TX: Mature teenager [13] had apparent authority for at least an entry

A mature teenager [13] had apparent authority to consent to an entry into the house, but not likely a search. On the facts of this case, this teenager had apparent authority for the entry. Limon v. State, 340 S.W.3d 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (dissent), revg Limon v. State, 314 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2010) (posted here):

Similarly, we need not consider a per se rule that children may, or may not, give consent to entry. Under given circumstances, and taking into account “widely shared social expectations” and “commonly held understanding,” it may be reasonable or unreasonable to believe that a child has authority to consent to a particular intrusion. As the Supreme Court stated in Randolph, “‘a child of eight might well be considered to have the power to consent to the police crossing the threshold into that part of the house where any caller, such as a pollster or salesman, might well be admitted,’ but no one would reasonably expect such a child to be in a position to authorize anyone to rummage through his parents’ bedroom.” Based on the Supreme Court’s example in Randolph, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a minor child from consenting to entry when the record shows the officer’s belief in the child’s authority to consent is reasonable under the facts known to the officer.

Under the circumstances of the present case, we find five key facts supporting the reasonableness of Perez’s belief. First, A.S. opened the door by himself in response to Perez’s knock. The trial court could have believed that his act suggests a greater level of authority to permit entry than, for example, if he had answered “What do you want?” from behind the door, or if he had answered the door with an adult in view behind him. Second, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to its ruling, the trial court reasonably could have inferred from Perez’s testimony that A.S. appeared to be at least a teenager of significant maturity, if not a young adult.

Third, A.S. consented to mere entry through the front door, as opposed to entry or search of less public areas of the house. The trial court could have believed that it was reasonable to rely on a teenager’s authority to consent to such a limited scope of entry, while it would not have been reasonable to rely on his authority to consent to a more intrusive search.

Fourth, the officer’s announced purpose was to conduct an emergency public-safety function. We think it an even more widely shared social expectation that a teenager would have authority to permit entry for an emergency public-safety function than, for example, entry for a salesperson to make a sales pitch.