The stop of defendant’s car for exiting a parking lot too slowly in a high crime area lacked reasonable suspicion, and the stop and its fruits are suppressed. United States v. Williams, 804 F. Supp. 2d 659 (M.D. Tenn. 2011)*:

The Court next examines the existing contextual considerations. In United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2006), the Sixth Circuit noted the relevant contextual consideration of time of day and crime area in supporting the stop, but warned not to rely “too easily or too heavily” on these contextual factors. The Sixth Circuit held that based on the totality of the circumstances, “an individual, whose general appearance and location matched the description given in the anonymous shot-fired call, fled and made furtive movements when approached by the police late at night [1:20 a.m.] in a high-crime area -provided reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.” Id. at 468.

Here, the stop occurred shortly before 4:00 a.m. in an area known for weapons and fighting, which are relevant factors that support the stop. Yet, the Defendant was driving slowly, fully complied, and did not demonstrate nervous or evasive behavior, which are also relevant factors that do not support the stop. After considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that there was not reasonable suspicion for the Terry stop of Defendant’s vehicle on February 13, 2010. Accordingly, the Defendant’s motion to suppress (Docket Entry No. 21) should be granted.

The district court’s finding of voluntary consent was supported by the record. Just because the officers were not exact on defendant’s words, they were the only witnesses, so the finding is supported by the record. United States v. Webster, 418 Fed. Appx. 519 (7th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

A computer technician found child pornography on defendant’s computer and reported it to the police. They obtained a search warrant application that omitted significant details of the investigation, but that did not undermine the probable cause that was shown. United States v. Shelton, 418 Fed. Appx. 514 (7th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

The traffic stop was without reasonable suspicion. As a back up argument, the government argued reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved in drug activity. “In drawing objective and reasonable inferences from these observations, it can be concluded, at best, that a man drove to the same hotel and took the elevator to the same hotel floor where a suspected drug dealer was known to be staying, and left driving a car that might have previously been seized in a DEA drug investigation.” That’s not reasonable suspicion. United States v. Tootoo, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Haw. 2011).*

Defendant’s interaction with the officer here was consensual on the totality of circumstances. ‘The Tenth Circuit has also made clear that ‘no single factor can dictate whether a seizure occurred.’ Hill, 199 F.3d at 1148. Considering the facts of this case in light of these legal principles, the court concludes that the interaction between the defendant and Officer Kaufman amounted to a consensual encounter that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Flores, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77291 (D. Utah July 14, 2011).*

The evidence supports the conclusion that defendant consented to the search of his bags at a train station. United States v. Brown, 438 Fed. Appx. 203 (4th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant made three challenges to the search warrant and affidavit for a grow operation. First, the CI provided probable cause by his detail, which was corroborated by recorded telephone calls. While some of the calls seemed innocent, they take on a different color compared to the CI’s information. Second, the warrant was not stale, despite the two month lapse from the last PC to the issuances of the warrant because it was for an ongoing grow operation that would likely be there. Third, the warrant was not general. “Courts have recognized that ‘officers executing a search warrant are ‘required to interpret it,’ and they are ‘not obliged to interpret it narrowly.’” Here, they knew they were looking for a grow operation. United States v. Tiem Trinh, 665 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011):

Furthermore, authorities independently corroborated many of the CS’s details through intercepted phone conversations and general monitoring of the Trinhs. See United States v. Soule, 908 F.2d 1032, 1039 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting that police officers’ contemporaneous corroboration of the “material elements” of the CS’s information “lent substantial intrinsic verification to the informant’s veracity and basis of knowledge”). Thus, the fact that surveillance observed seemingly innocent van travels between Boston and Buffalo takes on a greater significance and supports the CS’s credibility when viewed in light of other corroborative evidence indicating incriminating activity. See Greenburg, 410 F.3d at 69 (providing that a surveillance agent’s “observation of seemingly innocent truck movement, which matched the informant’s prediction about such activity, helped establish a substantial reason to believe that the informant’s description of the entire scheme was accurate”).

Defendant arrived at SEA and paid cash for a last minute ticket to Anchorage on Alaska Airlines and had no luggage. The ticket agent called the police, and they met defendant at the gate and talked to him. He consented to a full-body pat down that produced 700 Oxycodone pills. Going to the groin area for the search was reasonable under the facts. United States v. Russell, 664 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 2012):

The factual context is key to our decision. Bruch specifically advised Russell that he was looking for narcotics. After consenting to the search, Russell was more than cooperative. To facilitate the search, he lifted his arms to shoulder height and spread his legs. Russell could have objected either of the two times he gave verbal consent before the search, or while Bruch worked his way up from the ankles to the groin. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 776 (8th Cir. 2005) (granting a motion to suppress where the suspect consented to a search of his person but then withdrew consent by actively shielding his groin area from the officer’s search). Indeed, Bruch purposely searched from the ankles up because “it gives them an opportunity to say that they don’t want the search … there is an opportunity to stop.” Instead Russell said nothing and certainly did nothing to manifest any change of heart about his consent to search. He never objected, expressed any concern, nor did he revoke consent or call a halt to the search, nor did he complain to the officer after the fact.

We hold that the search was reasonable. Narcotics are often hidden on the body in locations that make discovery more difficult, including the groin area. The search here did not extend inside the clothing. Finally, this case does not present a question of a body pat-down by an officer of the opposite gender. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting as a significant factor that the searching officer was the same gender as the suspect); United States v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295, 298 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“In particular, we do not address situations where, unlike here, the officer and the suspect are of opposite sexes.”). Not only would a reasonable person in Bruch’s situation understand that the general consent for a narcotics search of the person included a pat-down of all areas of the body, including the groin area, Russell’s unrestricted consent to the search and conduct during the search suggested nothing different.

One unsupported informant is not probable cause, but three unsupported informants is the good faith exception because past cases suggested that it might be OK. People v. French, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1307, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 383 (1st Dist. 2011):

A search warrant affidavit contains information from three informants, none of whom are reliable. Each informant states two named individuals are selling drugs from a particular residence and drive a particular vehicle. The affiant officer corroborates those facts and determines that one of the alleged drug dealers has a history of narcotics offenses, but fails to include in the affidavit the dates and any details of those offenses. We conclude that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause to issue the warrant, in part because the police corroboration of the informants’ statements and the “interlocking” details of those statements related to “pedestrian” facts. However, we find the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applicable and affirm.

. . .

The minimal police investigation and lack of detail in the affidavit are factors weighing against application of the good faith exception. Where “neither the veracity nor basis of knowledge of the informant is directly established, the information is not so detailed as to be self-verifying and there is no logistical or other reason why verification from other sources cannot be achieved, … the failure to corroborate may be indicative that it was objectively unreasonable for the officer to believe in the existence of probable cause.” (Maestas, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1220–1221.) Nevertheless, the question under Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 879, “is not whether further investigation would have been reasonable, but whether a reasonable officer in [the affiant’s] position would have known that the affidavit, as it existed at the time it was to be presented to the magistrate, was legally insufficient without additional and more recent corroboration.” (Camarella, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 606, fn. omitted.)

We apply the good faith exception in the present case because broad language in several prior court decisions may have led a reasonable officer to conclude the affidavit presented a debatable question as to the existence of probable cause. In particular, several decisions contain language flatly suggesting that multiple unreliable informants can corroborate each other. Thus, in Sheridan, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d at page 489, the court stated, “[I]t may not be said as a matter of law, that two or more independent reports of previously untested informers each corroborating the other, of the same criminal activity, do not constitute probable cause for an arrest or search. … [S]imilar information from separate unrelated sources substantially increases the probability of its credibility.” In Balassy, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d at page 621, the court stated, “one ‘unreliable’ informer’s statements may be corroborated by those of another, if they were interviewed independently, at a different time and place. [Citations.]” (Accord, Green, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 205.) And in Laws, supra, 808 F.2d at page 103, the court stated, “The fact that two apparently unassociated persons make the same assertion increases the probability that it is true.” (See also Hyde, supra, 574 F.2d at p. 863, fn. omitted.)

. . .

As explained previously, all of those cases are distinguishable from the present case. However, because the broad language in the decisions in the previous paragraph was “arguably supportive legal authority” in favor of issuance of the warrant, we conclude the existence of probable cause was debatable and, therefore, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized under the search warrant. (Garcia, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 723; see also People v. Pressey (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1191 [126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 162] [“Given the dearth of authority directly on point and the existence of potentially supportive precedent, the issue of probable cause was ‘debatable’ when the warrant herein was sought, even though the issue, upon examination, is not a particularly close one.”].)

[Note: So, California: what about the next time? Does this case mean that the good faith exception will not be applied, or is it still “and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation” that warrants can, in fact, still be issued without probable cause? In this case, probable cause was “debatable” so there is no change in the law.]

Trial court erred in finding a passenger could contest the search of the car as a “fruit” of an illegal stop when he didn’t show standing. State v. White, 2011 Ohio 6748, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 5575 (9th Dist. December 29, 2011)*:

[*P8] Therefore, here, White contested the search of the Ogbartam-Tetteh’s vehicle as the “fruit” of an illegal stop. See Carter, 69 Ohio St. 3d at 67 (“The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, or ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’”), quoting Nardone v. United States (1939), 308 U.S. 338, 60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307. However, in the context of a valid stop, White could contest the search only if he had a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the area searched. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at paragraph four of the syllabus. The trial court determined that the initial stop and the arrest were proper. Therefore, White had the burden of proving that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in order to contest the validity of the search of Ogbartam-Tetteh’s vehicle.

Officers arrested defendant for being unlawfully in the country, but delayed timely bringing him before a USMJ. His subsequent statement violated McNabb/Mallory and was suppressed. United States v. Valenzuela-Espinoza, 664 F.3d 1265 (9th Cir. 2011).*

A rented airplane hanger cannot be compared to a hotel room for purposes of determining a reasonable expectation of privacy. The hanger was shared with others and the owner had the ability to admit others. The fact the drug dog was only 70% reliable did not undermine probable cause. United States v. Ruiz, 664 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished):

Finally, Mr. Ruiz cites two cases involving parking lots which, he claims, support his argument that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hangar. In United States v. Ludwig, 10 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir. 1993), we held that a defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a motel parking lot that “was open and visible from the public roads bordering it,” where the defendant “produced no evidence that the lot was fenced, that a gate prevented unauthorized entry, or even that signs restricted entry to the parking lot.” Id. at 1526. The parking lot was patrolled by law enforcement officers and drug dogs with permission from the motel manager. Id. at 1525. Ludwig is of no help to Mr. Ruiz. There, as here, police were present with the owner’s permission. Id. The mere fact that the defendant in Ludwig lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in an unfenced, open parking lot does not imply that Mr. Ruiz had a privacy interest in a fenced hangar that he shared with the hangar’s owner and other customers.

With two officers involved in the stop, one said defendant could leave, but the other said three times that he wanted permission to search the car. Defendant was not free to go. State v. Hogan, 252 P.3d 627 (Kan. App. 2011).*

A call from a store loss prevention officer that defendant bought Sudafed and Coleman fuel at the same time was reasonable suspicion for a stop of defendant’s car for possession of precursors for making methamphetamine. People v. Steele, 292 Mich. App. 308, 806 N.W.2d 753 (2011), leave to appeal denied by, 801 N.W.2d 882 (2011).*

While defendant did not show that he had standing in the vehicle that was not his by showing that he had permission to operate it, there was reasonable suspicion for the stop for smuggling. United States v. Varela, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40818 (D. Ariz. April 7, 2011).*

Defendant was stopped for following too close and then a rolling stop. He argued that the video supported his position, but, instead, it supported the officer’s actions. United States v. Huff, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142659 (E.D. Tenn. December 6, 2010).*

School district’s drug and alcohol testing of those in extracurricular activities did not violate the state constitution, following Vernonia under the Fourth Amendment. Hageman v. Goshen County School Dist. No. 1, 2011 WY 91, 256 P.3d 487 (2011).*

The stop of defendant’s vehicle was with reasonable suspicion of drug activity, so the pretext argument fails. State v. Alderete, 2011 NMCA 55, 149 N.M. 799, 255 P.3d 377 (2011).*

Defendant’s driving gave reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Watson, 354 S.W.3d 324 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).*

“The legislature’s use of broad language in K.S.A. 22-2502(a)(1) of ‘[a]ny things which have been used in the commission of a crime’ and ‘any property which constitutes or may be considered a part of the evidence,’ gave the district court jurisdiction to issue a search warrant in this case for samples of the defendant’s blood, hair, buccal cells, and fingerprints.” State v. Powell, 45 Kan. App. 2d 1090, 257 P.3d 1244 (2011).

The stop of defendant for not moving over for a stopped emergency vehicle was valid, and DUI affirmed. State v. Brooks, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 462 (June 22, 2011).*

The defendant moved to suppress the search under a warrant, and the trial court granted it. The state requested findings of fact and conclusions of law on possible exceptions, but the trial court felt constrained to rule only on the warrant. Remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law on possible exceptions to the warrant as alternatives to sustain the search. State v. Alberts, 354 S.W.3d 320 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2011).*

Defendant’s mother, a visitor to the house, could consent to an entry. As far as the officers were concerned, she had apparent authority. Here, her daughter was taking a nap and did not hear the officers at the door. State v. Barkhausen, 2011 Iowa App. LEXIS 1139 (April 27, 2011).*

Defendant’s stop in a Wal-Mart parking lot on suspicion of DWI was initiated by a 911 call from a Wal-Mart employee who met the officer in the parking lot. Defendant was apparently under the influence. A drug dog was present and alerted. The finding of consent did not have to be reached. United States v. Chavez, 660 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant was Mirandized and then told the officers where his Dilaudid was hidden. That was consent. Cox v. State, 75 So. 3d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).*

Entry into a home to serve a summons violated the Fourth Amendment. Guerrero v. Moore, 442 Fed. Appx. 57 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished):

Moore contends that he did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of Esperanza Guerrero when he entered her home in an effort to serve a judicially-issued misdemeanor summons on Antonia Munguia. He fails to persuade us, however, that the summons was the functional equivalent of an arrest warrant for Fourth Amendment purposes. Summonses confer more limited authority than arrest warrants; notably, Moore lacked the authority to take Munguia into custody upon service of the summons. Moore fails to cite any persuasive Fourth Amendment precedent that permits a government official to enter a dwelling to serve a non-custodial misdemeanor summons. Indeed, the latest relevant opinion of the Virginia Attorney General concludes that an officer lacks such authority. 2003 Va. Op. Att’y Gen. 64, 2003 WL 23208766 (Sept. 16, 2003) (“[A]bsent consent of a dwelling owner, a law-enforcement officer must obtain a warrant before entering a dwelling for the purpose of serving a summons for a misdemeanor.”).

The four day search of defendant’s property was reasonable under the “one warrant one search” rule, even though it included a second entry into defendant’s house on the property. He had a junk yard with over 3,000 cars on it, and all had to be searched. State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 124, 337 Wis. 2d 351, 804 N.W.2d 216 (2011):

P25 Based on our review of the circumstances existing at the time of the November 8 search, we are satisfied that it was a continuation of the ongoing search which commenced on Saturday, November 5. As in Squillacote, the number and type of items identified in the search warrant necessitated an extensive and exhaustive search. See Squillacote, 221 F.3d at 557. The lateness of the hour, the weather conditions, and the extensive and intensive nature of the search make it apparent that the search of Avery’s trailer could not have been completed on November 5. See id. Further, the continuous presence of law enforcement at the Avery salvage yard and their continuous control over Avery’s trailer from the time of the first search to the time of the sixth search belies any argument that the search of Avery’s trailer was fully executed at an earlier time.

P26 We therefore turn to the second inquiry—whether the decision to conduct another entry into Avery’s trailer to continue the search was reasonable under the circumstances. See Keszthelyi, 308 F.3d at 569. For the same reasons cited above, we are satisfied that the decision was not only reasonable but necessary, particularly given the evolving information and the accumulation of evidence during the ongoing search. Probable cause had not dissipated during the course of the earlier searches, but rather continued to mount as additional evidence was identified. See id. at 572 (continued probable cause is “critical to establishing the reasonableness of the second search”).

P27 We uphold the trial court’s ruling that “the multiple entries were part of a proper single execution of the November 5, 2005 warrant.” To require the government to obtain a new search warrant for the continued search under the circumstances of this case would be an unjustified burden. See Squillacote, 221 F.3d at 558. We turn next to the trial court’s alternative basis for denying Avery’s motion to suppress, namely that “the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.”

Court rejects pretextual search warrant argument that probable cause for crime A does not permit seizure of evidence of crime B found during execution of the warrant that police hope or suspect they will also find. United States v. Fautz, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89133 (D. N.J. August 11, 2011).

In an investigative stop after an apparent car switch, the defendants were patted down and their cell phones removed from their possession. That was not unreasonable. United States v. Lopez, 441 Fed. Appx. 910 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*

The officer had to know that one defendant did not have apparent authority to consent to the search of another defendant’s wallet that was pulled out and laid on the console while showing his DL to the officer. A gym bag in the back seat, however, was a different matter. United States v. Rodriguez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89043 (S.D. Ala. August 10, 2011).*

Defendant’s stop was based on an anonymous and unreliable tip, and nothing was observed that indicated any criminality. State v. Taylor, 388 S.C. 101, 694 S.E.2d 60 (2010)* (this case is a good summary of the law of anonymous tips).

Defendant consented to a search of his car, and that revealed the odor of marijuana. Probable cause developed at that point, and the search was valid under the automobile exception. State v. Toledo, 204 N.C. App. 171, 693 S.E.2d 201 (2010).*

Police responded to a 911 call that defendant was on her property, and that justified their entry. They did not know that the caller wasn’t there. State v. Pierce, 155 Wn. App. 701, 230 P.3d 237 (2010).*

The tribal officer governed by the Fourth Amendment approaching the front door instead went to a window to peek inside to see if the defendant was inside. Looking in a window not associated with the point of entry was an unreasonable search of the interior. United States v. Fuentes, 800 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Ore. 2011):

Under the government’s interpretation of [United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2001)], whenever an officer knocks on the door of a home and the occupant declines to respond, the officer is free to roam the property and peer into any window of the home simply by asserting that they were attempting to contact the occupants. Such a rule would eviscerate the occupant’s right to decline to answer the door. See King, 131 S. Ct, at 1862 (“the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak”). Further, if an officer is permitted to breach the curtilage of a home, press his face to the glass of any window, and peer into the home whenever he asserts he is attempting to contact the occupant, what would prevent him from opening the front door or a window? After all, the officer would have a better chance of contacting the occupant that way. I decline to extend Hammett and Garcia to circumstances in which law enforcement officers enter the curtilage of a home, stand within inches of a window not associated with any point of entry, and peer inside without a warrant or any other justification.

Finally, the government suggests that Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2010), supports the detectives’ warrantless search of Fuentes’ living room. I disagree. Unlike the exigent circumstances in King, where officers detected the strong smell of marijuana, knocked on the door, and then heard the sound of evidence being destroyed, there were no exigent circumstances preceding Detective Webb’s search of Fuentes’ living room. At the time Detective Webb looked into Fuentes’ living room, he had no specific, particularized basis for believing that a crime had been committed, that his safety was threatened, or that evidence was being destroyed. That the detectives heard movement after Fuentes refused to answer the door does not give rise to a reasonable belief that a warrantless search was necessary to ensure officer safety or prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. King does not support the conclusion that Detective Webb’s warrantless search of Fuentes’ living room was justified.

Under the specific circumstances of this case, I find it was unreasonable for Detective Webb to enter the curtilage of Fuentes’ home, stand within inches of a window that is not associated with any point of entry, and peer into the home without any particularized basis for believing exigent circumstances existed. Accordingly, the detectives’ observations of the marijuana pipe were unlawful.

Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house he was moving into. He was there rent-free while getting his stuff all there, and he’d spent the night a few times and had some things already there. Since the search occurred without a warrant and no exception applies, the search is suppressed. United States v. Rock, 798 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D. Wis. 2011):

Second, defendant manifested an intent to make this house his home by bringing belongings, including a bed, and his girlfriend to live with him. He set up the bed and slept for at least a short period of time before the officers arrived. While it is true that defendant left his other property in Milwaukee, the record shows that he planned to buy — and, in fact, did buy — necessary items, including an inflatable bed and clothing, in Illinois.

Third, defendant had the permission of Perez and Perez’s mother, the owners, to live in the house rent-free. The fact that defendant stayed at the grace of the Perez family and lacked a key does not defeat his expectation. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 98-100. As the Olson Court explained, society recognizes the value of permitting another, “in between jobs or homes,” to stay free of charge in a host’s home. Id. at 98. Nor can the poor condition of the house defeat defendant’s expectation. Many citizens live in dilapidated houses; they enjoy the same Fourth Amendment protection as the occupants of mansions. Importantly, the house had not been condemned by the City of Rockford prior to defendant’s arrest, despite the fact that police were apparently aware of it (and deemed it a gang house). And as the magistrate judge noted, only vague hearsay supports the notion that the back door was “off the hinges.”

The R&R: United States v. Rock, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83229 (E.D. Wis. May 26, 2011):

The house was obviously in a state of disrepair; there was no running water, there was graffiti on the walls, the grass probably needed cutting, and the home lacked appliances and was later condemned. But there is no evidence that the house had been declared uninhabitable prior to the officers’ entry, and the protection of the Fourth Amendment is not limited to homes where all utilities function and are neatly maintained. The evidence demonstrates that Rock was present with the permission of the property owner, and rather than being present only for a limited purpose such as a business transaction or even a social gathering, see Carter, 525 U.S. at 90, at the time the officers searched the home, this was Rock’s residence. Although Rock arrived only a few hours before his arrest and the house was condemned shortly after his arrest, at the time of the officers’ entry, this was Rock’s home. In light of the fact that courts have repeatedly held that an individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in the more transient dwelling of a hotel, the court finds no basis to require the satisfaction of an arbitrary temporal element so as to “vest” a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his residence.

As has been said in a variety of contexts, the Fourth Amendment draws a bright line at the threshold of a person’s home, see, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), and “[e]veryone has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his residence.” United States v. Brown, 64 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 1995). The evidence demonstrates that this was Rock’s home and thus he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.

Officers drove by a parked car in front of a vacant house in an area known for drug activity, and they could smell marijuana coming from the car, and that supported the stop. State in Interest of C.R., 2011 La. App. LEXIS 931 (La. App. 4th Cir. August 3, 2011).*

Defendant’s hope that cross-examination of the government’s computer forensic expert would cause that expert to cave was not enough to generate a need for a hearing that he couldn’t otherwise show a need for. United States v. Farlow, 800 F. Supp. 2d 341 (D. Me. 2011).*

Defendant’s stop near the border was justified because of excessive smoke emissions from her diesel truck. United States v. Sandoval, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85791 (D. Ariz. August 3, 2011), R&R 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86300 (D. Ariz. May 19, 2011).*

Defendant was semi-accosted by the police and told to come over to them. He put down his backpack where he was standing and walked over to them. That became a stop without reasonable suspicion. Defendant did not, by any means, abandon his bag by putting it down and walking over to the officer, but he left it open enough that the contents were visible, and that afforded a plain view untainted by the detention away from the bag. State v. Belcher, 2011 Ohio 5015, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4163 (2d Dist. September 30, 2011).*

There was no showing that the third party consenter to this search was too drunk or mentally ill to consent, so the trial court’s finding stands. State v. McElveen, 73 So. 3d 1033 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2011).*

Officers received an anonymous tip that defendant was dealing drugs and they set up surveillance, which told them nothing other than defendant lived where the informant said he did, and there was no correct predictive behavior indicating criminality. When they figured they’d been made, they moved in and detained him. The detention was without reasonable suspicion. State v. Marino, 74 So. 3d 742 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2011).*

Defendant’s girlfriend’s mother lacked apparent authority to consent to the search of the defendant’s duffle bag in her house when he was staying there. People v Holmes, 2011 NY Slip Op 8075, 89 A.D.3d 1491, 932 N.Y.S.2d 270 (4th Dept. 2011):

Upon remittitur, we agree with defendant that the weapon and his statements to the police must be suppressed. The mother of defendant’s girlfriend did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of the duffel bag (see generally People v Gonzalez, 88 NY2d 289, 293). The People presented no evidence that the mother “shared common authority’ over defendant’s duffel bag, based upon mutual use or joint access and control” (id. at 294). The warrantless seizure of the weapon therefore was improper (see People v Coston, 271 AD2d 694, lv denied 95 NY2d 833, 962; cf. People v Kelly, 58 AD3d 868, lv denied 12 NY3d 818). We further agree with defendant that his statements to the police must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree (see People v Christianson, 57 AD3d 1385, 1388; People v James, 27 AD3d 1089, 1090-1091, lv denied 6 NY3d 895).

Officers had information from a CI that defendant was in the bathroom doing drugs. When she came out, she seemed under the influence. She left her backpack on the trunk of a car when talking to the officer and then was arrested. There was probable cause to believe evidence was in the backpack, so it was more than just a search incident. Agee v. Commonwealth, 2011 Ky. App. LEXIS 224 (November 10, 2011).*