CA3: Unprovoked flight alone is not probable cause

Unprovoked flight alone is not probable cause. It adds to reasonable suspicion, but it cannot be probable cause under Wardlow. United States v. Navedo, 694 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2012):

Our holding today reiterates that unprovoked flight, without more, can not elevate reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate into the probable cause required for an arrest. Rather, a person whom police approach is free to avoid a potential encounter with police by leaving the scene, and the rate of acceleration of the person’s gate as s/he leaves away is far too ephemeral a gauge to support a finding of probable cause, absent some other indicia of involvement in criminal activity. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991); Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98 (“The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.” (citations omitted)). Unprovoked flight can only elevate reasonable suspicion to probable cause if police have “reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances” to believe that an individual is engaged in criminal activity, as was the case in Laville. 480 F.3d at 194.

As discussed at length above, none of those circumstances are present here. The police had no reason to suspect that Navedo was himself involved in criminal activity, and even if they had appropriately formed such a suspicion, they would only have been entitled to detain and investigate, not arrest. We conclude, therefore, that the police lacked probable cause to arrest Navedo under the circumstances here and that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the physical evidence that was seized following that arrest.