In a Medi-Cal investigation of a doctor for false billing for cheaper IUDs, investigators went to his waiting room and requested that he provide documentation within ten days as required by state law. The doctor mailed the invoices. The visit to the waiting room was not an illegal search. People v. Guzman, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66 (2d Dist. 2011):

At the preliminary hearing, appellant made a section 1538.5 motion to suppress the invoices as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. Appellant’s counsel conceded that the investigators’ entry into the waiting room did not violate the Fourth Amendment “because … the waiting room area … is open to the public.” Counsel was correct. (See People v. Pham (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1531, 1533 [235 Cal. Rptr. 99].) Counsel argued that the Fourth Amendment violation occurred when, without advance notice, the investigators requested the invoices: “I think any of us can go into a doctor[‘]s waiting room cause it’s almost like a public area. But when you go in unannounced and then you say give me documents, that exceeds the 4th amendment.”

. . .

Even were we to assume that the unannounced visit to appellant’s office was unlawful, the invoices would not be subject to suppression as the fruit of an unreasonable search and seizure. The remedy of suppression is permissible only when compelled by the Fourth Amendment. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 888–889 [210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].) There is no authority supporting the proposition that an otherwise lawful request for records at a doctor’s office violates the Fourth Amendment merely because of noncompliance with a statutory notice requirement. Even if such an authority existed, we agree with the magistrate’s analysis. Suppression of evidence is not required because the investigators did not demand the immediate production of the records. Instead, they gave appellant seven days to produce the invoices. By so deferring the production of the documents, the investigators substantially complied with the notice requirement. They did not disrupt the operation of appellant’s medical practice.

Officer’s stall in handing over traffic ticket to allow the drug dog to get there made the stop unreasonable. Menne v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 806, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 865 (December 8, 2010)* [but reversed Menne v. State, 2012 Ark. 37, 2012 Ark. LEXIS 57 (February 2, 2012) posted here]:

The issue before us is whether the traffic stop was complete when Trooper Roark obtained consent from Menne. Based on Sims and Ayala, we hold that it was. The legitimate purpose of the traffic stop ended after nine-and-a-half minutes, when Trooper Roark had received, verified, and returned all of Menne’s documentation. The trooper specifically testified that he had completed his speeding investigation, and he had written the warning ticket. We acknowledge that Trooper Roark had not yet given the ticket to Menne to sign. However, relying upon our holdings in Sims and Ayala along with the trooper’s testimony that his investigation was complete, that fact does not alter our conclusion. Nine-and-a-half minutes after stopping Menne, the legitimate purpose of the stop was complete. The trooper’s failure to hand over the warning ticket to Menne at that time was nothing more than a stalling tactic to allow time for the drug dog’s arrival. Therefore, the trial court erred when it denied Menne’s motion to suppress. Menne’s detention beyond the completion of the traffic stop was illegal, and any subsequent consent given by Menne was invalid.

On the state’s petition for review, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding that the record supports the trial court’s finding of reasonable suspicion to continue the stop. Also, defendant was advised of a right to refuse consent, although it was not legally required.

The Oregonian: Eugene verdict clarifies legal protections for protesters who turn video cameras on police by Bryan Denson:

Camcorders, smart phones and live-streaming gizmos bob atop seas of demonstrators these days in Oregon, often capturing hostilities between police and demonstrators from various angles.

State law permits protesters to record police in public places. But courts have made few rulings on what officers can do with the recording devices they seize from people during arrests.

The rules of engagement became clearer in Eugene’s U.S. District Court last week, when a civil jury determined that a city police sergeant violated an environmental activist’s constitutional protections against illegal search and seizure during a 2009 leafletting campaign outside a bank.

[Note: This is so obvious, there is no qualified immunity. It isn’t even close.]

Defendant was accused of hunting baited bears on his own land, and the land was clearly open fields under Oliver. State v. Ballance, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 60 (January 17, 2012).*

When defendant was paroled, he agreed to be searched without cause. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006). Even if reasonable suspicion was necessary, the officers had it. United States v. Wade, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11561 (N.D. Ga. January 4, 2012).*

Under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, there was probable cause to believe defendant’s vehicle was used in the commission of a drug crime so the vehicle was “contraband,” and that justified its impoundment. United States v. Allen, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152604 (M.D. Ga. December 5, 2011).*

Kentucky v. King was decided while defendant’s case was pending, but he only argued the Fourth Amendment, not the state constitution. He loses his issue of police created exigency, but he gets a remand for other reasons, so he can raise the state constitution on remand. Commonwealth v. Gentle, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 243, 952 N.E.2d 426 (2011).*

The state’s testimony that defendant’s DNA was obtained by search warrant was not an inference that the defendant did not consent where two other suspects did consent. Even if it were potential error, it was harmless here. State v. Hill, 801 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. 2011).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not moving to suppress a recorded conversation in the back of a police cruiser since it would have been baseless. Jarnigan v. State, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 662 (August 24, 2011).*

While the police had probable cause to believe that a person was involved in a New Jersey homicide, they did not have probable cause for an entry into the bedroom of the house they entered. There was information that people were there, but not specifically the defendants. A cell phone ping put a particular phone at that address at the time, too, but unless it was shown to be “real time,” it wasn’t timely information. State v. Kendrick, 132 Conn. App. 473, 31 A.3d 1189 (2011):

After reviewing the record, we conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of entry into the bedroom, a reasonable, well-trained police officer would not have had reasonable grounds to believe that Singer was in the bedroom, or that the occupants of the bedroom would flee, destroy evidence, or, in the time necessary to procure a warrant, endanger the safety of others.

. . .

Here, in contrast, the police were not relying on either their own or an eyewitness’ affirmative identification of Singer. The lights in the bedroom were off, the door to the bedroom was slightly ajar and there is no indication in the record that the police could see the occupants of the bedroom. Rather, the trial court’s limited findings, the testimony at the suppression hearing and the state’s position at oral argument reveal the following factors in support of the belief by the police that Singer was present in the bedroom at the time of the warrantless entry: (1) the cellular telephone ping information, (2) the general description given by the landlord and (3) Blanca Valvo’s statement that two African-American males were present in the apartment. Under the totality of the circumstances known to the police at the time of their entry into the bedroom, including but not limited to the absence of any specific identification by the landlord or Blanca Valvo of a light-skinned African-American male with tear drop tattoos on his face as one of the persons present in the apartment or the bedroom, we conclude that it was unreasonable for the police to assume that Singer was present in the apartment or the bedroom and posing an imminent threat of harm to its occupants. Accordingly, it was improper for the court to conclude that an exigency justified the warrantless entry.

Thus, although it may be clear that the police had probable cause to believe that Singer had committed the New Jersey homicide, that he was armed and that he posed a continuing threat to others, there is no evidence in the record that persuades us that the police had a reasonable basis to believe that an immediate warrantless entry of the bedroom was necessary. Rather, at the time the New Jersey police entered the bedroom, their belief that Singer was armed, present, and posing an immediate danger to their safety and the safety of those in the residence was premised on a string of attenuated speculation without any positive identification of Singer.

Defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended license, and the officer suspected he was in possession of drugs. In a patdown, the officer went over his crotch area and felt something that probably was drugs. The officer unzipped defendant’s pants and found a baggie of drugs sticking through a hole in his underwear. The search incident was valid on the patdown revealing probable drugs. People v. Carter, 2011 IL App (3d) 90238, 354 Ill. Dec. 260, 957 N.E.2d 576 (2011).

Defendant was put on probation for a sex offense in Texas and transferred probation to Ohio, and his probation included a search provision. His probation officer went by the house twice and found the mail box full of mail and no sign of the probationer. So, the PO searched the house finding bullets and that defendant had absconded. The search was legal. State v. Gaona, 2011 Ohio 5214, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4290 (5th Dist. October 7, 2011).*

Result of a P2P search of defendant’s computer could be used in a search warrant, and the search warrant was not stale because there was indication that the child pornography was on the computer for quite sometime. United States v. Suing, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116349 (D. Neb. September 30, 2011).*

Defendant was charged with harassing communications, and his phone records were obtained for the prosecution. This did not violate the Third and Fourth Amendments under Smith v. Maryland. American Fork City v. Smith, 2011 UT App 203, 258 P.3d 634, 685 Utah Adv. Rep. 69 (2011).* [This is the first time I’ve seen the Third Amendment cited in a long time. The defendant was, of course, pro se.]

Police attempted to pull over defendant, but he refused to stop. He finally did and bailed from the car running down an alley with the police on his heels. They finally catch him and he’s got the magazine to a gun. Only then was he seized under Hodari D., and the magazine was found by a valid search incident. United States v. Johnson, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12996 (3d Cir. June 23, 2011) (unpublished).*

Crediting the officers’ testimony, their encounter with the defendant was consensual. They asked to talk to him, and he agreed. United States v. Falls, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67386 (M.D. Tenn. June 22, 2011).*

The district court’s conclusions about how the probation officer was involved in the search was supported by the record, so the search was valid. United States v. Hadnot, 2439 Fed. Appx. 654 (9th Cir. 2011).*

In a juvenile action over the taking of DNA on arrest, only those with a finding of probable cause by a judicial officer that an offense occurred may have DNA taken. Mario W. v. Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389 (Ariz. App. 2011):

P18 Using a buccal swab to procure a DNA sample, like blood drawn for the same purpose, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Maricopa County Juvenile Action Nos. JV-512600 and JV-512797, 187 Ariz. 419, 423, 930 P.2d 496, 500 (App. 1997) (recognizing that “a compelled intrusion[] into the body for blood” is deemed a Fourth Amendment search (quoting Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966)) ); see also State v. Garcia-Salgado, 170 Wn.2d 176, 240 P.3d 153, 157 (Wash. 2010) (finding that a cheek swab, taken for the purposes of collecting DNA, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment). In general, a search is considered unreasonable unless it is accompanied by a judicial warrant issued following a finding of probable cause. JV-512600 and JV-512797, 187 Ariz. at 423, 930 P.2d at 500.

P19 The totality of the circumstances test is used to balance the juveniles’s individual rights against the State’s interest in conducting the DNA search. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 390, 399, 403-04 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying the totality of the circumstances test to balance the government’s rights to conduct a DNA search of an arrestee and pretrial detainee under the federal DNA Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a) (2006)); United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 2006) (utilizing a totality of circumstances analysis and finding the taking of a DNA sample from a convicted felon to be constitutional due to the convicted felon’s “sharply reduced expectation of privacy, and the minimal intrusion required in taking a blood sample for DNA analysis for identification purposes only”); see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846, 848, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250 (2006) (applying the totality of circumstances test and finding a state law that required parolees to agree to be subject to a search or seizure by a parole officer at any time, with or without cause, to be constitutional); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001) (finding a warrantless search of a probationer’s apartment to be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment after examining the totality of circumstances). My colleagues on this panel agree that the totality of the circumstances test is applicable.

P20 We analyze various factors to evaluate the balance of the juveniles’s rights against the governmental interest in this case. Such factors include: whether there was a judicial finding of probable cause that the juvenile committed the charged offense, the level of intrusion in relation to other pre-adjudicative procedures, the degree and nature of physical intrusion required by the test, statutes restricting use of test results, and any evidence in the record regarding improper uses of the results.

. . .

P22 A judicial finding of probable cause serves as a “watershed event” that distinguishes such a defendant from the general public and permits application of the totality of circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In this regard, I agree with the reasoning of the United States Magistrate Judge in United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Cal. 2009): …

Defendant’s efforts to disassociate himself from the house searched started with the premise that the government could not show that he lived there or was sufficiently associated with it to even be arrested. This argument undermines his standing to contest the search. United States v. Square, 790 F. Supp. 2d 626 (N.D. Ohio 2011):

The undersigned is of the opinion that adequate evidence exists to establish Defendant’s residence at 16320 Eldamere. Detective Moran retrieved mail indicating that 16320 Eldamere was Defendant’s mailing address, and Ohio BMV records also indicated that it was his mailing address. Nevertheless, the undersigned acknowledges that firearms and ammunition were found in a locked bedroom and in the ceiling above a sleeping area in the basement. Hr’g Ex. T, Tr. at 23-24, 61. Defendant contested the Government’s assertion that he had control over these areas, and that he was even a resident of 16320 Eldamere. See, e.g., Tr. at 155, 156, 158, discussed supra. Defendant challenges his connection to the residence and his admissions regarding ownership of the firearms in order to demonstrate that police lacked probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 158-59. In so doing, Defendant also necessarily undermines his standing to challenge the seizure of those firearms. The two analyses (lack of probable cause and standing) are conceptually linked in this case since a defendant’s alleged possession of contraband is insufficient to establish standing. U.S. v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980).

Given the record of this case, the Government may not be able to establish that Defendant possessed the firearms and ammunition without also establishing facts that would demonstrate his residence at 16320 Eldamere. Nevertheless, the undersigned will not speculate as to the evidence to be introduced at trial.

Accordingly, the undersigned views this issue as a matter of Defendant’s failure to carry his burden of establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular areas searched. To the extent that Defendant could mount a successful challenge regarding his connection to the searched areas, he would simultaneously disprove standing to challenge those searches. Simply put, Defendant cannot deny residence at 16320 Eldamere, deny a connection to the southwest bedroom, deny a connection to the basement, and still seek protection from the Fourth Amendment.

Do I really need to put a Practice Pointer here?

Dog alert outside a house for the presence of marijuana was reasonable basis to issue a search warrant. United States v. Cole, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54220 (M.D. Fla. April 15, 2011). Note: Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011), posted here, the day before, held that it is not in Florida state court.

Gant came down while defendant’s appeal was pending, and it was not argued. Aside from procedural default, he would lose on the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim under the automobile exception. Ezell v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143023 (W.D. Wash. September 17, 2010).*

The CI’s information was detailed and predictive, and defendant did what the CI predicted, officers finding him within 15 minutes of the call. That also gave information for a frisk because of information about a gun. Aside from that, defendant could have been detained for jaywalking. United States v. Watson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54011 (C.D. Ill. April 6, 2011),* adopted 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54016 (C.D. Ill. May 20, 2011).*

The Florida Supreme Court held today that a dog sniff of the home violates the Fourth Amendment. The court discusses all cases decided to this point from all jurisdictions. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011):

We have for review State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008), in which the district court certified conflict with State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). We have jurisdiction. … We quash the decision in Jardines and approve the result in State v. Rabb.

Police conducted a warrantless “sniff test” by a drug detection dog at Jardines’ home and discovered live marijuana plants inside. The trial court granted Jardines’ motion to suppress the evidence, and the State appealed. The district court reversed, and Jardines sought review in this Court. Jardines claims that the warrantless “sniff test” violated his right against unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment. The issue presented here is twofold: (i) whether a “sniff test” by a drug detection dog conducted at the front door of a private residence is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and, if so, (ii) whether the evidentiary showing of wrongdoing that the government must make prior to conducting such a search is probable cause or reasonable suspicion.

. . .

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the dog “sniff test” that was conducted here was an intrusive procedure. The “sniff test” was a sophisticated undertaking that was the end result of a sustained and coordinated effort by various law enforcement departments. On the scene, the procedure involved multiple police vehicles, multiple law enforcement personnel, including narcotics detectives and other officers, and an experienced dog handler and trained drug detection dog engaged in a vigorous search effort on the front porch of the residence. Tactical law enforcement personnel from various government agencies, both state and federal, were on the scene for surveillance and backup purposes. The entire on-the-scene government activity—i.e., the preparation for the “sniff test,” the test itself, and the aftermath, which culminated in the full-blown search of Jardines’ home—lasted for hours. The “sniff test” apparently took place in plain view of the general public. There was no anonymity for the resident.

Such a public spectacle unfolding in a residential neighborhood will invariably entail a degree of public opprobrium, humiliation and embarrassment for the resident, whether or not he or she is present at the time of the search, for such dramatic government activity in the eyes of many—neighbors, passers-by, and the public at large—will be viewed as an official accusation of crime. Cf. Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (explaining that the dog “sniff test” in that case was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was limited in scope and was anonymous and did not subject the individual to “embarrassment and inconvenience”). And if the resident happens to be present at the time of the “sniff test,” such an intrusion into the sanctity of his or her home will generally be a frightening and harrowing experience that could prompt a reflexive or unpredictable response.

“Moreover, there is nothing revelatory about the notion that a collector of child pornography will maintain his collection for years. This idea is arguably part of the field of common knowledge. Courts over the years have consistently found that collectors of child pornography do not quickly dispose of their cache and, in fact, rarely if ever dispose of such material. As such, even a substantial delay between the distribution of child pornography and the issuance of a search warrant does not render the underlying information stale.” State v. Friday, 73 So. 3d 913 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2011).

The record supports the finding of consent for the officer to enter, and then a roach was seen in plain view. Further consent developed from that. State v. Stephens, 71 So. 3d 462 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2011).*

“We would find the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress the blood sample seized from Defendant without his consent and without a warrant after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. However, in the light of the fact that no Missouri case has yet addressed the import of the removal of the words ‘none shall be given’ from Section 577.041, which we believe involves a significant departure from current case law as represented by the Smith case, and the general interest and importance of the issues involved, we transfer the case to the Missouri Supreme Court, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 83.02.” State v. McNeely, 2011 Mo. App. LEXIS 858 (E June 21, 2011).*

A package consigned to Fed Ex “reeked of marijuana.” They called police who seized it, took it to the police station and opened it without a warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Robey v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 4th 1, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 510 (2d Dist. 2011), petition for review granted Nov. 1, 2011:

Was the warrantless search justified based on smell alone? Not according to the California Supreme Court. (Guidi v. Superior Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 1 [109 Cal. Rptr. 684, 513 P.2d 908]; People v. Marshall (1968) 69 Cal.2d 51 [69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 442 P.2d 665].) To smell it is not the same as to see it. [¶] The trial court erred in denying Robey’s motion to suppress evidence of the marijuana.

The officer had a kind of anonymous tip, but face to face, and he could assess the credibility of the story about defendant having a gun. It was not a situation where a gun was being brandished. The court doesn’t have to decide whether the informant’s tale is enough because, once the officer encountered the defendant, his conduct added to what the informant said, and it completed the totality of circumstances. United States v. Washington, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122446 (S.D. Ill. October 24, 2011).*

In analyzing consent, court factors handcuffs, number of officers, familiar surroundings, no warning of right to refuse, fact defendant had been arrested before, being intelligent and “very cooperative and nice,” and telling the officers where the stuff was to find it was all by consent. “As the Fifth Circuit remarked in Martinez, ‘it would be significantly more likely for a defendant to consent voluntarily to a search that he knew would produce evidence of a crime if he had already voluntarily admitted to committing the crime.’” United States v. Jenkins, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122225 (W.D. La. September 12, 2011).*

The government was investigating the defendant for white collar crime operated out of his home office, and Brackinreed was a trusted employee with access to everything. The government debriefed Brackinreed, and he produced papers he smuggled from defendant. He later gave consent to enter a storage building with records that he had full access to and the key. His days were numbered with defendant, but defendant had done nothing to cut him off from the files, storage unit, or computers. Brackinreed had the ability to consent even though defendant had an expectation of privacy. United States v. Leiske, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82535 (D. Ore. July 27, 2011).*

The officer’s stop of defendant for a temporary tag was a mistake of fact not of law. While a real temporary tag from Texas was valid in Alabama, it looked fabricated to the officer. United States v. DeJesus, 435 Fed. Appx. 895 (11th Cir. 2011)* [Now police can claim that the temporary tag looked fake.]

Reading the transcript of the suppression hearing, the court is amply sure that defendant consented to a search of his car. That general consent to search the car permitted looking inside bags. United States v. Cunningham, 441 Fed. Appx. 209 (4th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant came to the ER with a GSW to the lower calf and ankle, claiming that he’d been shot by an unknown assailant from some distance. Detectives were called as required by state law for all GSWs, and he noticed soot around the entrance wound hole in the clothing. The hospital personnel cut off the pant leg to treat the defendant and bagged it and turned it over to the officer. The seizure was a result of a plain view. Defendant conceded he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his clothing on showing up at an ER with a GSW. Commonwealth v. Fortuna, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 45, 951 N.E.2d 687 (2011), Review denied 460 Mass. 1114, 954 N.E.2d 539 (2011).

Defendant was cited by the city for overgrown vegetation and trash in the yard, and he appealed. He had no Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in what the city inspector could see from the street. City of Independence v. Cady, 349 S.W.3d 419 (Mo. App. 2011).*

Two serial informants, both independently corroborated, was probable cause. United States v. Holmes, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87527 (W.D. La. Aug. 3, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87512 (W.D. La. July 14, 2011).*

Unnecessarily spinning one’s tires does not justify a stop. Here, the state did not rely on the community caretaking function for the stop, so there was no factual support for it in the trial court. Burnett v. State, 264 P.3d 607 (Alas. App. 2011)* (court explains in dicta that community caretaking function might have arguably applied if the facts were developed).

Driving with a dealer plate at night is not reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. State v. Williams, 2011 Ohio 5807, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4765 (2d Dist. November 10, 2011).*

Following other circuits, just because an administrative search has a mixed motive that the plaintiff tow company owner may have stolen property did not make the administrative search invalid. Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland, 439 Fed. Appx. 433 (6th Cir. 2011):

The individual defendants’ pre-search suspicion that Rodriguez possessed a stolen dump truck did not render their warrantless administrative search of M & M invalid. This conclusion finds support in United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 77 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1983), where the Supreme Court concluded that customs officers had not offended the Fourth Amendment when, pursuant to a federal statute, those officers boarded a sailboat in a shipping channel and asked to see the sailboat’s documentation. Id. at 580-83, 592-93. …

In cases more factually analogous to this one, other federal circuits have concluded that an officer’s suspicion as to the presence of a stolen vehicle did not render unconstitutional the initiation of a warrantless administrative inspection of an automotive repair- or salvage-related business. For example, in Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2007), an Auto Theft Unit officer had received a complaint from an individual who had allegedly purchased a vehicle with a suspicious VIN from a particular auto body repair shop and salvage yard. Id. at 1235-36. After receiving this complaint, the officer and his supervisor set out to search the repair shop/salvage yard pursuant to a Florida statute that “permits a warrantless physical inspection of” such businesses “during normal business hours ‘for the purpose of locating stolen vehicles.’” Id. at 1236 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 812.055). In a subsequent civil rights action, the owner of the repair shop/salvage yard asserted that, “from the inception, the search of the [business] was not a routine administrative inspection, but rather an ordinary criminal raid, undertaken with suspicion of a particular crime and implemented to discover and seize evidence of that crime.” Id. at 1240. Although the Eleventh Circuit recognized “that the administrative search exception [should] not be allowed to swallow whole the Fourth Amendment,” id. at 1241, that court concluded that the inception of the warrantless administrative inspection at issue nonetheless passed constitutional muster, id. at 1242. Noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has made quite clear that an administrative search is not rendered invalid because it is accompanied by some suspicion of wrongdoing,” the Eleventh Circuit determined that the complaint the officers had received did not generate the probable cause necessary to support an application for a search warrant. Id. Lacking “direct criminal suspicion of wrongdoing,” the officers had “validly invoked their statutory authority to” search the repair shop/salvage yard. Id.

Defendant’s car was stopped on a radio report of a vehicle matching its description involved in an armed robbery. Because of the nature of the crime under investigation, greater safety measures could be employed against those in the car without turning an investigative detention into an arrest. United States v. Smith, 648 F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 2011):

Applying these principles to this appeal, we agree with the district court that under the totality of the circumstances, the officers’ reasonable suspicion of a connection between Smith and his Cadillac and the bank robbery warranted an investigatory detention. The reasonable safety measures officers took in effecting an inherently dangerous investigative stop in connection with an armed robbery did not transform the encounter with Smith into an arrest. Detective Vogel’s investigation indicated Smith was the owner and primary user of the white Cadillac seen on the surveillance video picking up a man matching the description of the bank robber and driving toward the bank moments before the robbery. A witness placed Smith behind the wheel of the Cadillac a few blocks away from the bank shortly before the robbery occurred.

Plaintiff Pennsylvania State Trooper who was ordered back to work ten months after an injury had a call to his barracks recorded, allegedly without his knowledge, over the return to work order. He had no claim under the Fourth Amendment or Title III, and the district court should have just dismissed the case. Diana v. Oliphant, 441 Fed. Appx. 76 (3d Cir. 2011).*

Defendant was walking down the street, and two officers in a parked car saw him coming. The passenger got out, and he had a vest with “POLICE” on the front. Defendant turned and ran, dropping a bag of drugs as he fled. Officers retrieved the bag and ultimately caught the defendant. The stop was valid. United States v. Rivera, 441 Fed. Appx. 87 (3d Cir. 2011).*

Officers had reason to attempt to stop the defendant based on corroborated information from a CI. When they activated their patrol car lights, the defendant put his car in reverse and backed into the patrol car. He was not seized at that time because he had not yet stopped. United States v. Oakley, 441 Fed. Appx. 989 (4th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant claimed he did not understand English well enough to consent, but he had a job at one place for 17 years until the business closed, he conversed in English with the officers for a while, and his actions showed consent. His stating that he had to leave to go pick up his uncle was insufficient to show a withdrawal of consent. United States v. Lopez-Sanchez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86376 (N.D. Ind. August 4, 2011).*