IT World.com: SOPA replacement uses child porn as excuse to spy on 99.7 percent of Americans / SOPA author Lamar Smith pushing bill to make web sites track every user’s every move by Kevin Fogarty:

The SOPA and PIPA bills that went down in flames earlier this year for their unbearable intrusiveness, used content piracy as an excuse to give the government powerful tools with which to censor Internet content.

For 2012 the primary author of those bills has switched to a fallback tactic: using child porn as an excuse to create a vast surveillance network from which the government can demand data on every email sent, site visited or link clicked on by all but a fraction of one percent of the U.S. population.

Internet anti-censorship advocates including Anonymous are calling for the ouster of Texas Congressman Lamar Smith, who is following his co-sponsorship of the failed Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) with a bill critics call “Big Brother” disguised as an effort to curb child porn and sexual abuse.

The link I can’t imbed: http://www.itworld.com/security/251584/sopa-replacement-uses-child-porn-excuse-spy-997-percent-americans

Drug Policy Alliance Press Release: Congress Approves Drug Testing of America’s Unemployed / Americans Will Be Forced to Pay for the Violation of their Own Constitutional Rights:

WASHINGTON, DC—Congress today approved a deal which will broadly expand drug testing. As part of the deal to extend the payroll tax cut and unemployment benefits, Democrats caved in to Republican demands to allow states to drug test people applying for unemployment insurance (UI) benefits.

The deal, which President Obama will sign, allows states to drug test UI benefit claimants who might apply to work for employers with a drug testing policy. The new policy amounts to a subsidized “prescreen,” at taxpayer expense, for employers who would eventually have done their own tests. The policy actually encourages employers to just announce that they will drug test, without actually paying to do it, because state unemployment bureaucracies will now do that for them.

This policy is strongly skewed toward lower-wage jobs, as “white-collar” employers are far less likely to humiliate job applicants in this way. This policy broadly expands and subsidizes drug testing in a way that may be difficult to reverse for many years, if ever.

Overhearing a conversation between attorney and client in the courtroom in front of a courtroom security officer was not a violation of the Fourth or Sixth Amendment because they chose to talk within earshot of him. “Had Lawson and his counsel wished to protect the right to private consultation, they could have chosen to discuss matters in the jail where Lawson had the right to hold discussions with counsel without security personnel in the room. Such was Lawson’s right. His choice not to do so, however, is not a violation of his constitutional right to counsel.” This is not a situation of an overheard private conversation where there was an expectation of privacy. State v. Lawson, 2012 Ohio 548, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 481 (12th Dist. February 13, 2012).

“Fruits of the crime” from state Rule 41 in the search warrant was an adequate description where it was not possible for officers to specify what the proceeds would be. The police validly seized the goods, but it wasn’t good enough to convict for possession of proceeds because it was speculation. State v. Conway, 2012 Ohio 590, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 514 (8th Dist. February 16, 2012).

JURIST: FISA and the Battle Between National Security and Privacy by Jimmy Gurulé:

Defendant Mohanad Shareef Hammadi, an Iraqi citizen who was granted refugee status under the Refugee Admissions Program and resided in Bowling Green, Kentucky, was arrested and charged with 10 terrorism-related offenses. The indictment alleged that Hammadi and a co-defendant attempted to provide material support and resources to members of al Qaeda in Iraq, a designated foreign terrorist organization, including rocket-propelled grenade launchers, hand grenades, machine guns, cases of C4 plastic explosives, sniper rifles and money, to be used in the preparation for and killing of Americans located outside the US. Hammadi and his co-defendant were also charged with attempting to provide two Stinger surface-to-air missile launcher systems to al Qaeda in Iraq for the purpose of killing Americans abroad.

Prior to trial, Hammadi filed a motion to disclose and suppress evidence obtained pursuant to electronic surveillance and a physical search authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Hammadi alleged that the evidence should be suppressed on the grounds that it was illegally obtained or not collected in conformity with the order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.

Faint odor of marijuana coming from a car and occupants’ sharing a cigar while parked in front of a fire hydrant in a high crime area still was not reasonable suspicion to order them from the car. Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 945 N.E.2d 899 (2011):

The Commonwealth argues that the stop’s location, a high crime neighborhood; the defendant’s nervous demeanor; and the occupants’ sharing of a cigar are facts that bolster the suspicion of criminal activity first aroused by the odor of burnt marijuana. We disagree.

The stop’s location, although potentially relevant to an objective assessment of officer safety, cannot justify reasonable suspicion to believe a person is involved in criminal activity. See Commonwealth v. Santos, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 122, 125 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Holley, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 659, 663 (2001) (traffic stop taking place in high crime area must be “considered with some caution because many honest, law-abiding citizens live and work in high crime areas”). Further, the officers knew that the defendant lived on Sunnyside Street, the very street on which the encounter occurred. Surely the officers could not find it suspicious that the defendant was spending time on his own street. Moreover, the defendant’s nervous demeanor cannot be the grounding factor on which to base suspicion of criminal activity. See Commonwealth v. DePeiza, 449 Mass. 367, 372 (2007). It is common, and not necessarily indicative of criminality, to appear nervous during even a mundane encounter with police, even though, as a passenger, the consequence of receiving a citation is not personal. Here, even though the defendant may have recognized Officer Diaz, a myriad number of innocent reasons other than hiding criminal contraband may more readily explain why a nineteen year old man would appear nervous while being addressed by a police officer. See United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Nervousness is a common and entirely natural reaction to police presence …”).

The Commonwealth’s contention that because the occupants were sharing a small cigar, known to the officers to mask the odor of marijuana smoke, they were also sharing a marijuana cigarette is without merit. The Commonwealth’s assertion of such sharing is based on Diaz’s noticing the driver light the cigar as the officers drove down the street and Morgan’s noting the defendant smoking the cigar once the officers had stopped. The judge made no finding whether she credited the inference that the occupants shared the cigar. Further, there was no evidence that the occupants shared marijuana. The driver’s admission to smoking “earlier in the day” does not require, as the Commonwealth argues, the inference that the defendant smoked as well. Even if we assume the occupants shared the cigar, it does not necessarily follow that because the occupants shared one legal item, they shared another illegal substance. We will not infer the defendant’s participation solely from the driver’s admission concerning his own conduct at some point earlier in the day. See Commonwealth v. Wren, 391 Mass. 705, 707 (1984) (suspicion must be based on reasonable inferences; “hunch will not suffice”).

Here, there could be no suspicion of a criminal offense. When the people of this Commonwealth answered “yes” to Question 2 on the 2008 ballot, the offense of possessing one ounce or less of marijuana changed from being a criminal to a civil offense. 19 See G. L. c. 94C, § 32L (“Notwithstanding any general or special law to the contrary, possession of one ounce or less of marihuana shall only be a civil offense …” [emphasis added]). The ballot informed voters that a “yes vote would replace the criminal penalties for possession of one ounce or less of marijuana with a new system of civil penalties.” Information for Voters: 2008 Ballot Questions, Question 2: Law Proposed by Initiative Petition, Possession of Marijuana. The arguments in favor of a “yes vote,” written by the Committee for Sensible Marijuana Policy 20 and presented on the ballot, told voters that the change would remove the threat of various criminal “sanctions” for those who possess one ounce or less of marijuana and instead impose a “$100 fine, similar to a speeding ticket.” Id. It also explained that the police would be “freed up” by the new law to focus on serious crimes and “taxpayers would save $30 million a year in arrest costs.” Id. In contrast, arguments against the change in the law warned voters that “[m]arijuana decriminalization is an endorsement of substance abuse and dangerous criminal activity ….” Id. We assume that before casting their votes, voters read the arguments “for” and “against,” as well as the new law itself. Because we have the benefit of the written explanation in support of the initiative, the people’s intent in answering Question 2 in the affirmative was clear: possession of one ounce or less of marijuana should not be considered a serious infraction worthy of criminal sanction.

NYTimes.com: Drones Set Sights on U.S. Skies by Nick Wingfield and Somini Sengupta:

WOODLAND HILLS, Calif. — Daniel Gárate’s career came crashing to earth a few weeks ago. That’s when the Los Angeles Police Department warned local real estate agents not to hire photographers like Mr. Gárate, who was helping sell luxury property by using a drone to shoot sumptuous aerial movies. Flying drones for commercial purposes, the police said, violated federal aviation rules.

“I was paying the bills with this,” said Mr. Gárate, who recently gave an unpaid demonstration of his drone in this Southern California suburb.

His career will soon get back on track. A new federal law, signed by the president on Tuesday, compels the Federal Aviation Administration to allow drones to be used for all sorts of commercial endeavors — from selling real estate and dusting crops, to monitoring oil spills and wildlife, even shooting Hollywood films. Local police and emergency services will also be freer to send up their own drones.

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not playing the video of defendant’s stop at the suppression hearing since it was merely cumulative to the officer’s testimony and contradicted nothing. United States v. Franklin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153257 (W.D. Ark. November 16, 2011).*

The search of defendant’s vehicle was with probable cause and involved the automobile exception and not Gant search incident. United States v. Winarske, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19334 (D. N.D. February 16, 2012).*

The information provided in the affidavit showed probable cause [it clearly did], and, even if it didn’t, it’s not bare bones, and the good faith exception would apply. United States v. Escamilla, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19079 (D. Md. February 15, 2012).*

An IRS agent is not required to tell a taxpayer when asking for consent that a criminal investigation may ensue. United States v. Dilworth, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142941 (D. N.J. December 12, 2011):

“A consent search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the consent was induced by the deceit, trickery or misrepresentation of the Internal Revenue Agent.” United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977). However, “the mere failure of a revenue agent (be he regular or special) to warn the taxpayer that the investigation may result in criminal charges, absent any acts by the agent which materially misrepresent the nature of the inquiry, do not constitute fraud, deceit and trickery.” Id. Importantly, “the record must disclose some affirmative misrepresentation to establish the existence of fraud, and the showing must be clear and convincing.” Id.

“Shuffling, scuffling sound inside the trailer” when police knocked was exigent circumstance for entry to prevent desctruction of evidence. United States v. Aguirre, 664 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2011).

Defendant was stopped in the area of a recent burglary because he matched the description given by the victims and was near the place. His stop and patdown were with reasonable suspicion. State v. McCormack, 132 Conn. App. 490, 33 A.3d 264 (2011).*

Although the defendant was not renting a motel room, he was staying there, and had his clothes and stuff there; therefore, he had standing. He was unlawfully detained when he consented, and that vitiated consent. State v. Woods, 311 Ga. App. 577, 716 S.E.2d 622 (2011)* [Ga.Ct.App. cases are only on LexisOne, but this case doesn’t show].

Consent to “look in” or “inspect” the interior of a car is consent to search under the case law. United States v. Guerrero, 806 F. Supp. 2d 992 (S.D. Tex. 2011).*

The written inventory policy of the North Las Vegas PD was not introduced, but it was testified to orally, and there was no serious cross-examination about it. Therefore, the court finds that the policy was established. Moreover, when the defendant got out of the vehicle that was being impounded, he asked to take two computers, which he was permitted to do, but the officer also saw a credit card encoding device and far too many gift cards for a normal person to have, and that was probable cause to believe that credit card theft was in the offing. United States v. Berhe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98360 (D. Nev. June 10, 2011).*

Defendant’s arrest was outside the house, and a protective sweep was unjustified on this record. Once inside, the father’s consent was tainted by the officers’ presence during the protective sweep. Diaz v. State, 34 So. 3d 797 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), is similar. Rozzo v. State, 75 So. 3d 409 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011):

Similarly, “exigent circumstances exist where the occupants of a house are aware of the presence of someone outside, and are engaged in activities that justify the officers in the belief that the occupants are actually trying to escape or destroy evidence.” Lee v. State, 856 So. 2d 1133, 1138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964)) (emphasis in original). Fears for officer safety based on generalizations about drug cases, rather than on any specific risk presented by the facts of defendant’s case, do not qualify as exigent circumstances. Lee, 856 So. 2d at 1139-40.

Police were called to an altercation in a rural area, and they walked down a gravel driveway. On the driveway, marijuana plants were plainly visible, and the view was reasonable. Dora v. State, 957 N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. App. 2011).*

The search of defendant’s car based on driving on a suspended license a year before Gant was invalid under Gant. The state sought a remand, but the court finds the record sufficient even though the suppression hearing was well before Gant. The state’s alternative of plain view fails because the gun was found after the car door was opened. State v. Johnson, 204 N.C. App. 260, 693 S.E.2d 711 (2010):

While the suppression hearing was focused on the constitutionality of the police officer’s stop of defendant, the record exceeds that scope, and covers in detail all aspects of the encounter including: the stop, the officer’s questioning of defendant regarding his license, defendant’s arrest for driving on a suspended or revoked license, defendant’s removal to the backseat of the patrol car, and the subsequent search of defendant’s car incident to his arrest.

The prosecutor’s questions at the hearing were designed to elicit all information concerning the officer’s stop and subsequent search of defendant’s vehicle. Further, Officer Dickerson’s detailed report concerning the entire incident was admitted at the hearing and is included in the record on appeal. According to the officers, defendant was arrested shortly after the stop. For instance, defendant was asked for his driver’s license; defendant admitted he did not have a license; and as a result, the officers immediately arrested defendant for driving with a revoked license. After being arrested, defendant was placed in the rear of the patrol car and Sergeant Osborne searched the car. While searching, Sergeant Osborne found a handgun after he opened the door and looked under the driver’s seat.

Defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended license, and a search of his person was conduct. Gant does not apply to searches of the person, only the car. State v. Whitney, 156 Wn. App. 405, 232 P.3d 582 (2010).*

While New Jersey recognizes automatic standing, not so with abandonment. Here, police had CI information that defendant was coming on a bus with drugs. The police met the bus in Union City and the passengers got off. They approached defendant to talk and he said that he had no luggage. On the bus remained one bag which was searched, and defendant clearly abandoned the bag. Stuff inside can be identified to him. State v. Carvajal, 202 N.J. 214, 996 A.2d 1029 (2010).*

The fact the police chief personally knew the CI since both were children enabled the chief to give the CI more credibility, and it was corroborated. The stop was based on reasonable suspicion. State v. Crowell, 204 N.C. App. 362, 693 S.E.2d 370 (2010).*

Where the trial court’s finding on a fact in granting a motion to suppress is not supported by any evidence, the appellate court can reverse it. State v. Battle, 2011 Ohio 6661, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 5488 (10th Dist. December 22, 2011).

The court credits the officer’s testimony that the drugs in this case were dropped from defendant’s blouse, and she was not made to lift it to cause them to fall out. United States v. Lighten, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147801 (W.D. N.Y September 20, 2011).*

Defendant’s furtive movements and driving a stolen car in Pennsylvania reasonably justified his patdown that produced a weapon used to kill a police officer in D.C. Johnson v. United States, 33 A.3d 361 (D.C. App. 2011).*

Previous finding of a zoning violation requiring an inspection thereafter did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Jensen v. County of Sonoma, 444 Fed. Appx. 156 (9th Cir. 2011) (unpublished)*:

Furthermore, given its finding that there was a zoning ordinance violation, the County’s order requiring the Jensens to schedule inspection to confirm abatement is reasonable and does not present a Fourth Amendment violation. See Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 923-924 (9th Cir. 2006); G.H. Love, Inc. v. Fleming, 161 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1947).

The deputies actions here were not sufficient to rise to a show of authority. There were no guns drawn and the tone was conversational. Defendant’s authority is distinguishable because there the defendant was ordered to have his hands on his head with his fingers interlaced for control. State v. Lantzsch, 244 Ore. App. 330 (2011), on remand from State v. Lantzsch, 349 Ore. 663, 249 P.3d 1281 (2011).

Officers had plenty of probable cause that defendant was in possession of drugs. When he was being followed, he went to a hotel room. It was reasonable to infer the drugs would have been there. United States v. Jones, 431 Fed. Appx. 714 (10th Cir. July 25, 2011).*

OFAC blocking order was a seizure but was not challenged, and a balancing of interests support the government’s actions so the evidence was not suppressed. United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011):

We agree with the Ninth Circuit’s assessment of the debilitating effect of a blocking order, but because the defendants have not challenged the order in this case, our analysis begins at a different point than Al Haramain [posted here], and the applicable balancing of interests yields a different result. Here, the unchallenged blocking order gave the Government complete control over both HLF’s assets and the premises and reduced the defendants’ interests to a minimum. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Al Haramain, the significant effects of a blocking order are “by design.” 660 F.3d 1019, Id. at * 22 (“[T]here is no limited scope or scale to the effect of the blocking order.”). Indeed, a “designation [as a SDT] is not a mere inconvenience or burden on certain property interests; designation indefinitely renders a domestic organization financially defunct.” 660 F.3d 1019, Id. at *10. Further, “[a] blocking order effectively shuts down the private entity.” 660 F.3d 1019, Id. at *22.

The text of the blocking order in this case demonstrates the Government’s control and the virtual elimination of any possessory and privacy interests held by the defendants in the assets and premises of HLF. The blocking order expressly directed all persons to leave the offices. It prohibited the defendants from engaging in any activity involving HLF’s property, and it even prohibited the defendants from occupying the premises without OFAC’s prior authorization. The warrantless imposition of these conditions has not been contested here. Unlike in Al Haramain, we are therefore faced with a presumptively valid order that stripped the defendants of any possessory interests in the HLF offices and assets. Any remaining privacy interest that the defendants had was minimal, and, as we discuss below, was protected by the subsequent warrant obtained prior to the Government’s search.

Balanced against the defendants’ significantly diminished privacy interests is the Government’s “extremely high” interest in preventing actions that could facilitate terrorism. Al Haramain, 660 F.3d 1019, 2011 WL 4424934, at *23. An important purpose of a blocking order is to prevent asset flight, which was a genuine concern in this case. The evidence here showed that the defendants had been funneling millions of dollars to organizations associated with Hamas. They were capable of quickly transferring large sums of money by wire transfer to overseas bank accounts controlled by HLF and others. These accounts were in locations such as the West Bank and Gaza, where they were likely to be beyond the reach of a judicial warrant. The Government therefore had a strong interest in moving quickly to prevent the flight of assets that could be used to further terrorist activity. See 660 F.3d 1019, id. at *23 (recognizing that “’asset flight’ is a legitimate concern”).

In addition to considering the competing interests of the defendants and the Government, we also consider the nature of the Government’s intrusion into the defendants’ interests. We address here an uncontested blocking order that has comprehensively restricted the defendants’ privacy and possessory interests. Viewed objectively, therefore, we believe that the Government’s mere transfer of HLF’s property from the offices to a storage facility pursuant to the blocking order, without invading the contents of the material, did not intrude into the defendant’s privacy or possessory rights any more than was reasonable under the initial blocking order. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115 (“The reasonableness of an official invasion of the citizen’s privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as they existed at the time that invasion occurred.”).

We stress the importance of the fact that the Government took custody of the property without searching it and secured it to prevent unauthorized use, loss, or destruction. As we have said, the Government was already permitted by IEEPA and the blocking order to control the property and the premises, and its transfer of the assets to storage did not further circumscribe the defendants’ interests. Had the Government actually examined the property before obtaining a warrant, this might be a different case.

Defendant who arrived at the house before the search began and during surveillance was not a “transient visitor” under the state definition, which is arriving during the search. Because he was there when the search started, he was subject to being searched. State v. Dean, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 930 (December 21, 2011).

Under the totality of circumstances, the government showed probable cause for the arrest of the defendant, so his search incident was valid. Because the district judge ignored authority on point, he is disqualified on remand. United States v. Steppello, 664 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 2011)*:

The government brought our decision in Gagnon to the district judge’s attention in its motion for reconsideration, but the district judge denied the motion without comment. When circumstances “might reasonably cause an objective observer to question [the judge’s] impartiality,” we have the power to remand the case to a different judge. Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1, 21 (2d Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc). We believe that is warranted here. Accordingly, we order that, upon remand to the district court, this case be transferred to a different judge.

Defendant’s wife had common authority to consent to a search of the house despite moving out because of defendant’s abuse. “‘There is a difference between voluntarily giving up your home and being forced to flee from it in fear for your life …’ U.S. v. Backus, 349 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress because the defendant’s wife, who fled as a result of the defendant’s abuse, still had enough common authority over, or a sufficient relationship to, the marital home to consent to a search of it).” Barnes v. State, 75 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

Defendant was stopped for a traffic offense, smelled of alcohol and admitted to being in a bar which just had happy hour. That was reasonable suspicion for a further detention. State v. Montelauro, 2011 Ohio 6568, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 5408 (10th Dist. December 20, 2011).*

The search and seizure issue raised on appeal was not the same one litigated in the trial court, so the issue is waived. State v. Williams, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 929 (December 15, 2011).*

The finding of one pill and a small bindle of drugs for personal use on defendant’s person during a traffic stop did not justify a search of his car under search incident or the automobile exception. There was no probable cause as to the car under Gant and Thornton because what was possessed here suggests nothing about the car. People v. Coates, 266 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2011):

The People offer no specific evidential hypothesis from which a fair probability of more contraband could be inferred, and we can discern none. While being wrapped in a piece of paper might suggest that the driver’s lone pill was not lawfully prescribed for him by a practitioner, see § 18-18-302(3)(c), C.R.S. (2011), the pill itself was clearly a prescription medication rather than contraband by its very nature. And whether lawful or not, possession of the single prescription pill in this case implied that the driver was the ultimate user and nothing more. Cf. Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 128 Cal. Rptr. 641, 547 P.2d 417, 427 (Cal. 1976) (small quantity of marijuana found in car indicative of personal use rather than distribution). As the People seem to acknowledge, nothing in the driver’s possession of a single prescription pill of Xanax, standing alone, created a fair probability that he had more of the same, and even if so, that he would be transporting it in the vehicle he was illegally driving rather than carrying any other pills he might have in his pocket, along with the sole pill discovered by the police.

Even assuming some degree of articulable suspicion, however, it is difficult to explain how the nervousness of an underage driver, stopped while unlawfully possessing a prescription drug, and his claim to have had a prescription for that drug, could in any way strengthen the inference, much less elevate suspicion to a “fair probability,” that more contraband would be found in the defendant’s vehicle. The reactions of the driver in this case would have been just as naturally explained simply by his having been stopped while driving illegally, in unlawful possession. See People v. Goessl, 526 P.2d 664, 665, 186 Colo. 208, 211 (1974). Nothing suggested the passengers were aware that the driver was carrying contraband, much less that they themselves were also in possession or acting as his suppliers. In fact, the testifying officer conceded that he had no other reason to believe more drugs would be found in the vehicle.

Loose tobacco can be a factor in the totality of circumstances for probable cause. State v. Simmons, 201 N.C. App. 698, 688 S.E.2d 28 (2010):

Although the State has cited a number of cases in its brief involving the presence of loose tobacco, State v. Jacobs, 162 N.C. App. 251, 253, 590 S.E.2d 437, 439 (2004) (stating during the recitation of the facts that the investigating officer, while examining the interior of a car, recovered a bundle of bills and noticed an odor of marijuana and the presence of loose tobacco that the officer believed to have come from hollowed-out cigars used to smoke marijuana); People v. Shabazz, 301 App. Div. 2d 412, 413, 755 N.Y.S.2d 20, 22 (2003) (holding that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the search of a car since a bag that had been thrown from the car contained a cigar that had been modified for the purpose of smoking marijuana and since loose tobacco or marijuana could be seen on the floorboard of the car); People v. Mays, 190 Misc. 2d 310, 315-17, 738 N.Y.S.2d 152, 157-58 (2001) (holding that a suppression motion should be denied since the defendant showed signs of impairment, since defendant was parked near a nightclub which was “a problem” at 4:00 a.m., and since there was a pile of loose tobacco in defendant’s car), the parties have not provided us with any authority tending to show that the mere presence of “cigar guts,” standing alone, is sufficient to justify a finding of probable cause. Instead, the available decisions tend to show merely that the presence of loose tobacco, along with other factors, may suffice to support a valid search and seizure. Thus, given that all of the cases dealing with loose tobacco are factually distinguishable from this case, we have no choice except to attempt to decide this case on the basis of general principles of search and seizure law.

CI’s basis of knowledge was shown by the fact that the informant said that he saw the defendant with drugs. United States v. Boxley, 2009 D.C. App. LEXIS 648 (D.C. December 31, 2009).*

Search of defendant’s car was lawful as an inventory search, so problematic inevitable discovery (State v. Weinstein, 12/3/09, posted here) did not have to be reached. State v. Morales, 154 Wn. App. 26, 225 P.3d 311 (2010).

Defendant’s pat down as a stopped potential truant was invalid because it was conducted without reasonable suspicion he was armed. T.M. v. State, 37 So. 3d 384 (Fla. App. 4th DCA 2010).*

“Once defendant punched Officer Porras, any allegedly unlawful conduct in stopping and questioning defendant was attenuated by his calculated, aggressive and wholly distinct conduct ….” People v. Holland, 2010 NY Slip Op 4922, 74 A.D.3d 520, 904 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1st Dept. 2010).*

“We find that the officer’s suspicion that Trejo was tired or impaired [as a driver] is not sufficient to constitute a reasonable basis for the traffic stop.” [The state actually argued, apparently with a straight face, that the defendant had no standing to challenge a search of her person.] Trejo v. State, 76 So. 3d 702 (Miss. App. 2010), aff’d 2011 Miss. LEXIS 602 (Miss., Dec. 15, 2011).*