In a drug trafficking case, it is a reasonable inference for an issuing magistrate that drugs and guns will be kept in the trafficker’s home. United States v. Johnson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155885 (E.D. Ky. October 31, 2012), quoting United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 2008):

In a recent line of cases, we have held that an issuing judge may infer that drug traffickers use their homes to store drugs and otherwise further their drug trafficking. See, e.g., United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 393-94 (6th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Gunter, 266 Fed.Appx. 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished decision) (noting that our precedents establish that there is a nexus between a drug dealer’s criminal activity and the dealer’s residence when there is reliable evidence connecting the criminal activity to the residence); United States v. Newton, 389 F.3d 631, 636 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated in part on other grounds, 546 U.S. 803, 126 S.Ct. 280, 163 L.Ed.2d 35 (2005) (holding that in cases involving drug traffickers engaged in “continuing operations,” the “lack of a direct known link between the criminal activity and the residence[ ] becomes minimal”); United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that there was probable cause based on an affidavit that stated, in the affiant’s experience, many drug traffickers use their residences to conduct their drug trafficking activities). …

Defendant was stopped as a potential drug buyer leaving a house occasionally surveilled for apparent drug dealing. He was asked for his ID, and that led to finding a warrant for his arrest and he was searched incident to that arrest, not the original stop. The court finds that the stop was a Fourth Amendment violation, but attenuation analysis favored the state, and the search incident was not suppressed. State v. Strieff, 2012 UT App 245, 716 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 286 P.3d 317 (2012). The court gives a lengthy expose of Utah and Supreme Court case law on attenuation. Valuable reading for litigators, and maybe LEOs too. Just a paragraph:

[*P27] The court’s conclusion that Officer Fackrell’s conduct was neither purposeful nor flagrant is further supported by the circumstances of the encounter as a whole. The officer’s misconduct amounted to a misjudgment, one of constitutional proportion certainly, but a single misstep over the constitutional boundary rather than a deliberate transgression. See generally Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1990) (stating that conduct premised on an error about the officer’s authority “does not rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring prophylactic exclusion” of evidence); People v. Brendlin, 195 P.3d 1074, 1080 (Cal. 2008) (“[A] mere ‘mistake’ with respect to the… law[] does not establish that the… stop was pretextual or in bad faith.”). Moreover, from Strieff’s perspective, the degree of intrusion upon his rights, though real, was relatively minor. Even without reasonable, articulable suspicion, Officer Fackrell could legally have stopped Strieff and asked to see his identification, noted his name and date of birth, and then run a warrants check while Strieff remained free to leave. See, e.g., State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 34, 63 P.3d 650 (stating that there is no Fourth Amendment seizure when an encounter is consensual, as evidenced by a person voluntarily responding to noncoercive police questioning); State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1984) (per curiam) (concluding that no detention occurs when an officer merely asks a defendant for identification and for an explanation of his or her activities). Had a warrant then turned up, the officer would have had a constitutional basis for detaining Strieff as well as a professional obligation to arrest him. The situation that actually developed in this case is not so different as to suggest that the detention was either a deliberate or glaring violation of Strieff’s constitutional rights or the result of official indifference to them. And, although we accept the State’s concession that Strieff was not free to leave because Officer Fackrell retained his identification, we note that the furthest Officer Fackrell may have taken Strieff’s identification was to the officer’s nearby vehicle. Recognizing that such a minimal encroachment does not justify a Fourth Amendment violation, we nevertheless view the relatively slight intrusion as support for the district court’s conclusion that Officer Fackrell was not acting purposefully or flagrantly in detaining Strieff. See generally State v. Martin, 179 P.3d 457, 463-64 (Kan. 2008) (taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the officers’ encounter with the defendant, including the relatively minimal intrusion upon the defendant’s privacy by engaging him in a brief conversation about his activities, to conclude that the officer’s conduct was not purposeful). The purpose and flagrancy factor therefore weighs against suppression.

Unprovoked flight alone is not probable cause. It adds to reasonable suspicion, but it cannot be probable cause under Wardlow. United States v. Navedo, 694 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2012):

Our holding today reiterates that unprovoked flight, without more, can not elevate reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate into the probable cause required for an arrest. Rather, a person whom police approach is free to avoid a potential encounter with police by leaving the scene, and the rate of acceleration of the person’s gate as s/he leaves away is far too ephemeral a gauge to support a finding of probable cause, absent some other indicia of involvement in criminal activity. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991); Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98 (“The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.” (citations omitted)). Unprovoked flight can only elevate reasonable suspicion to probable cause if police have “reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances” to believe that an individual is engaged in criminal activity, as was the case in Laville. 480 F.3d at 194.

As discussed at length above, none of those circumstances are present here. The police had no reason to suspect that Navedo was himself involved in criminal activity, and even if they had appropriately formed such a suspicion, they would only have been entitled to detain and investigate, not arrest. We conclude, therefore, that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Navedo under the circumstances here and that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the physical evidence that was seized following that arrest.

The exclusionary rule can apply to deportation cases where there is widespread or an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment. “Lopez-Mendoza sanctions the application of the exclusionary rule in cases where constitutional violations by immigration officers are ‘widespread’ or evidence has been obtained as a result of ‘egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.’ Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51.” Appellant should have been able to prove it. Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney General of the United States, 694 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2012):

The BIA rejected Oliva-Ramos’s reliance on Lopez-Mendoza because it regarded the “comments from a plurality of the Supreme Court [to be] obiter dictum.” The BIA explained that the Court had not yet found circumstances sufficient to apply the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings, and the Board’s “own precedents … recognize no such exception to the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule premised on widespread Fourth Amendment violations.” There are several flaws in the BIA’s approach.

The BIA leapfrogged over the serious concerns it should have addressed under Lopez-Mendoza about the manner in which the evidence was obtained here. See Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234-35 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2005); Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 493 (9th Cir. 1994); cf United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 243 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Typically, the exclusionary rule requires that we suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search.”).

We must reject the BIA’s reading of Lopez-Mendoza that would only permit suppression of evidence based on “fundamentally unfair” circumstances in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The BIA’s analysis of Lopez-Mendoza views that opinion only as a plurality. In doing so, the BIA ignored the fact that almost all of the Justices on the Court agreed that the exclusionary rule should apply to some extent in removal hearings. As we explained above, eight of the nine Justices agreed with that proposition. Four would have limited the rule to instances of widespread or egregious violations of law by Government officials, and four others would apply the rule without that condition. See Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 778 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051-61 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting)); see also Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1448 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (same).

Moreover, even if the pronouncement in Lopez-Mendoza was dicta as the BIA labeled it, Supreme Court dicta should not be so cavalierly cast aside. …

The procedural rules of search warrants are ministerial and not a ground to suppress without prejudice to the target. Here, even the court where the warrant supposedly issued didn’t exist any more, but that didn’t matter. No substantive violation occurred. State v. Temple, 170 Wn. App. 156, 285 P.3d 149 (2012):

¶7 Temple next argues that the police violated the warrant procedures established by court rules. He identifies the following errors: (1) the search warrant affidavit, the search warrant, the search warrant return, and the search warrant inventory were not filed with the issuing court; (2) the search warrant return was not accompanied by the inventory of property seized; (3) the police did not provide Temple with a copy of the warrant or a receipt for the property seized; and (4) the search warrant inventory was not made in the presence of any other person and falsely states that it was. He concedes insufficiency of any one of these errors alone to invalidate the warrant, absent a showing of prejudice.

¶8 However, Temple contends that the cumulative effect of these procedural deficiencies raises constitutional considerations and requires suppression. However, he does not demonstrate how the alleged errors prejudiced him. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel conceded that nothing in Temple’s trial preparation would have changed if these procedures had been followed to the letter. As we noted in State v. Parker, “The rules for the execution and return of a valid search warrant are ministerial in nature. Absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant, procedural noncompliance does not compel invalidation of the warrant or suppression of its fruits.” The courts’ ministerial rules for warrant execution and return do not “flow so directly from the Fourth Amendment’s proscription upon unreasonable searches that failure to abide by them compels exclusion of evidence obtained in execution of a search warrant.” Temple’s constitutional argument fails.

Remember my rules:

1. There are no [longer any] technicalities under the Fourth Amendment.

Roommate did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of defendant’s separate bedroom and bathroom. State v. Robinson, 152 Idaho 961, 277 P.3d 408 (App. 2012):

The absence of locked doors does not mean that Mr. Daigneau had access to these rooms. While it does make it physically easier for him to enter these rooms, it is not uncommon for residents of a home to leave their bedroom doors unlocked. The fact that each bedroom was private and not communal is strengthened by the fact that each bedroom door was shut prior to the search commencing.

The fact that Mr. Daigneau slept at the residence does not mean that he has the actual authority to authorize the search of the entire residence. The same holds true for the fact that Mr. Daigneau listed the house in question as his residence. The State was aware prior to the search that Mr. Daigneau shared the residence with others. The probation forms list the other residents of the house, police officers on the scene the night before were aware that both [Robinson] and Mr. Daigneau lived at the residence, and the State was aware that Mr. Daigneau did not own the residence.

From these facts it is conclusive that Mr. Daigneau had actual authority only over his own bedroom and to some extent the common areas of the house. The extent of the search at that time should have been limited to communal areas and Mr. Daigneau’s private bedroom. It also must be noted that [one officer] testified that he did not know whose bedroom the back bedroom was.

The affidavit was more than just “bare bones,” and the good faith exception was satisfied. The question is not “just lacking” in probable cause, but so lacking that no reasonable officer could rely on it. United States v. Oldaker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25788 (N.D. W.Va. February 16, 2012).*

Officers had reasonable suspicion for a probation search, and probable cause was not the standard. United States v. Bolivar, 670 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2012).*

To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, an inventory did not require watch commander approval. The policy mentions it, but failure to follow is not a Fourth Amendment issue when the inventory is otherwise proper. State v. Stewart, 152 Idaho 868, 276 P.3d 740 (App. 2012),* Review denied by State v. Stewart, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 135 (Idaho, May 22, 2012).

“[T]he Court finds that the warrantless entry into the apartment was justified based on the fact that there was a violent altercation in the apartment, evidence of blood on people, the entrance, and inside the apartment and based on the information that individuals — including several children — and a firearm were said to be still inside. See Flores-Castaneda, 384 Fed. Appx. at 367; see also United States v. Rodriguez, 601 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that ‘domestic disputes often involve high emotions and can quickly escalate to violence’).” United States v. Fuentes, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153004 (E.D. Tex. November 10, 2011).*

Based on collective knowledge, officers had reasonable suspicion that a Honda and a cargo van driving in tandem from one place to another were hauling drugs in the van. The collective knowledge doctrine applies to reasonable suspicion. United States v. Montero, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153022 (W.D. Ky. November 1, 2011).*

Pulling up behind a car with just headlights on and the officer knocking on the window does not communicate that the person is not free to leave. State v. Randle, 152 Idaho 860, 276 P.3d 732 (App. 2012),* Review denied by State v. Randle, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 132 (Idaho, May 22, 2012).

Multiple 911 calls of shots fired with facts observed at the scene created a reasonable belief that a person was injured inside. (Critical factual findings of the trial court on the motion to suppress were unsupported by the record, so the court reviewed all de novo.) People v. Lomax, 2012 IL App (1st) 103016, 975 N.E.2d 115 (June 29, 2012):

[**P39] Multiple calls to 911 complaining that people overheard gunshots being fired created a reasonable belief that an emergency situation existed at the first-floor rear unit of the South Wells building and that someone was in need of aid. Defendant’s arguments to the contrary, which are that the police could not be sure whether or not the sounds were in fact gunshots and that none of the calls were made by anyone who had physically observed a gun, if accepted, would frustrate the purpose of the 911 emergency system. As the Seventh Circuit found in Hanson, multiple reasons exist as to why no one who had observed a gun had called 911. Hanson, 608 F.3d at 337. If someone had been shot and was in need of medical attention, he or she might not be able to operate a phone. Hanson, 608 F.3d at 337. Furthermore, anyone else in the apartment might have been afraid to call 911 because of threats of physical violence from the person holding the gun. Hanson, 608 F.3d at 337.

[**P40] The reasonableness prong of the test is determined by the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of entry. Ferral, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 705 (citing Griffin, 158 Ill. App. 3d at 51). The United States Supreme Court has cautioned courts against second-guessing the police’s assessment of the situation. Ryburn v. Huff, __ U.S. __, ___, 132 S. Ct. 987, 992 (2012) (per curiam). Police officers often must make split-second decisions, without the benefit of immediate hindsight, in situations that are often “‘tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.'” Ryburn, __ U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 992 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989)).

Hanson is Hanson v. Dane County, 608 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2010), posted here.

Officers entered defendant’s home looking for his missing wife and daughter and only performed a cursory walk through. The next day they came back to look for anything that might tell them where they were, and then they smelled decomposing bodies. The entries were valid, and the second entry was still justified under the emergency aid exception. Defendant was arrested in the U.K. and extradited, having flown there after the murders. Commonwealth v. Entwistle, 463 Mass. 205, 973 N.E.2d 115 (2012):

An objective analyst who knew what Sergeant Sutton knew — that he had taken only one or two steps into the master bedroom, that he did not have an unobstructed view of the entire bedroom from that vantage point, and that he had not entered the bathroom off the master bedroom — would conclude that the search conducted after the first entry had not reasonably eliminated the risk that a missing person was in need of assistance inside the home. Because the risk that the Entwistle family had suffered serious harm had grown more acute with another day having passed with no sign of the family and no word as to their whereabouts, there continued to be an objectively reasonable basis to enter the home again to search for them in areas that had not yet been searched, including the bathroom adjoining the master bedroom and the unexamined portion of the master bedroom. Contrast Peters, supra at 825 (“once three officers had swept through every room and saw nothing suspicious, it was extraordinarily unlikely that a dead or injured victim was within the house” [emphasis added]). Therefore, even though this was not the subjective basis relied on by the officers in making this second entry, we conclude that the second entry was justified under the emergency aid exception based on this separate and objectively reasonable basis for the entry.

The entry on January 22. When the police next entered the house on Sunday, January 22, there was an even greater objective basis to fear for the health and safety of the Entwistle family. Nearly twenty-four hours had passed since the first entry, and there was still no word from the defendant or his wife. Inquiries to local area hospitals in the previous twenty-four hours had yielded no results. The police knew from the first entry that the Entwistle automobile was not in the garage, but no relevant law enforcement query had been made regarding the vehicle and no police department had located the vehicle in response to the Hopkinton police broadcast. The family and friends of the defendant’s wife were so concerned that they wished to report the family as missing persons.

Previously, as to turning on a camera to see if the pictures would tell them anything:

In contrast, Officer O’Neil’s observation of the dates of the last photographs taken on the digital camera was not in plain view because he had to “turn on” the camera in order to determine the dates of the photographs. See id. (“Under Hicks, [supra,] it is clear that the Fourth Amendment forbids handling an item to expose something hidden”). We recognize that something more than a search for victims or suspects may be appropriate under the emergency aid exception where entry was made to search for a missing person, the missing person was not found within the house, and there is an objectively reasonable basis to believe that information in the home might shed light on her whereabouts. But we need not reach that issue here because, even if the officer’s search of the camera were unconstitutional, it proved harmless. All that was learned from the inspection of the camera was that photographs had last been taken on Thursday, January 19, and this evidence was cumulative of other testimony that the defendant’s wife was alive on that day. Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 456 Mass. 350, 355 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Peixoto, 430 Mass. 654, 660 (2000).

As to the camera search, is it logical to look at the camera to see if the pictures shed any light on the missing persons? Why not? But, the court doesn’t even decide it. Apparently nothing remotely incriminating was found. The pictures would potentially show when the missing were last seen.

Defendant told the police that he saw the bodies and left the U.S. to go back to England, where he was a citizen and originally met his wife when she was a student, without calling the police to report the murders. He bought a one way ticket. Could it be reasonably concluded that defendant abandoned his house and any reasonable expectation of privacy in it because, sooner or later, the decomp would become overwhelming and be smelled from outside by anybody in the area? This is never discussed by the court, but it is completely plausible.

Atlantic.com: What the ‘Bailey’ Case May Reveal About Supreme Court Ideology by Daniel Epps:

Imagine that the police have a warrant to search a house. Could they detain you — in handcuffs — just because you happen to be driving away from that house before the search?

That’s the issue in Bailey v. United States, which the Supreme Court will hear Thursday. (The case was originally scheduled for Tuesday, but umpire-in-Chief John Roberts declared a rainout due to Hurricane Sandy.)

Though the situation in Bailey is relatively rare, the way the Court decides the case could reveal a lot about the future of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.

The case arose, like so many Fourth Amendment cases do these days, out of a narcotics investigation. Police got a tip that someone nicknamed “Polo” was selling drugs out of the basement apartment of a house in Islip, New York.

Volokh.com: Thoughts on the Oral Arguments in the Dog Sniff Cases by Orin Kerr:

This morning I attended the oral arguments at the Supreme Court in the dog sniff cases, Florida v. Jardines and Florida v. Harris. Based on the arguments, my guess is that the state will win one and lose one. The Court will probably agree that the Fourth Amendment was violated in Jardines, in which the officer brought the dog to the front door and the dog sniffed for drugs. On the other hand, the Court will probably rule that the Fourth Amendment was not violated in Harris because the training the dog received was sufficient. Here are some impressions from the argument, as well as my guesses to where the future majorities may be (which of course are worth the electrons you paid for them): …

Officers placing photographic equipment on a grow operation in open fields was not a Fourth Amendment issue–there was no reasonable expectation of privacy there. United States v. Mendoza, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154750 (E.D. Wis. October 9, 2012). Update: CNET: Court OKs warrantless use of hidden surveillance cameras by Declan McCullagh; ArsTechnica here; Government Technology here.

Defendant stopped at the gate to Fort Campbell to provide ID before entering the base, and the officer on duty at the gate could smell the “pungent odor of alcohol.” That, according to an unpublished Kentucky case, at least, was reasonable suspicion for a stop. United States v. Riley, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154672 (W.D. Ky. October 29, 2012).

Defendant voluntarily consented. She had been Mirandized and had time to think about it on the drive back to her apartment before it happened. United States v. Lizarraras-Chacon, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154763 (D. Ore. October 29, 2012).*

WaPo: Supreme Court is asked to be skeptical of drug-sniffing dogs by Robert Barnes,

NEW SMYRNA BEACH, Fla. — Aldo the German shepherd and Franky the chocolate Lab are drug-detecting dogs who have been retired to opposite ends of the ultimate retiree state.

But their work is still being evaluated, and on Wednesday it will be before the Supreme Court. The justices must decide whether man’s best friend is an honest broker as blind to prejudice as Lady Justice, or as prone as the rest of us to a bad day at the office or the ma­nipu­la­tion of our partners.

…

For one thing, no national standard for certification exists. “There’s no such thing as a well-trained narcotics detection dog,” said Jeffrey Weiner, a criminal defense lawyer from Miami. “It means whatever a trial judge or appellate judge or Supreme Court justice wants it to mean.”

ABAJ: Chemerinsky: The Fourth Amendment Goes to the Dogs by Erwin Chemerinsky.

NPR here; NBC News here.

Prior post here.

Defense counsel representing both the driver and passenger of a car had a conflict of interest because it was obvious they had conflicting defenses to the charge. State v. Smith, 2012 Ohio 5020, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4397 (3d Dist. October 29, 2012):

[*P30] Under these circumstances, we do not see how one attorney could legitimately claim to give effective and impartial advice to serve both Defendants. It may have been different if Smith declined to accept the plea agreement because she professed her innocence, or if she was reluctant to testify against Brooks because of some sense of loyalty or fear of reprisal. However, Smith had already signed a confession admitting her guilt and implicating Brooks.

[*P31] If Smith’s counsel would have successfully pursued this plea offer on Smith’s behalf, the result would have detrimentally affected Brooks. See Moss, supra. As such, the existence and the terms of this plea offer establish that Smith’s counsel “actively represented conflicting interests,” and that the conflict “actually affected the adequacy of his representation.” See State v. Gillard, 78 Ohio St.3d at 552. Based on the facts in this case, Smith’s constitutional rights to effective and conflict-free representation of counsel were denied her at the plea bargaining stage.

[*P32] This Court has also recognized the trial court’s duty to conduct an inquiry into a possible conflict of interest to determine whether a defendant would receive the right to conflict free counsel guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Johnson, 185 Ohio App.3d 654, 2010 Ohio 315 ¶¶ 3-4 (3d.Dist), citing to Gillard. In Johnson, a review of several seminal United States Supreme Court cases clearly demonstrated that where a trial court knows or reasonably should know of an attorney’s possible conflict of interest in the representation of a person charged with a crime, the trial court has an affirmative duty to inquire whether a conflict of interest actually exists. Johnson, at ¶ 3, quoting Gillard, 64 Ohio St.3d at 309-312. When “a trial court breaches its affirmative duty to inquire, a criminal defendant’s rights to counsel and to a fair trial are impermissibly imperiled and prejudice or ‘adverse effect’ will be presumed.” Id.

Defendant was stopped for wandering over the centerline then an abrupt turn. He was seen stuffing something between the seats then jumped out of the car and headed toward the officers. That gave them concern for their safety and they may have pulled their guns. They had probable cause for a search of the car. State v. Whitfield, 2012 Ohio 5019, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4391 (9th Dist. October 29, 2012)* [No they didn’t. They had reasonable suspicion for a search of the seats for a possible weapon, which could have produced the same outcome, but it is NOT probable cause.]

Officers watching a drug house saw a car pull up, the passenger get out and go in, and come back out in five minutes. The car made a u-turn, and officers attempted a stop. Defendant fled from the car and dropped a baggie of crack which he admitted was his. Officers had reasonable suspicion for a stop. State v. Murray, 2012 Ohio 4996, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4381 (6th Dist. October 26, 2012).*

Cato.com: The Fourth Amendment in the Supreme Court This Week by Jim Harper:

Prior to the development of trade and commerce, movable property was “not esteemed of so high a nature, nor paid so much regard to by the law,” Blackstone tells us in his commentaries on the laws of England. Such property in transit was routinely confiscated by authorities or tariffed at exorbitant rates.

When commercial relations expanded, the quantity and value of personal property increased, and the law “learned to conceive different ideas of it.” Legal protection for movable property increased.

Where an impoundment policy mentions “suspicion,” the court requires that the suspicion be reasonable so the inventory search will be reasonable and less subject to the whim of the officer. United States v. Eckholt, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153614 (N.D. Iowa October 24, 2012):

The impoundment policy itself does not state that an officer’s “suspicion” must be “reasonable.” The policy simply states that to justify impoundment, an officer must “suspect” the vehicle was used to commit a public offense. If the policy does not require an officer’s suspicion be reasonable, however, then any suspicion at all would justify the search, giving an officer unfettered discretion to search any vehicle. The Court believes a “reasonableness standard” may be inferred. The issue before the Court, then, is whether Lt. Klunder had a “reasonable suspicion” that Defendant’s vehicle was “used in the commission of a public offense.” The Government argues that because Defendant had drug paraphernalia on his person, Lt. Klunder had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was used in the commission of drug or drug paraphernalia possession.

Defendant was stopped in a high crime area with at least reasonable suspicion. The fact there were drugs involved and the stop was a high crime area justified a patdown. The officer also articulated a fear [not facts] that defendant could have procured a weapon from the other person in the car. State v. Bales, 2012 Ohio 4968, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4349 (2d Dist. October 26, 2012):

[*P23] Additionally, it is well recognized that the need for a protective pat down becomes more urgent where drugs are involved. “The very nexus between drugs and guns can create a reasonable suspicion of danger to the officer.” State v. Thompson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-050400, 2006 Ohio 4285, ¶11. Further, “[r]ecognizing the prevalence of weapons in places where illegal drugs are sold and used * * * an officer’s fear of violence when investigating drug activity is a legitimate concern that will justify a pat-down search for weapons.” State v. Oatis, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-03-074, 2005 Ohio 6038, ¶ 23, citing State v. Taylor, 82 Ohio App.3d 434, 612 N.E.2d 728 (2d Dist.1992).

[*P24] We find that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Benge articulated a reasonable basis to believe that appellant may be armed and dangerous. The area in which the officers stopped appellant was known for its high rate of crime and specifically its high rate of drug crimes. Officer Benge testified that, based on her knowledge and experience as an officer, “weapons are synonymous with drugs. They go hand and hand.” Moreover, Officer Benge testified that she was concerned appellant may have obtained a weapon from the female passenger while they were in the back of the cruiser unhandcuffed. These factors, taken together and viewed objectively through the eyes of the officer on the scene, warrant a reasonable belief that appellant could be armed. Thus, the totality of the circumstances supports the trial court’s finding that Officer Benge’s pat down of appellant was proper.

Note: This is virtually a per se rule the way this is written.

Russia Today: Fourth Amendment freedom in focus of US Supreme Court today:

The US Supreme Court will hear today arguments against the 2008 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), upon which the government could obtain extended rights to spy on its citizens.

The arguments will be presented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).

Though the amendments are pursuing national security issues and not targeted at US citizens, they are, as the ACLU claim, violating the Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches.

The case is Clapper v. Amnesty International USA. [The Executive Branch of government is closed because of the hurricane, but the judicial branch isn’t.]