I got a goddamn gun”); United States v. Thomas, 372 F.3d 1173, 1175, 1178 (10th Cir. 2004) (warrantless entry permitted after defendant brandished a weapon).

Officers were at the defendant’s house based on a 911 call that a woman was being held hostage against her will. When they got there, the woman was not harmed, but the officers entered to check it out. Drugs were found in plain view. The entry was still with exigent circumstances, and the first appearances were not binding. State v. Arnold, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 637 (July 26, 2010).*

The video, not presented at the suppression hearing, was shown at trial, so it could be relied upon to determine the reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop and seizure. State v. Wilson, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 646 (July 26, 2010).*

Traffic stop led to defendant throwing baggie of drugs out of the car, and another officer who shortly arrived found it. That justified a search incident. United States v. Singleton, 373 Fed. Appx. 532 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).

The officer had reasonable suspicion for the detention. “A recognized exception to this rule is that if additional reasonable suspicion arises in the course of the stop and before the initial purpose of the stop has been fulfilled, then the detention may continue until the new reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or confirmed. … However, mere ‘uneasy feelings’ and inconsistent stories between a driver and passenger do not constitute articulable facts that support a reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking.” United States v. Lee, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39703 (W.D. La. March 9, 2010).*

Defendant was targeted by a Nevada Interdiction Task Force that was waiting for him on I-15 south of Las Vegas. He was clocked at 73 in either a 65 or 70 zone (it didn’t matter), and he was dressed inappropriately for the weather and he was sweating profusely and nervous. There was reasonable suspicion, and he consented to the search. United States v. Comstock, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39666 (D. Nev. January 21, 2010).*

An oil rig worker returning from a rig in the Gulf of Mexico crossed the border for purposes of a border search. The point of origin of the trip is irrelevant; the fact of a border crossing is what makes it reasonable. The oil rig is a federal enclave, but defendant traveled through international waters to get back to shore. Child pornography was found on his computer during a border search. United States v. Pickett, 598 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2010) (this per curiam opinion is not on the court’s website).

The record supports the conclusion that officers smelled burning marijuana when the defendant’s car was stopped, and that led to a search. United States v. Hunter, 373 Fed. Appx. 973 (11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the consent search. On the merits, a motion to suppress would fail on alleged coercion. Therefore, no IAC. United States v. Henderson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38147 (M.D. Pa. April 19, 2010).*

Defendant admitted he was lawfully stopped and ordered out of the car. He admitted that he had unlawful prescription drugs in the car. That justified a search. United States v. Schlatter, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38258 (N.D. Ind. April 19, 2010).*

Factual mistake on typing in the vehicle license number (“N” v. “M” when vehicle was driving by at night) that yielded a matching vehicle was an objectively reasonable stop. United States v. Christensen, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37330 (D. Utah April 15, 2010):

Applying these principles, the court concludes that Officer Lavin’s factual mistake 4 was objectively reasonable given the totality of the circumstances in this case. As set forth above, Officer Lavin was attempting to observe a known drug house, a vehicle parked in front of the house, and the vehicle’s license plate, all while driving at a rate of fifteen to twenty miles per hour, late at night. It was under these conditions that Officer Lavin mistakenly typed an “N” instead of an “M” while entering the license plate query. Then, after receiving the computer results, Officer Lavin erroneously concluded that the computer-generated vehicle description was consistent with the white truck parked in front of the residence.

While a more detailed and lengthy review of the vehicle description would have yielded additional information that might have alerted Officer Lavin to the fact that the insurance information was for a different vehicle, the description nonetheless included the critical and obvious terms “1997,” “white,” “truck” — terms that were entirely consistent with the vehicle he observed. Given the conditions under which Officer Lavin was working, the relatively rapid pace in which the situation unfolded, and the remarkably similar license plate numbers and vehicle descriptions, the court finds that Officer Lavin’s mistake was objectively reasonable.

The District Court properly denied a COA on this § 2255 petition because his plain view argument was not even fairly debatable. United States v. Winston, 373 Fed. Appx. 826 (10th Cir. 2010).*

The search warrant for defendant’s computer did not have to specify for particularity where the files would be found in a computer because of the possibility of manipulation of the data. Officer could have provided more information to the state court judge issuing a search warrant, but that did not make what was disclosed misleading. United States v. Sherman, 372 Fed. Appx. 668 (8th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)*:

We conclude Officer Buehrle made a good faith effort to independently verify the allegations of Schellert and he completed an adequate, although arguably not perfect, investigation. There is nothing contained in either Schellert’s affidavit or in Officer Buehrle’s affidavit which was either recklessly inaccurate or misleading to the state court. While more information could have been included in the application for the search warrant, its absence does not diminish the factual basis to support a finding of probable cause. The district court’s factual determinations for both the Franks hearing and the motion to suppress are not clearly erroneous and its legal conclusions are a proper application of the law. Neal, 528 F.3d 1069; Stevens, 530 F.3d 714; and Ketzeback, 358 F.3d 987.

. . .

The first paragraph of the search warrant was tied to the specific fraudulent practices suspected, and the computer records identified in the second paragraph were likely to contain evidence relevant to those suspect practices. The search warrant necessarily needed to include all computer equipment and systems to effectively allow law enforcement to “recognize and seize the materials described.” Horn, 187 F.3d at 788. “The failure of the warrant to anticipate the precise form in which [the data] would appear is not fatal.” United States v. Lowe, 50 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 1995).

Habeas petitioner’s petition was partly about the legality of his arrest, an issue rejected by the state court. This habeas is merely quarreling with the state court, and that deprived federal court of jurisdiction to decide the issue. Denial of relief was correct, and COA denied. Pickens v. Workman, 373 Fed. Appx. 847 (10th Cir. 2010).*

No jurisdiction in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for Fourth Amendment violations. Brock v. United States, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 91 (April 6, 2010).*

Defendant’s medical records in a hospital are not his private papers (O.C.G.A. § 17-5-21) exempt from a search warrant as mere evidence. (The court gives a history of the state “private papers” exemption.) Brogdon v. State, 287 Ga. 528 (2010).

Defendant did not raise lawfulness of search of his vehicle in the trial court, so application of Gant was waived. State v. Cross, 156 Wn. App. 568, 234 P.3d 288 (2010).*

Officers had probable cause to arrest defendant for obstructing a felony stop after officers responded to a call about a large fight. State v. Parsons, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 759 (July 14, 2010).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion from an informant’s statement that a drug deal would go down at Hardee’s from a “beat-up hooptie,” and a car matching that description showed up at the Hardee’s and nobody got out of the car. State v. Whitelow, 2010 Iowa App. LEXIS 725 (July 14, 2010).*

The police showed nexus to the defendant’s property for this search warrant, and the court gives a primer on staleness. United States v. Towne, 705 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2010)*:

Police are not required to seek a warrant the moment they have information sufficient to establish probable cause, but stale information cannot be considered in the probable cause analysis. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210-211, 53 S. Ct. 138, 77 L. Ed. 260 (1932). Whether or not information is stale depends on the nature of the property to be seized, the nature of the alleged crime, and the nature of the premises to be searched. Andresen v. State, 24 Md. App. 128, 331 A.2d 78, 105 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975), aff’d, Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976). “The likelihood that the evidence sought is still in place is a function not simply of watch and calendar but of variables that do not punch a clock.” Id., 331 A.2d at 106. Burglar’s tools, for example, might reasonably remain in the hands of a professional thief for ten months. Commonwealth v. Scanlan, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 173, 180-181, 400 N.E.2d 1265 (1980). Pedophiles typically hide child pornography in the secrecy of their homes and rarely discard the images, hence a pornography collection might reasonably remain in the possession of a pedophile for an indefinite period of time. See United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1997) (ten months); People v. Russo, 439 Mich. 584, 487 N.W.2d 698, 707-711 (Mich. 1992) (six and one-half years); Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Mass. 840, 846, 874 N.E.2d 1089 (2007) (“Perhaps a lifetime.”). Collectors of illegal firearms also carefully preserve their weapons. See United States v. Batchelder, 824 F.2d 563, 564 (7th Cir. 1987) (illegal silencers properly seized on nine-month-old information). See also State v. Bova, 240 Conn. 210, 690 A.2d 1370, 1384 (Conn. 1997) (items that are not facially incriminating are more likely to remain undisturbed on a premises than are items that are obviously inculpatory).

The police had a search warrant for the upstairs apartment. Once they entered, they realized that there were two apartments, and, like Garrison, they exited and went to the door of the right place. This entry was reasonable and with exigent circumstances, and what happened here was not a deliberate “manufactured” exigency. United States v. Rios, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37600 (E.D. Wis. April 15, 2010), USMJ’s R&S 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37544 (E.D. Wis. February 12, 2010).*

Defendant’s patdown was too intense and involved lifting his shirt to expose drugs in his waistband. The officer had reason for a patdown, but didn’t pat him down. Instead, he lifted his shirt. State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 999 A.2d 415 (2010) (applying Fourth Amendment and N.J. Const.).

“Finally, although the petitioner complains that counsel performed deficiently by failing to file a motion to suppress, the record establishes that any suppression motion would have been unsuccessful given the petitioner’s pretrial admission that he had granted the officers consent to search his residence and the officers’ corroborating testimony that consent was given. Furthermore, counsel testified that, pursuant to the policy of the district attorney’s office, the filing of a motion to suppress would have caused the state to revoke the plea offer, which included Mrs. Raney’s probationary sentence. Under these circumstances, the petitioner has failed to establish that his counsel performed deficiently by failing to file a motion to suppress.” Raney v. State, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 536 (June 23, 2010).*

Officer directed defendant out of the car before the ticket was written, and he asked the defendant if he had anything on him that he shouldn’t have. Defendant believed he was seized at the time of the questioning which was without reasonable suspicion, and the motion to suppress should have been granted. State v. Smith, 236 Ore. App. 5, 237 P.3d 853 (2010).*

Search of defendant’s car was reasonable when there was the smell of burnt marijuana coming from the car when it was stopped. Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 43, 883 NE 2d 905 (2008), which only involved the smell of burnt marijuana on clothes as not justifying a search of the car is distinguished. Commonwealth v. Degray, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 928 N.E.2d 971 (2010).*

Defendant was stopped for being involved in a possible theft offense. During the stop, it was determined that there was no theft offense, so the justification for the stop evaporated, and there was no additional justification. Suppression order affirmed. State v. Knox, 2010 Ohio 2889, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2393 (8th Dist. June 24, 2010).*

A passenger’s conduct and words were an apparent diversion from the car which added to justification to get the passengers out and drugs were in plain view and validly seized. State v. Newsome, 2010 Ohio 2891, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2394 (8th Dist. June 24, 2010).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic infraction, and the officer determined that he had no valid DL. After deciding that he would ticket defendant and tow the vehicle he told defendant to get out of the vehicle and asked if he had any contraband on him. Defendant admitted that he did. The trial court found that he was not free to leave but that the question was valid. “There is no bright-line rule as to whether an officer’s request that a person step out of a vehicle in the context of a traffic stop constitutes a seizure for purposes of Article I, section 9. Such a request is merely one of the factors that is part of the totality of the circumstances that must be evaluated.” Here, the totality shows that it was a seizure, and it should have been suppressed. State v. Smith, 236 Ore. App. 5, 237 P.3d 853 (2010).*

The third party consenter had apparent authority to consent to the search of defendant’s house. She referred to it to the police as “my house.” Randolph does not stand for the proposition that the defendant cannot be removed from the premises to defeat consent. United States v. Shrader, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62565 (S.D. W.Va. June 23, 2010).*

Private search by hotel employees of things left in a hotel safe after checkout is not unreasonable. State v. Stokke, 235 Ore. App. 477, 237 P.3d 829 (2010), on remand from State v. Stokke, 348 Ore. 114, 228 P3d 1213 (2010) (reconsider in light of State v. Luman, 347 Ore. 487, 223 P3d 1041 (2009)).

Defendant was a suspect in a homicide and he was stopped by an officer off duty in a pickup truck. A patdown for a weapon was permissible. “We further conclude that Detective Bartlett’s initial pat-down of the defendant was reasonable because the officer knew that the weapon was at-large and because the defendant would be riding next to the officer in a pick-up truck, with the only restraint being a seatbelt.” State v. Rose, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 466 (May 20, 2010).*

Officer saw defendant’s car sitting in the middle of the intersection during a red light, and that was reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Wiggins, 2010 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 450 (June 7, 2010).*

The search incident of defendant’s cell phone was valid on this limited record, partly because the issues asserted on appeal by the defendant were not presented to the trial court and the record was not developed. Aside from that, the record was replete with information that the cell phone was related to defendant’s crime, and that made the search incident valid on the record. State v. Nix, 236 Ore. App. 32, 237 P.3d 842 (2010):

Fourth, and finally, defendant, as respondent, advances an extended, and nuanced, argument that the search here would not be lawful under the Fourth Amendment as a search incident to arrest. That presentation proceeds from a discussion of myriad federal decisions–none of which was cited to the trial court–and ultimately urges that, given categorical constructs adopted by the federal courts and particular purported characteristics of cellular telephones, including with respect to data storage capacity, a warrantless search of an arrestee’s cellular telephone cannot be deemed a lawful search incident under the Fourth Amendment. Again, no distinct Fourth Amendment analysis was raised before the trial court, and no record pertaining to the purported pertinent characteristics of cellular telephones generally–much less defendant’s cell phone specifically–was developed before the trial court.

. . .

Defendant’s position is predicated on the proposition that the only pertinent crimes are those for which defendant was, in fact, arrested, viz., the crimes that were the subjects of the outstanding warrants. However, that proposition is erroneous. Under Owens, a search incident to arrest need not relate to the crime for which defendant was arrested so long as it relates to another crime for which the officer effecting the arrest also had probable cause. 302 Ore. at 204.

The state presented overwhelming, uncontroverted evidence establishing probable cause, as of the time of the search incident, to arrest defendant for delivery of a controlled substance. Defendant, who had a prior conviction for manufacturing of controlled substances, was the subject of an ongoing investigation for drug-related crimes. During the course of that investigation, the police monitored controlled buys from defendant’s residence and interviewed people who claimed that defendant had dealt them methamphetamine. Moreover, on the day of his arrest, defendant was observed engaging in what appeared to be a “hand-to-hand” transaction involving controlled substances. Further, when Jones searched defendant, he discovered items consistent with that crime, including a number of small, clear plastic baggies commonly used for packaging controlled substances and a significant amount of cash. Based on his knowledge of the ongoing investigation and the items he found on defendant, Jones reasonably relied on the information he received from other officers that there was probable cause to arrest defendant for delivery of a controlled substance.

A protective sweep was justified along with the arrest of the occupant of a mobile home with an operating meth lab where officers could hear other people inside. A protective sweep may precede an arrest if the circumstances support it. State v. Fenn, 41 So. 3d 544 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2010), judgment rendered May 20, 2010:

An in-home protective sweep may occur after the suspect is arrested. Two Bienville Parish officers were investigating possible methamphetamine activity involving the applicant, whose vehicle was parked outside her residence, a mobile home in Saline, Louisiana. A man answered her door. When the door was opened, the officers smelled the strong odor of solvents, necessary components in the production of methamphetamine. The deputies also heard noises indicating the possible presence of an unknown individual in the dwelling. The man at the door denied that applicant Fenn was home. The officers left.

Within a few moments, the officers were informed of an outstanding Texas arrest warrant for the man who had been at the door. An arrest was quickly made, either at the door or on the porch, and the officers, for their protection, made a quick protective sweep of the home, to make certain that no one was present who could harm them. This sweep was predicated upon the foregoing specific and articulable facts, in concert with our culture’s universally acknowledged nexus between guns and drugs. The actions of the officers to protect themselves were objectively reasonable and appropriate.

Police officer went to the door of a “boot joint” (bootleg house) with a screen door and the inside door was open. The officer opened the screen door and stepped on the threshold and asked “Is this a boot joint?” They said yes, and he came in. This was an entry without exigent circumstances. State v. Johnson, 2010 Ohio 1790, 187 Ohio App. 3d 322, 931 N.E.2d 1162 (2d Dist. 2010)*:

[*P17] Officer Beall’s conduct in opening the screen door of the apartment and stepping into the open doorway to present himself to those inside constituted an unlawful warrantless entry onto those premises. The admission he then procured from Defendant that the premises was a boot joint is subject to suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed.2d 319. That scenario likewise operated to create the purported need to enter the apartment to secure evidence inside. It is on that need that the State relies to argue that the entry was authorized by the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. However, police by their own conduct cannot create an exigency and then enter a premises to prevent destruction of evidence.

Defendant’s furtive movements were sufficient to warrant his frisk, so defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the search. State v. Pope, 2010 Ohio 1749, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1458 (8th Dist. April 22, 2010).*

The argument defendant raises on appeal was not the one raised in the trial court, so the issue is not preserved for review. State v. Holmes, 2010 Ohio 1745, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 1460 (8th Dist. April 22, 2010).*

Defendant was stopped running from the scene of a reported robbery, and he matched the description. When he was finally stopped and hooked up, he had dropped his backpack. The police picked up the backpack and searched it, and no exception to the warrant requirement applied. Defendant was handcuffed and unable to reach in it. The government suggested inventory but did not prove anything about a policy. Inevitable discovery was speculative. United States v. Bennett, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35755 (E.D. Pa. April 8, 2010).*

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense and having heavily tinted windows. During the stop, defendant refused consent, and the officer got the drug dog out to sniff the car, and it alerted. This continuation of the stop was with reasonable suspicion based on observations of the officer of the occupants. United States v. Gastelo-Armenta, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35739 (D. Neb. January 21, 2010).*

Defendant counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress the search in this case. The codefendant won his suppression motion, but he had standing, and defendant did not. Since he could not prevail, defense counsel could not be ineffective. COA denied. United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 372 Fed. Appx. 844 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

Where PC was totally lacking, search warrant could not be relied upon in good faith. Agurs v. State, 415 Md. 62, 998 A.2d 868 (2010):

The affidavit supporting the warrant stated no facts suggesting that such items would be found in the home and stated only speculative and inconclusive facts suggesting that the petitioner was involved with controlled dangerous substances. Under these circumstances, the affidavit provided no indicia of probable cause that the petitioner had items related to controlled dangerous substances in his home. Accordingly, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply because the police could not have relied on the warrant in good faith.

Defendant’s stop was valid, and defendant does not really dispute that. The court cannot reweigh the evidence. State v. Sitts, 926 N.E.2d 1118 (Ind. App. 2010).*