WI: Four day search under warrant with two entries of the house was reasonable under the SW

The four day search of defendant’s property was reasonable under the “one warrant one search” rule, even though it included a second entry into defendant’s house on the property. He had a junk yard with over 3,000 cars on it, and all had to be searched. State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 124, 337 Wis. 2d 351, 804 N.W.2d 216 (2011):

P25 Based on our review of the circumstances existing at the time of the November 8 search, we are satisfied that it was a continuation of the ongoing search which commenced on Saturday, November 5. As in Squillacote, the number and type of items identified in the search warrant necessitated an extensive and exhaustive search. See Squillacote, 221 F.3d at 557. The lateness of the hour, the weather conditions, and the extensive and intensive nature of the search make it apparent that the search of Avery’s trailer could not have been completed on November 5. See id. Further, the continuous presence of law enforcement at the Avery salvage yard and their continuous control over Avery’s trailer from the time of the first search to the time of the sixth search belies any argument that the search of Avery’s trailer was fully executed at an earlier time.

P26 We therefore turn to the second inquiry—whether the decision to conduct another entry into Avery’s trailer to continue the search was reasonable under the circumstances. See Keszthelyi, 308 F.3d at 569. For the same reasons cited above, we are satisfied that the decision was not only reasonable but necessary, particularly given the evolving information and the accumulation of evidence during the ongoing search. Probable cause had not dissipated during the course of the earlier searches, but rather continued to mount as additional evidence was identified. See id. at 572 (continued probable cause is “critical to establishing the reasonableness of the second search”).

P27 We uphold the trial court’s ruling that “the multiple entries were part of a proper single execution of the November 5, 2005 warrant.” To require the government to obtain a new search warrant for the continued search under the circumstances of this case would be an unjustified burden. See Squillacote, 221 F.3d at 558. We turn next to the trial court’s alternative basis for denying Avery’s motion to suppress, namely that “the evidence would have been inevitably discovered.”