CA7: Defendant who was asked three times to produce guns under a court order, who asked questions about what was going on and was ignored, did not validly consent

Defendant was presented with an arrest warrant for guns and a state court order to produce all firearms in his possession as a condition of bond which he declined to answer. After three tries, without answering any of the questions about what was going on, defendant provided the guns and talked, and this could not be shown by the government to be voluntary by the preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, his statements at the same time were not voluntary either. United States v. Swanson, 635 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2011).*

Twenty-five people walking on a road near a beach in the Virgin Islands soaking wet and carrying bags was reasonable suspicion they entered the country illegally. The VIPD acted as expeditiously as possible in the detention and calling INS officers to the scene. United States v. Cherubin, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21897, 53 V.I. 783 (D. V.I. March 8, 2010).*

Merely asking questions of a passenger in a car after detention of the driver does not imply wrongdoing or an additional detention of the passenger. The passenger validly consented. State v. Jones, 241 Ore. App. 597, 250 P.3d 452 (2011)*:

Defendant argues that, by virtue of asking him if he had drugs or weapons, Jensen was implicitly accusing defendant of criminal activity. However, without a “show of authority that restrict[ed] [defendant’s] freedom of movement,” “the content of [Jensen’s] question[ ] did not cause defendant to be seized.” Ashbaugh, 349 Or at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). There is no such “show of authority,” as the Supreme Court has implicitly construed that term in Ashbaugh, on this record. Jensen was the sole officer talking to defendant; Berne was still in his patrol car preparing the driver’s citation, and a third officer was standing some distance away with the driver. There were no weapons drawn, and Jensen testified that he spoke with defendant in the same tone he used when answering counsels’ questions at the motion hearing. We conclude that, under Ashbaugh, Jensen did not “intentionally and significantly” interfere with defendant’s liberty or freedom of movement and, also under that case, we must conclude that a reasonable person in defendant’s situation would not have believed Jensen had done so.