Residents in an apartment complex complained of a strong ammonia smell, and the landlord tried to find the smell and couldn’t. He called the fire department for assistance, and they narrowed it down to defendant’s apartment. They considered it an emergency The landlord used his key to open the door, and defendant was standing there, and the smell of ammonia “poured out.” The firemen entered and found a meth lab. The entry was valid under exigent circumstances, and the police were called when it was determined to be a meth lab. State v. Huber, 2011 ND 23, 793 N.W.2d 781 (2011):

[*P21] Firefighter Bitz’s testimony reflects two key facts about the search of Huber’s apartment. First, it reflects the firefighters were concerned with locating the odor’s source. It was only during the course of this search that the methamphetamine lab and drug paraphernalia were discovered. Second, Bitz’s testimony reflects the fact that law enforcement did not enter the apartment until they were asked to remove an occupant for safety purposes. The officers also did not stop to independently look for evidence of a crime, and they remained separated from the firefighters as they continued their search.

[*P22] When it became apparent the responders were dealing with a methamphetamine lab, the dangers were exacerbated and law enforcement was justified in continuing to assist inside the apartment. See United States v. Lloyd, 396 F.3d 948, 955 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 545 U.S. 1110, 125 S. Ct. 2558, 162 L. Ed. 2d 285 (2005) (“Our cases have recognized that dangers [from methamphetamine labs] may continue for some hours.”) The dangers created by methamphetamine labs justify an immediate and ongoing search because of exigent circumstances due to these labs’ volatile nature. Id. at 954-55. In Michigan v. Tyler, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 436 U.S. 499, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978), the United States Supreme Court upheld law enforcement’s reentry of a fire scene hours after their first entrance. Law enforcement left the scene to allow visibility to improve and smoke and steam to dissipate. Id. at 502. Holding the reentry was a continuation of the first entrance, the United States Supreme Court held it was a meaningless distinction that law enforcement had departed and returned rather than remain in the building the entire time: “Little purpose would have been served by their remaining in the building, except to remove any doubt about the legality of the warrantless search and seizure later that same morning.” Id. at 511. The continued presence of a methamphetamine lab is no less a danger than that posed by a smoldering fire. Law enforcement’s presence in Huber’s apartment was at all times justified by the continuing emergency.

An IRS criminal investigator’s silence about his real purpose when he sought consent for records was not a misrepresentation to the taxpayer when he got consent for records. United States v. Kim, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98269 (N.D. Cal. September 3, 2010).*

The search of defendant’s person was without probable cause, and the frisk was without reasonable suspicion, so the gun had to be suppressed. The record was “devoid” of anything like probable cause, and there were no indicators of reasonable suspicion. Essentially, defendant was searched because he was with somebody else who was. Motion to suppress granted. A motion to suppress is not required to be accompanied by an affidavit. Rule 47 says “may.” United States v. Matias-Maestres, 738 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.P.R. 2010).*

Defendant’s stop was because the license plate light was out. When the officer approached, he could smell marijuana, and that justified the subsequent search. United States v. Bruce, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97976 (M.D. Ala. August 31, 2010).*

On Grits for Breakfast yesterday: More boondoggle than bonanza: Southbound checkpoints face Fourth Amendment challenges, about proposed Texas legislation for using checkpoints as revenue generators, hoping to cut into Mexican drug cartel profits:

Rob Kepple of the Texas District and County Attorneys Association told the Senate Transportation and Homeland Security Committee that, under existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in Texas, it’s “not a viable policy” to use southbound checkpoints to “bootstrap our way” into expanded asset seizures or to check immigration status. Ouch!

The most problematic question, said Kepple is whether DPS can do its own checkpoints aimed at searching for money, guns, drugs, stolen cars, etc., as opposed to checking for drivers licenses and liability insurance? Courts look at the intent of the checkpoint, he said, and if the intent is to generate forfeiture revenue that probably won’t cut it.

[Note: for some reason, my software isn’t letting me imbed a link, so search for “grits for breakfast”]

At last, a DA who was willing to adhere to the Fourth Amendment. Over in Florida, the Governor wants to drug test everybody who works for or gets money from the state, obviously oblivious to the Fourth Amendment issues and the cost. The DAs are silent because it is not yet a criminal justice issue. Nobody else is silent, however, because there have been dozens of articles and blog posts about it, and I haven’t bothered to link to any others. OK, here’s Mother Jones‘s.

ABAJournal.com: Police in Fla. Town Use Email and Skype to Obtain Warrants While Still on the Scene, linking to Florida Today’s Palm Bay police use Skype in DUI cases. From the latter:

Palm Bay detectives are using an Internet communications tool to create a high-tech way of getting official testimony to swear out warrants faster.

The method, using the popular online service Skype, helps officers in the field obtain blood search warrants in suspected DUI cases. Skype software allows video conferencing and phone calls over the Internet.

“When it comes to impairment, time is of the essence,” Cpl. Morgan said in a statement.

“The goal is get the most accurate capture of evidence closest to the time of the incident and our experience using Skype helps us do that.”

I’ve been advocating this over telephonic warrants for a long time. Most medium size cities and above have full computer links in police cars just for communication with dispatch, and they use digital radio or broadband. E-mail really helps eliminate errors in telephone recording and scope of warrants. Skype can record the transmission for litigation.

North Carolina’s Arrested Development: Fourth Amendment Problems in the DNA Database Act of 2010 by Lauren Hobson, 89 N.C. L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2011) [sorry, the PDF link on this site does not work]. Abstract:

Most Americans can probably hum a few bars of the theme song to one of television’s most successful franchises: Law & Order. Watching the ever-cynical Detective Briscoe investigate crimes alongside the good-looking Detective Logan made viewers root for police to catch New York City’s criminals. Sometimes, the “bad guys” won when the judge excluded the smoking gun from trial, introducing Americans to some of the costs to the criminal justice system in preserving defendants’ rights. As much as society hates seeing a criminal go free, maintaining a defendant’s rights before and during trial is integral to the American justice system. In passing the DNA Database Act of 2010, the North Carolina General Assembly has reduced the costs on law enforcement and prosecutors to obtain a conviction but increased costs to the civil liberties of criminal defendants who have not yet been tried by a jury of their peers. At first blush, one might wonder, “What is wrong with using DNA samples to close cold cases and close fresh ones even faster?” The problem lies in trampling arrested individuals’ civil rights in the footrace to a conviction.

This Recent Development will argue that collecting an arrestee’s DNA under the DNA Database Act of 2010 without a search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches. In Part I, this Recent Development will discuss the passage of the DNA Database Act and the statute itself. Part II will establish that a cheek swab of an arrested individual is a search. Since “[s]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions,” Part III will demonstrate that none of the “well-delineated exceptions,”—including search incident to lawful arrest, inventory search, or plain view—justify the warrantless search. Furthermore, as discussed in Part IV, at least two state courts differ in their treatment of this issue, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ invalidation of a statute analogous to North Carolina’s is instructive on the Fourth Amendment unreasonableness of cheek swabs under such statutes. Finally, Part V will show that the policy reasons advanced by supporters of DNA database laws are not persuasive, and there is a less constitutionally questionable method to achieve many of the same goals.

In a rapidly evolving situation involving a combative detainee outside, the officer’s action in stepping over the threshold of the house here was reasonable. United States v. Coulter, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117232 (W.D. Okla. November 3, 2010)*:

The issue then becomes whether Officer Williams acted illegally when he followed Ms. Silva to the house and, without a warrant, stepped across the threshold. Although a close question, the court concludes that under the facts of this case, he acted reasonably and did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

At the point when the detective entered the house, the officers were unaware of the reasons why defendant had reacted negatively to them and their vehicle. They also lacked any information about defendant. However, Detective Williams was familiar with the neighborhood. He stated he had been there many times during the past two years and had another target house just around the corner from defendant’s residence. In just a matter of minutes the officers had been confronted by a combative defendant and a verbally aggressive girlfriend in a neighborhood connected with drug activity. Although Ms. Silva had calmed down somewhat, the officers still had valid safety concerns when she got up and started towards the house despite being told she could not enter unaccompanied. It was not unreasonable for the officers to want to keep her within eyesight until they determined what was going on. Detective Williams stepped in the house only far enough to observe Ms. Silva as she retrieved her license from her purse.

The CI was reliable, and the dog sniff was reasonable. United States v. Maddox, 398 Fed. Appx. 613 (D.C. Cir. 2010) [two paragraph per curiam; no facts].*

This was brought to my attention today: Christopher Soghoian, on slight paranoia from December 2009: 8 Million Reasons for Real Surveillance Oversight:

Executive Summary

Sprint Nextel provided law enforcement agencies with its customers’ (GPS) location information over 8 million times between September 2008 and October 2009. This massive disclosure of sensitive customer information was made possible due to the roll-out by Sprint of a new, special web portal for law enforcement officers.

The evidence documenting this surveillance program comes in the form of an audio recording of Sprint’s Manager of Electronic Surveillance, who described it during a panel discussion at a wiretapping and interception industry conference, held in Washington DC in October of 2009.

It is unclear if Federal law enforcement agencies’ extensive collection of geolocation data should have been disclosed to Congress pursuant to a 1999 law that requires the publication of certain surveillance statistics — since the Department of Justice simply ignores the law, and has not provided the legally mandated reports to Congress since 2004.

Defendant was arrested on an arrest warrant and a search incident included lifting the nearby mattress which revealed evidence. That search incident was valid. United States v. McNish, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31853 (E.D. Pa. March 25, 2011):

The question for this Court is thus whether lifting up the mattress while arresting McNish violated his Fourth Amendment rights. A number of courts have concluded that a search under a nearby mattress conducted pursuant to a valid arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 555 F.3d 962, 967-68 (11th Cir. 2009) (“If there is reason to search the edge of a mattress by touch, there is reason enough to lift it up.”); United States v. Hernandez, 941 F.2d 133, 137-38 (2d Cir. 1991); Watkins v. United States, 564 F.2d 201, 204-05 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Snard, Crim. A. No. 09-212, 2009 WL 3105271, at *8-9 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2009); United States v. Yanez, 490 F. Supp. 2d 765, 776 (S.D. Tex. 2007); United States v. Parker, Crim. A. No. 05-505, 2006 WL 163562, at *4-5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 20, 2006).

The officers had way more (“far in excess of the probable cause threshold”) than probable case for this stop. United States v. Tandy, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32024 (S.D. Ga. March 28, 2011).*

Tolentino v. New York, posted here after cert granted November 15, 2010, and argued March 21st, was dismissed yesterday by SCOTUS as improvidently granted. SCOTUSBlog is here.

To me, this case was a ringer to just limit the exclusionary rule even more.

On DrugWarRant.com by Pete Guither: Caballes v. Illinois continues to destroy the Fourth Amendment, logic, and reason.

Definitely Justice Stevens’s low point on the court.

Orin Kerr on Volokh Conspiracy: Significant Test Case in Seattle on Lawfulness of Ex Ante Search Limitations in Computer Warrants about a February opinion unsealed in Seattle about protocol for computer searches: In The Matter Of The United States Of America’s Application For A Search Warrant To Seize And Search Electronic Devices From Edward Cunnius applying the Ninth Circuit’s Comprehensive Drug Testing case:

It didn’t take long, it seems. Recently, Magistrate Judge James Donohue in Seattle unsealed an opinion he handed down on February 11 denying a warrant application to search the computers of a suspect, Edward Cunnius. I have posted the opinion here: In The Matter Of The United States Of America’s Application For A Search Warrant To Seize And Search Electronic Devices From Edward Cunnius. Judge Donohue agreed that the government had established probable cause to search Cunnius’s computers for evidence of his selling counterfeit Microsoft software on Craigslist. Although the opinion isn’t particularly clear on this, he doesn’t appear to argue that the warrant fails the particularity requirement. However, Judge Donohue denied the warrant application because the government refused to go along with two restrictions from Judge Kozinski’s concurrence in CDT. First, Judge Donohue wanted the government to promise it would not rely on the Fourth Amendment’s “plain view” exception to try to bring charges for evidence outside the scope of the warrant. Second, he wanted the government to agree to search the computer using a taint team. The government refused to go along with those requirements, and Judge Donohue indicated he would deny the application on that basis. Prosecutors then asked Judge Donohue to write an opinion explaining the reasons for his denial so the government could appeal the decision to the District Court. The opinion was sealed until Cunnius was indicted, at which time the opinion was made public.

Warrantless arrests of suspected aliens for criminal prosecution require taking the suspected alien before a USMJ for an appearance, but an arrest for deportation doesn’t. United States v. Bernal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30484 (D. Neb. March 23, 2011):

The regulations implementing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) carefully distinguish between warrantless arrests for the purpose of commencing civil deportation proceedings, and warrantless arrests for criminal violations of the immigration laws. Quintana, 623 F.3d at 1240 & n.1 (noting that the regulations require that when a person is “arrested and charged with a criminal violation of the laws of the United States, the arresting officer shall advise the person of the appropriate rights as required by law,” and must take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge or other appropriate judicial officer, whereas “[b]ecause arrests under § 1357(a)(2) for the purpose of deporting an illegal alien result in ‘civil’ or ‘administrative’ removal proceedings, aliens held in that type of custody are not entitled to the protections of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [providing for appearance before a magistrate]”).

The victim of an armed robbery called the police and gave chase. When defendant was located, he was arrested; not because he was in a place where a robber might be, but because he exactly matched the description of the robber, and that was probable cause. United States v. Moulton, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142059 (N.D. Ga. November 22, 2010).*

Even if defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging defendant’s consent to search his cell phone, which he later withdrew and a search warrant was obtained for further search, the error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for lack of prejudice to the accused. McRae v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26743 (W.D. N.C. March 15, 2011).*

Defendant was 23 with a sixth grade education, and he was found to have consented to the search of his house. The atmosphere was not shown to be coercive. United States v. Rodriguez-Garabito, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26644 (N.D. Ill. February 25, 2011).*

Argument preview: Police and changing law on SCOTUSBlog about Monday’s oral argument in Davis v. United States:

The Court hears oral argument Monday on prosecutors’ use of evidence that was legal for police to seize when they did, but later became illegal. The case is another sequel to the Court’s ruling in Arizona v. Gant (2009).

At 10 a.m. Monday, the Supreme Court will hold one hour of oral argument on Davis v. U.S. (09-11328), another test of the scope of the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment. Arguing for Willie Gene Davis of Greenville, Ala., will be Orin S. Kerr, a George Washington University law professor in Washington, D.C. Arguing for the federal government will be Deputy U.S. Solicitor General Michael R. Dreeben.

Defendant’s stop for speeding was valid, and inconsistent statements about ownership of the car justified a six minute detention for a drug dog, which alerted and was probable cause for a search of the car. United States v. Guerrero, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27668 (E.D. Cal. March 17, 2011).*

Police called defendant’s PO with information allegedly received from defendant’s daughter that he had an AK-47 in the house, but it was represented as anonymous information. The PO and his supervisor decided to wait to see if the police obtained more information. Finally, they went to conduct the search. The court finds that it was without reasonable suspicion. United States v. Dono, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27446 (E.D. Pa. March 17, 2011).*

Detailed information from an identified caller that defendant was wearing a military uniform and carrying a gun and playing with the bullets when the caller knew that the defendant was not in the military was sufficient reasonable suspicion for a stop. United States v. Powell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27222 (N.D. W.Va. March 16, 2011), R&R Powell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27182 (N.D. W.Va. February 11, 2011).*

Officer’s violation of a state statute that police departments cannot spend money “for the purpose of detecting or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are persons of foreign citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws” was still not an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment justifying applying the exclusionary rule. The Fourth Amendment issue was unclear, too. Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5341 (9th Cir. March 11, 2011):

Generally, the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation proceedings to evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1050. An exception to this rule exists where the Fourth Amendment violation is egregious. Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1994). Therefore, we must deny the petition for review unless the deputy sheriff violated Petitioners’ Fourth Amendment rights and that violation was egregious.

. . .

Here, even if we assume there was a Fourth Amendment violation, there is no evidence the deputy sheriff deliberately violated the Fourth Amendment. Further, a reasonable officer would not have known he lacked probable cause to detain Petitioners because, as we explain below, the deputy sheriff, unlike the officers in Lopez-Rodriguez, was not acting against an unequivocal doctrinal backdrop. The law was unclear as to whether an alien’s admission to being illegally present in the United States created probable cause to seize the alien for violating federal immigration law. Because of this lack of clarity in the law, there was no egregious Fourth Amendment violation.

. . .

Petitioners also contend the deputy sheriff committed an egregious Fourth Amendment violation when he seized Petitioners because he should have known he lacked authority under Oregon law to detain Petitioners. Oregon prohibits state law enforcement agencies from “us[ing] agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of detecting or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are persons of foreign citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 181.850. But the deputy sheriff’s violation of Oregon law does not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment and, thus, cannot be the basis for finding an egregious Fourth Amendment violation. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 173-74, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008).

Defendant was found to have consented to a search of his car. He was pulled over near an apartment complex, and he was left sitting on a bench with his dog, unrestrained. After paraphernalia was found in the front seat, the officer walked over to defendant and asked him, without Mirandizing him, whether there were any other drugs in the car, and defendant told him. The court concludes that defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when that question was asked. United States v. Hocking, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29168 (W.D. Mo. February 17, 2011):

Although Hocking was not specifically told that he was not under arrest, Trooper Rudstrom did not insinuate that Hocking was under arrest either. Hocking was unrestrained, he was allowed to retrieve his dog from the vehicle, and was sitting on a bench out in the public. Neither officer at the scene was in particularly close proximity to Hocking for the majority of the time that he was on the public bench. Compare United States v. Martin, 369 F.3d 1046, 1057 (8th Cir. 2004) (suspect not in custody because “the atmosphere of the interview was not police-dominated [in that] two agents interviewed [the suspect] in a public place”). Moreover, when asked if there additional contraband in the vehicle, Hocking readily answered and Trooper Rudstrom employed no tricks or strong arm tactics. Finally, Hocking was not immediately arrested after the questioning and was only restrained (i.e., placed in handcuffs) after the weapon was found in the vehicle. Under these facts, the Court does not recommend suppression of Hocking’s statement to Trooper Rudstrom.

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not preserving defendant’s suppression issue for appeal because it was completely unmeritorious for any possible standing in the place searched and where he was just a casual visitor and he denied ownership of anything seized. Drake v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29008 (N.D. W.Va. March 21, 2011).*

An immediate report of child sex abuse where a CPS officer actually saw the injury and the crying child was sufficient exigency for entry into the mother’s home to take other children. There were other factors of the mother not cooperating in refusing to take the children to the hospital and the possible assailant still being nearby. Under Fisher, proof of exigency does not have to be “ironclad.” City of Columbus v. Montgomery, 2011 Ohio 1332, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 1166 (10th Dist. March 22, 2011):

[*P41] The primary issue to be determined here is whether or not the circumstances at issue gave rise to exigent circumstances and/or the need for emergency aid, thus justifying the warrantless entry into appellant’s home. The trial court determined that such exigent circumstances existed and we find no error in that determination.

[*P42] We begin by noting that this determination could arguably be considered a close call. Some of the typical indicia of injury and violence, such as blood or an ongoing fight or ongoing violence, were not readily visible to police upon their approach. However, “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Michigan v. Fisher (2009), ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 546, 549, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410.

[*P43] Here, Officer Brewer was advised by Ms. Williams, who had been with the two young children in the hours prior to the search, that the three-year old girl had gone to the restroom and was crying in pain. Upon checking the young girl’s genital area, Ms. Williams observed severe tears, swelling, and redness and believed someone had penetrated the little girl. The girl’s five-year old brother had alleged he also had been touched inappropriately on his genital area and both children were unable to control their bodily functions. Ms. Williams reported she had contacted the mother of the children, advising her that they needed to take the children to the hospital immediately, telling her that the little girl looked horrible and that the kids needed help and medical treatment. Instead of taking the children to the hospital as one might expect, the mother reportedly picked up the children and took them to the home of the two men who allegedly abused them. Then, when Officer Brewer contacted the mother and asked her to bring the children to the hospital, she again refused.

The search incident of defendant’s cell phone was shown to be with exigent circumstances because the government showed a risk of the phone losing its data before a warrant could be obtained, including remote “wiping” of the phone. United States v. Salgado, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77266 (N.D. Ga. June 15, 2010)* (surveying the case law). [I think that the cases are too deferential of exigence, like Belton, and this situation cries out for real litigation.]

The stop of defendant’s vehicle was an investigative stop for threatening a woman with a gun and a baseball bat. Defendant was likely under the influence, so the stop was with reasonable suspicion. United States v. Camacho, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129373 (D. Neb. June 24, 2009).*

Defendant was a mere trespasser, so he had no standing in a wooden shack he was staying in. The facts were in dispute. “Defendant has not established that his subjective expectation of privacy in the wooden structure and its curtilage is one ‘that society recognizes as legitimate.’” United States v. Murray, 53 V.I. 831, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77954 (D. V.I. August 2, 2010).*

Defendant’s probation and parole search was justified by complaints from the neighbors that he was drug dealing from his house. United States v. Strike, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78127 (D. Mont. August 2, 2010).*

Defendant argued that if his frisk was justified, it should stop with finding the gun. However, on these facts, the finding of a gun ripened to probable cause so the continued search was valid. Blyden v. People, 53 V.I. 637, 2010 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 25 (July 7, 2010):

After reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by Dowdye’s seizure of the additional items because probable cause arose to arrest Blyden at the time Dowdye recovered the firearm during the lawful Terry stop. “Probable cause exists where facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been … committed by the person to be arrested.” United States v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990). As we have concluded above, it was reasonable for Dowdye to conclude that Blyden had just committed a crime involving gunfire in light of his presence in the vicinity of the crime very soon after the shooting as well as his overall physical appearance. With this knowledge, the recovery of a firearm from Blyden, a person suspected of having recently committed a shooting, ripened Dowdye’s reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Blyden into probable cause to arrest him as a suspect in the shooting. [citing cases]

The issuing magistrate had a factual basis for issuing the search warrant for child pornography on defendant’s computer and cameras in his room involving his grandchildren. Eubanks v. State, 326 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. App. — Houston (1st Dist.) 2010).*