Taking a buccal swab for evidence in a rape case was a search. The court had held in 1980 that a penile swab was a search. Garcia-Torres v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1229 (Ind. 2011).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not raising defendant’s consent in a suppression motion because he clearly consented. State v. Burt, 2011 Iowa App. LEXIS 478 (June 29, 2011).*

The warrant for defendant’s car was not an anticipatory warrant, and probable cause existed. State v. Shaw, 2011 Ohio 3331, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2804 (2d Dist. July 1, 2011).*

Defendant was arrested on his porch, and a protective sweep for weapons was conducted inside. The protective sweep was not unreasonable because it was based on articulable facts that another person was present and potentially armed. United States v. White, 767 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D. S.C. 2010), Decision reached on appeal by United States v. White, 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15780 (4th Cir. S.C., July 29, 2011):

The circumstances warranted a reasonable fear that an individual with a firearm may still be lurking in the home: it had been reported to the officers that a gun was involved in the domestic disturbance occurring at the residence, the victim indicated she was not complying with Officer Church’s commands to come off of the porch because she was being held at gunpoint by someone inside the mobile home, and the gun remained unaccounted for after the officers detained Defendant outside of the residence. Based on these facts, the officers reasonably believed a firearm was still in the house and that it could have been in possession of another person. Therefore, their warrantless entry into Defendant’s home did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights.

Police entry into a church to investigate a claim of excessive noise from nighttime music was into a public place where there was no reasonable expectation of privacy. Faith Baptist Church v. Waterford Twp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18226 (E.D. Mich. March 2, 2010).*

Plaintiff was stopped for a traffic offense and refused to provide any identifying information because it would “number” him. He claimed sovereign immunity against the police. His arrest for lack of DL and insurance information was with probable cause and qualified immunity as was the limited search for papers in the car incident to the arrest. Unger v. Taylor, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4349 (5th Cir. March 2, 2010) (unpublished).*

Defendant’s quasi-public strip search in broad daylight in public was not unreasonable because it was supported by exigent circumstances. While other cases did find such a search unreasonable, this one wasn’t. “We must now weigh the scope, manner, and location of the search against the last Bell [v. Wolfish] factor—justification for the search. We hold that, in this case, the exigency of the search outweighed any intrusion on appellant’s privacy. In fact, the urgency of the search in this case was much greater than that in Paulino and Allen.” Turkes v. State, 199 Md. App. 96, 20 A.3d 173 (2011).

Motion to reconsider affirmance of denial of motion to suppress was denied because nothing was offered to show that the prior opinion was in error, so it was law of the case. State v. Caulfield, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 652 (La. App. 5th Cir. May 24, 2011).*

The search warrant’s identification of records of two persons “or others” did not make the warrant overbroad because “or others” could be severed from the warrant if necessary. United States v. Rios, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 10659 (9th Cir. May 24, 2011) (unpublished)* (Since this is a memorandum opinion, we can’t tell if this phrase is essentially irrelevant to the search anyway; if nothing outside the scope of the warrant was seized, where’s the beef?)

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not using the DVD of the traffic stop to show the length of the stop was unreasonable. Going to the merits of the issue, it wasn’t unreasonable, so defense counsel couldn’t be ineffective. State v. Bush, 2011 Iowa App. LEXIS 334 (May 25, 2011).*

Defendant was arrested for sex trafficking with minors. His cell phone was seized incident to his arrest from his car. The search of the cell phone could not be sustained under inventory, the automobile exception, exigent circumstances, or plain view. Granted, warrantless searches have been sustained in cases involving drug crimes, but this isn’t. United States v. Davis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38319 (D. Ore. April 7, 2011).

The video of the dog sniff supported the officer’s testimony that the dog alerted. Defendant’s expert said that it didn’t. The video does not contradict the claim that there were “handler cues.” United States v. Olivares-Rodriguez, 415 Fed. Appx. 734 (8th Cir. 2011) (unpublished), affg 729 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (N.D. Iowa 2010).*

The CI was corroborated. His information about seeing a gun in defendant’s house “within the last month” was not stale because guns are kept and not quickly transferred or used up. United States v. Donald, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38255 (E.D. Ky. April 6, 2011).*

Omitting critical information about the informant undermined the claimed probable cause, and the only reasonable inference was that it was to mislead the USMJ issuing the search warrant. And, the good faith exception did not apply. United States v. Simmons, 771 F. Supp. 2d 908 (N.D. Ill. 2011):

In this case, while there is no direct evidence of Officer Murphy’s intent to mislead the issuing judge, the inferential evidence leads to the conclusion that the omissions were material because Officer Murphy had “obvious reasons” for omitting the information, and the information was “critical” to the probable cause determination. As an initial matter, Officer Murphy was clearly aware that the CI was recently arrested, had an extensive criminal history, and was untested as an informant. During the evidentiary hearing, he testified that he ran the CI’s criminal record and saw the CI’s criminal history, any gang affiliations, and that the CI had used aliases in the past. He also had never previously worked with the CI, and had no indications that the CI had provided reliable information in the past. However, the Court concludes that Officer Murphy omitted any reference to any of these facts because of their potentially adverse impact on the issuing judge’s probable cause determination. While the omission of these facts would not be “critical” in a case in which there was other evidence to support probable cause, in this case, given the weak police corroboration of the CI’s statement and the absence of any other indicia of reliability of the CI and his statement, the omission of these facts was material.

The Court easily concludes that Officer Murphy had “obvious reasons” to omit the adverse facts. The reliability and credibility of information in a warrant application are essential to a judge’s probable cause determination, and the omitted facts strongly detract from the reliability of the CI—the sole source of the inculpatory information in the complaint. It is well-established that a newly-arrested informant “merits a greater dose of skepticism when assessing his credibility.” United States v. Olson, 408 F.3d 366, 370 (7th Cir. 2005). …

Importantly, the lack of other indicia of reliability in this case makes these facts particularly “critical” to the probable cause determination. …

Here, with the inclusion of the omitted information, the totality of the circumstances establishes that there is not sufficient evidence to find that probable cause supported the warrant. First, the post-arrest context in which the CI provided his statement, his criminal history that raises significant doubts about his credibility, and the sparsely-detailed statement he provided to the officers indicate that the CI’s statement was not “worthy of credence.” Second, the officers here took only minimal steps to corroborate the innocent details of the CI’s statement. Finally, while the live testimony of a confidential informant before the issuing judge may sometimes cure these insufficient indicators of reliability, in this case, the issuing judge was not apprised of key facts pertaining to the CI, and thus was unable to adequately gauge his credibility. The Court discusses each of these factors in turn, beginning with the CI’s statement.

A game and fish officer’s stop of a car leaving a pier was valid as an administrative search. Defendant was observed line fishing from the pier catching a spiny lobster and putting it in a black bag. He was stopped after he started driving away near the pier. The stop was reasonable, including the special needs of the game and fish laws. He was issued a citation. People v. Maikhio, 51 Cal. 4th 1074, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 74 (2011) (revg People v. Maikhio, 180 Cal. App. 4th 1178 (4th Dept. 2010) posted here):

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the Court of Appeal erred in determining that, under the applicable California statutes and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a game warden may make such a vehicle stop only if the warden is aware of facts that give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the angler or hunter has violated a fish and game statute or regulation. As we shall explain, California authority has interpreted the relevant statute as authorizing a stop of a vehicle occupied by an angler or hunter for such purposes, and the United States Supreme Court has held in a number of decisions that an administrative search or seizure may be conducted, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, in the absence of reasonable suspicion that a violation of a statute or administrative regulation has occurred. Such administrative searches and seizures are permissible when (1) the governmental action serves a special and important state need and interest distinct from the state’s ordinary interest in enforcing the criminal law, (2) the administrative rules or regulations that are required to achieve the state’s interest are of such a nature that limiting inspection only to those persons reasonably suspected of committing a violation would seriously undermine the state’s ability to meet its special need, and (3) the impingement upon the reasonable expectation of privacy of those subjected to the procedure is sufficiently limited such that the state’s need to utilize the procedure outweighs the invasion which the search entails, thus rendering the procedure reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

Applying these principles in the present context, we conclude that (1) the state’s interest in protecting and preserving the wildlife of this state for the benefit of current and future generations of California residents and visitors constitutes a special and important state interest and need that is distinct from the state’s ordinary interest in crime control, (2) the administrative regulations that are required to serve this interest — involving, for example, limits on the number, size, and species of fish or game that may be taken at different times and in different locations — are of such a nature that they would be impossible to adequately enforce if a game warden could stop, and could demand to be shown all fish or game that have been caught by, only those anglers and hunters who the warden reasonably suspected had violated the fish and game laws, and (3) the impingement upon privacy engendered by such a stop and demand procedure is minimal because (i) the stops are limited to those persons who have voluntarily chosen to engage in the heavily regulated activity of fishing or hunting and as a consequence have a diminished reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to items directly related to such activity, and (ii) the required demands are limited to items directly related to fishing and hunting and do not require disclosure of intimate or confidential matters as to which such persons retain a substantial privacy interest.

Even if we assume that a game warden’s stop of a car in which an angler or hunter is riding entails a greater intrusion on privacy than a stop of an angler or hunter who is on foot, we conclude that when, as in this case, the vehicle stop is made reasonably close in time and location to the fishing or hunting activity, the encroachment upon an angler’s or hunter’s reasonable expectation of privacy resulting from a brief vehicle stop and demand is nonetheless rather modest, and no more intrusive than other actions by game wardens that have been upheld in past California cases.

A mature teenager [13] had apparent authority to consent to an entry into the house, but not likely a search. On the facts of this case, this teenager had apparent authority for the entry. Limon v. State, 340 S.W.3d 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (dissent), revg Limon v. State, 314 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2010) (posted here):

Similarly, we need not consider a per se rule that children may, or may not, give consent to entry. Under given circumstances, and taking into account “widely shared social expectations” and “commonly held understanding,” it may be reasonable or unreasonable to believe that a child has authority to consent to a particular intrusion. As the Supreme Court stated in Randolph, “‘a child of eight might well be considered to have the power to consent to the police crossing the threshold into that part of the house where any caller, such as a pollster or salesman, might well be admitted,’ but no one would reasonably expect such a child to be in a position to authorize anyone to rummage through his parents’ bedroom.” Based on the Supreme Court’s example in Randolph, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a minor child from consenting to entry when the record shows the officer’s belief in the child’s authority to consent is reasonable under the facts known to the officer.

Under the circumstances of the present case, we find five key facts supporting the reasonableness of Perez’s belief. First, A.S. opened the door by himself in response to Perez’s knock. The trial court could have believed that his act suggests a greater level of authority to permit entry than, for example, if he had answered “What do you want?” from behind the door, or if he had answered the door with an adult in view behind him. Second, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to its ruling, the trial court reasonably could have inferred from Perez’s testimony that A.S. appeared to be at least a teenager of significant maturity, if not a young adult.

Third, A.S. consented to mere entry through the front door, as opposed to entry or search of less public areas of the house. The trial court could have believed that it was reasonable to rely on a teenager’s authority to consent to such a limited scope of entry, while it would not have been reasonable to rely on his authority to consent to a more intrusive search.

Fourth, the officer’s announced purpose was to conduct an emergency public-safety function. We think it an even more widely shared social expectation that a teenager would have authority to permit entry for an emergency public-safety function than, for example, entry for a salesperson to make a sales pitch.

A search warrant to Microsoft for all records on a hotmail account was not overbroad or unreasonable. The government needed to sort through it. United States v. Bickle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94921 (D. Nev. June 21, 2011):

Particularity is not the problem with the warrant in this case. The warrant called for Microsoft to disclose all records and information in Microsoft’s possession associated with polarbickle@hotmail.com. It is not ambiguous concerning what was sought. Rather, the question is whether the warrant is overbroad in authorizing Microsoft to disclose all account information and content while temporally and subject matter limiting what the government was authorized to seize. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement is to make general searches impossible and prevent “exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” See United States v. Rodriguez, 869 F.2d 479, 486 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 49 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1976)). The need to prevent general exploratory rummaging of a person’s belongings is particularly acute in document searches because, unlike requests for other tangibles, document searches tend to involve broad disclosures of the intimacies of private lives, thoughts, and transactions. United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1468 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, the Ninth Circuit has often recognized a legitimate law enforcement need to scoop up large quantities of data and sift through it carefully for concealed or disguised pieces of evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2006).

When officers were executing a search warrant at a gambling hall, defendant was avoiding the officers, and it was reasonable to handcuff him and put him on the ground for officer safety. A gun and drugs were found. United States v. Campbell, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17958 (6th Cir. August 26, 2011) (unpublished).*

The officer’s testimony was ambiguous and not inconsistent, and defendant does not satisfy his burden of showing that the testimony was clearly erroneous. United States v. Rhodes, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 17957 (6th Cir. August 26, 2011) (unpublished).*

An adult theater stated a Fourth Amendment claim for city destruction of its marque, not a substantive due process claim. Cinema Art Theater v. City of Troy, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95992 (N.D. N.Y. August 26, 2011).*

Defendant’s second motion to suppress was no different than the first, so it would not be reheard in the interest of judicial economy. United States v. Kemp, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95930 (S.D. Fla. March 30, 2011).*

“I find that Mercado’s statement ‘You can check it if you want,’ constituted an express invitation to police to search the entire vehicle, including its trunk. However, Mercado argues that his consent to the search was involuntary because he was not informed that he had a right to refuse consent, and he provided consent only when surrounded by ‘significant police presence including [a] police dog.’” There is no right to know one can refuse, and the dog apparently wasn’t there at the time. Nevertheless, under First Circuit authority, consent in the face of a police dog isn’t coerced per se. United States v. Mercado, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262 (D. Mass. August 30, 2011).*

A motion to reconsider can be entertained in criminal cases, but this one was just a rehash of the first argument and was denied. United States v. Murry, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96934 (E.D. Wash. August 29, 2011).*

The officer stopped defendant’s vehicle for lack of license plates and no working lights. After running defendant’s DL, he told him he was free to go but the car was being impounded. “Regardless of defendant’s concern regarding leaving his vehicle unattended, there appears to be no dispute that he was told he was free to leave, and chose not to do so. The evidence at this point was that Officer Hilburn was suspicious about the condition of the vehicle, given that it was full of debris and did not look as though it had just been purchased. It was also his testimony that he had observed the vehicle leaving a residence where drug transactions were known to occur.” Then the officer noticed that the passenger seemed to be under the influence of drugs. The call for the drug dog was reasonable. United States v. Stringer, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97195 (W.D. Mo. July 20, 2011), adopted 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97162 (W.D. Mo. August 30, 2011).*

Consent to enter after a knock-and-talk in Spanish was granted, but the search was found not by consent. It was not disputed that backup was called to the house via dispatch 17 minutes before the consent to search was signed. United States v. Cruz-Mejia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100947 (D. Ariz. July 5, 2011)*:

The transcript then reflects several time entries related to each communication with dispatch. On page 5, the transcript reflects a time entry of “13:43,” or 1:43 p.m., followed by a request for “a third unit” at Cruz-Mejia’s address. (Id. at 5.) Thus, based on the testimony of Sergeant Esquivel and Officer Pina, when that call for back-up was made, the search was about to begin, was ongoing, or had been completed. However, the communication occurred 17 minutes prior to 2:00 p.m., the time when Mexley Martinez signed the consent form. This timeline was not rebutted in any way by the Government and is entirely consistent with Martinez’s claim that she signed the consent form only because the officers had already conducted the search and found all the weapons and she thought, “why not sign it.” (TR2 92-93.) Thus, the search was performed without consent.

Officers were on the lookout for a Crown Victoria with a particularly LPN suspected of selling drugs at an apartment complex. When the vehicle showed up again a citizen informant called the police to tell them that it was back, and that was reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop within five minutes of the call in the apartment complex. The citizen informant’s tip was entitled to more credibility. United States v. Cornielius, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100884 (E.D. Tenn. July 26, 2011).*

The child pornography search warrant in this case was not stale just because the information was about six months old since child pornography is likely to be kept. There is no bright-line rule with child pornography. United States v. Muñoz, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100836 (D. Minn. July 5, 2011).*

Police came to defendant’s house at 1 a.m. and beat on the door. When he answered, guns were drawn and he was patted down. On the totality, the court finds a nighttime consent less likely to be consensual and more like coercive. United States v. Morrow, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84522 (N.D. Ohio August 2, 2011):

Having carefully considered the totality of the circumstances under which Defendant allegedly consented to the entry of the police, the Court finds that the consent, if given, was not voluntary. The Government has failed to successfully carry its burden that Defendant’s alleged consent was “unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.” United States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d at 402. Defendant was alerted to the presence of the police by banging at the front and then the back doors of his home at shortly after 1:00 a.m. Whether he opened the door or just unlocked it is not dispositive. Officer Donohue’s testimony, however, that several officers entered with their guns drawn and he proceeded to pat down Defendant is quite compelling. Such a nighttime or early morning entry coupled with the show of force evident from the record and testimony that Defendant was not free to go nor, realistically, free to make the police leave his residence are factors more likely to lead to a coerced rather than voluntary consent. Considered together, the evidence presented does not provide the Court confidence that Defendant voluntarily consented to the initial entry of the police.

The officer was well aware of the defendant and that he had been driving on a suspended license since 2003. When he saw the defendant driving, the stop was justified. State v. Patrick, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 590 (July 28, 2011).*

Defendant’s DNA was taken by search warrant and it linked him to a murder. He never challenged the search warrant for the DNA and the search warrant is not in the record. Therefore, the argument is moot. State v. Ogbeiwi, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 586 (July 29, 2011).*

On the totality, the government showed that the consent was valid. Defendant was de facto arrested and moved from the place of the traffic stop to the residence where the search would occur, and he was told that he could consent or a search warrant could be obtained. Defendant also believed that nothing would be found because he told a confederate to get rid of the counterfeit money they were making. United States v. Carney, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85985 (M.D. La. August 4, 2011).*

Defendant’s search warrant and arrest away from the premises were based on a CI’s observations that he was in possession of a gun within the previous seven days. Since he was a felon, his stop and search away from the premises was based on probable cause from the reliable CI. It could not be justified by the warrant since he was not on the premises at that time. United States v. Griffin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85414 (E.D. Wis. August 2, 2011)* R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87800 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 2011)* [The CI may give PC to arrest, but what about conviction? Here, the police had the SW being executed at the house, and that likely would provide evidence for prosecution. A search incident under Gant might be problematic. Without the SW being executed at the time, the police might not have a prosecutable case.]

Defendants’ consent after a late morning knock and talk was valid and virtually spontaneous after being advised of the right to refuse consent. The officers entered through a gate by following another vehicle in, violating curtilage, but that did not void the consent. United States v. Victores, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86742 (S.D. Fla. August 5, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86538 (S.D. Fla. February 10, 2011).*

Defendant’s stop was valid for two traffic offenses, and the officer also had reasonable suspicion from earlier seeing him carry a gun to the car arguably in violation of state law. United States v. Gonzales, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85178 (W.D. Okla. August 2, 2011).*

A pharmacy had a contract with an Indian tribe and operated on tribal lands. An investigation was opened for selling some drugs without a proper prescription, and its dumpster was searched. A search warrant for patient records was obtained, and the court found that the pharmacy lacked an expectation of privacy in the records. With no standing, the Franks claim was moot and did not have to be decided, citing United States v. Mastromatteo, 538 F.3d 535, 544 (6th Cir. 2008). United States v. Williams, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104295 (W.D. Okla. September 14, 2011).*

Defendant could be arrested for no driver’s license under Missouri law. His admission that there was a meth pipe in the car was probable cause to search it under the automobile exception. United States v. Brown, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104187 (W.D. Mo. August 24, 2011).*

“[P]etitioner has not demonstrated that [defense counsel] failed to file a meritorious claim. Any motion to suppress evidence based upon a lack of probable cause would have been frivolous.” Mitchell v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104027 (W.D. Wash. August 3, 2011).*

Defendant consented to an entry for ICE officers to look for her illegal alien husband. They saw ammunition and asked about guns, and she showed them the guns in a gun cabinet owned by her husband she had access to. She was arrested for admitting to buying guns for him and aiding his possession which she said she did not know was against the law[; thereby implying voluntariness because she didn’t think she did anything wrong]. United States v. Valencia, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104766 (W.D. Ark. August 22, 2011).*

Defendant’s stop was justified by following too close, which the officer suspected was a tandem drug run. Once the car was stopped, reasonable suspicion developed from extreme nervousness, a rented car, the appearance of stuff in the car indicating “hard travel” that they were driving long distances without stopping, inconsistent stories, and signs of tampering with the cowl as a place to hide drugs. Then there came consent. Motion to suppress denied. United States v. Bryant, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104507 (N.D. Tex. September 9, 2011).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not forecasting Gant which came later, but that is moot anyway because of Davis v. United States finding pre-Gant searches valid. Jeter v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104943 (D. S.C. September 15, 2011).*

Fla. state legislator introduces repeal of mandatory drug tests for welfare recipients by Ashley Lopez in the Florida Independent:

State Sen. Arthenia Joyner, D-Tampa, has filed legislation repealing a new law requiring all welfare applicants to first pass a drug test.

Joyner filed Senate Bill 284 shortly after a lawsuit was filed by a Navy veteran who refused to waive his Fourth Amendment rights and submit to a drug test before receiving temporary assistance benefits he was otherwise qualified for. The American Civil Liberties is representing 35-year-old Orlando resident Luis Lebron — who is also a full-time student and single father.

Gov. Rick Scott, a proponent of the law, has said that the law was passed for “for the benefit of children.”

Officers investigated a bad car wreck, and the driver was not there. There was blood in the car. Officers went to his house and saw blood on the doorknob and a key in the lock. Their entry to check on the defendant whom they found in bed bleeding was reasonable to see if the accident victim needed medical care. State v. Wilson, 2011 Ohio 4651, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 3833 (5th Dist. September 13, 2011).

CI’s tip here was adequately corroborated to show probable cause. State v. McClain, 2011 Ohio 4690, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 3883 (6th Dist. September 16, 2011).*

The officer stopped the car for no headlights, and there were five people in the car. One had a warrant. The officer was justified in asking for a patdown, and defendant consented to it in any event. State v. Covert, 2011 Ohio 4713, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 3905 (3d Dist. September 19, 2011).*

The officer was working overtime at an apartment complex and he encountered defendant, and defendant consented to a patdown which revealed drugs. State v. Springer, 2011 Ohio 4724, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 3913 (2d Dist. September 16, 2011).*

What goes around, comes around: A police officer under investigation for stealing firearms from detained persons validly consented to a search of his house that produced such a gun. As far as voluntariness is concerned: “The Court notes that Defendant was well-educated and was a trained law enforcement officer.” United States v. Callahan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109580 (N.D. Ga. September 26, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114569 (N.D. Ga. July 25, 2011).

While the search warrant and application were not in the parties’ submissions, they are in the court’s files and subject to judicial notice. The warrant here was with probable cause, and it was not unparticular: a street address of the place to be searched is enough. United States v. Gonzales, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109953 (N.D. Ind. September 26, 2011):

An accurate street address is by itself sufficient to allow a reasonable person to “ascertain and identify the place intended.” Here, the warrant included a physical description of the dwelling in addition to an accurate street address. The Defendant has not offered any explanation why this was not sufficient, made a claim that this description does not accurately describe the house to be searched, or suggested that there was a risk that officers executing the warrant would search some other house.

While the advance notice of the checkpoint did not comply with Tennessee Department of Safety General Order 410-1, that single shortcoming did not necessarily render the checkpoint an unconstitutional seizure under Tenn. Const. art. I, § 7. The trial court erred by not considering all relevant factors in determining the overall reasonableness of the checkpoint and whether the checkpoint was conducted in accordance with the mandatory requirements of state case law. State v. Vires, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 738 (September 26, 2011).*

During an administrative liquor control search, no justification was needed to search the open areas. However, reasonable suspicion was required to enter a safe under the administrative search exception. Gina, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm’n, 2011 Ohio 4927, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4045 (10th Dist. September 27, 2011).

A report from mall security about a probable theft from a store identifying the car involved was reasonable suspicion for a stop when the car was seen. State v. Moore, 2011 Ohio 4908, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4040 (12th Dist. September 26, 2011).*