The stop should have ended when the officer gave a warning ticket, and he was made to stand in the rain while the officer continued on his investigative mission. United States v. Culp, 860 F. Supp. 2d 459 (W.D. Mo. 2012)*:

Here, the unfolding of the circumstances makes the detention much more akin to a prolonged investigatory expedition with the singular mission of searching Defendant’s vehicle than a permissible course of action reasonably directed toward the proper ends of the stop. The parties agree that the purpose of the traffic stop was concluded, at the latest, once Gillespie made the decision to only give Defendant a warning and not issue him a ticket, and so informed Defendant, returning his belongings, and asked Defendant if he had any questions. It was only after that point, that Gillespie embarked on an extensive course of investigation and questions aimed at conducting a search. …

Although Gillespie testified that he had already decided not to issue Defendant a ticket for “following too closely” and only give him a warning, he nonetheless returned to the driver’s side of Defendant’s vehicle, directed Defendant to get out of the car and had him move to the back of the vehicle, where he was further detained while Gillespie pursued a mission entirely separate from the underlying traffic violation. It is clear from the video recording that Defendant remained there, standing in the rain, at Gillespie’s behest, and would not have thought he was free to leave. Certainly, had Defendant believed that this was a mere consensual encounter at this point, he would not have remained in the pouring rain, in his shirt sleeves, while Gillespie ambled on with questions.

As the Sixth Circuit noted in Everett, “the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness.” 601 F.3d at 494. The Court “must conduct a fact-bound, context-dependent inquiry in each case.” Id. Having fully considered the circumstances as they unfolded during the stop, as viewed on the video recordings, in conjunction with Gillespie’s testimony, the Court finds no acceptable purpose for Gillespie’s extended detention and prolonged questioning of Defendant, pat-down, and persistent requests to search the vehicle, all after the purpose of the traffic stop had undisputedly ended.

Warrantless pre-Jones GPS monitoring was illegal, and the good faith exception would not be applied. United States v. Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d 560 (E.D. Ky. 2012):

The Court, on referral, considers a motion to suppress. In sum, this is a case about legitimate law enforcement objectives pursued in an illegitimate way. Eight months after receiving a tip that Defendant was engaged in marijuana trafficking, law enforcement attached a global positioning tracking device on Defendant’s car, believing that the law allowed for the installation of that device without a warrant. That belief turned out to be wrong. Although the Supreme Court held that such a warrantless installation of a tracking device violates the Fourth Amendment after the investigation giving rise to this case, the exclusionary rule applies and requires the suppression of evidence obtained through the installation and use of that tracking device. Unfortunately, the cost of suppression is high—Defendant was found with large quantities of marijuana and made damaging admissions, which support a Class A felony marijuana trafficking charge. Defendant’s criminal history category, previously determined by this Court to be the worst possible under the Guidelines, underscores Defendant’s propensity for dangerous criminal behavior. Indeed, Defendant admitted to marijuana trafficking while on supervised release from a previous Judgment of this Court.

For a variety of reasons, however, the deterrence benefits of suppression outweigh its heavy costs. This is so primarily because no unequivocal precedent allowed for the warrantless installation of the tracking device. Instead, law enforcement interpreted various cases to support their decision not to seek a warrant. Of course, it is the business of the courts to interpret the law. In the absence of unequivocal precedent allowing for the government’s installation of the tracking device, suppression is necessary. Thus, as more fully described below, having reviewed the evidence, briefs, and arguments submitted by counsel, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the motion to suppress.

Officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was a trespasser on the apartment complex where he was stopped, but the CI’s information that he was a drug dealer was not corroborated or specific, and the pat down exceeded the purpose of the stop. United States v. Pressley, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54096 (D. Conn. May 20, 2011).*

A truck stop employee found a quantity of heroin and cocaine in a baggie in the bathroom, and called the police. He had a description of a person who could have lost it and the car she came in. The police staked out the truck stop and, four hours later, a car arrived and a man got out and looked on the ground in the parking lot with a flashlight. He saw the police and left. The officer stopped the vehicle, and close up could see it matched the description given by the truck stop employee. The stop was with reasonable suspicion. It led to a valid search under the automobile exception. State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 266 P.3d 1161 (App. 2011).

Statutory county court judge that issued the search warrant lacked authority to issue a search warrant out of court under their enabling legislation. District court judges do have such jurisdiction under the constitution. Sanchez v. State, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 3824 (Tex. App.—Houston (1st Dist.) May 19, 2011).*

Execution of search warrant two months after child pornography was received did not make it stale, considering courts have sustained search warrants based on information nearly a year old in child porn cases. United States v. Richardson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54272 (S.D. Fla. May 16, 2011).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the search of defendant’s computer for child pornography because he would lose on the merits. The search was not timely, but not unconstitutionally stale, and the warrant was issued with probable cause. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 266 P.3d 1169 (App. 2011).*

Defendant’s stop was [barely] supported by reasonable suspicion when he finally [albeit reluctantly] consented to a search of the car for a weapon which he admitted he had. State v. Taylor, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 356 (May 20, 2011).*

A game warden was investigating a trespassing hunter, and the hunter claimed, showing a permission slip, that he was on defendant’s land with permission. The game warden went to defendant’s house to check it out. The house was 300′ from the road [no mention of curtilage] and he went to the front door, observing a marijuana plant 12-15″ high growing in the front flower bed. Nobody answered the door, but the officer got a search warrant for defendant’s house. One paragraph of completely unverified hearsay was in the affidavit, which should not have been there, but there was probable cause otherwise. And the GFE was enough, too. State v. Burks, 2011 Ohio 3529, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2987 (3d Dist. July 18, 2011).*

Defendant’s car was stopped for a traffic offense, and the officer received sufficient information from other officers to give “collective knowledge” reasonable suspicion that drugs might be found to detain him long enough to get a drug dog there. The dog’s alert gave probable cause. State v. Kelley, 2011 Ohio 3545, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2995 (4th Dist. July 14, 2011).*

The search warrant for defendant’s house was based on information from pharmacy employees who were CIs that defendant was over-purchasing pseudoephedrine, and the employees did not have to be identified to show they were believable. The showing of nexus to the house created a fair inference that evidence of methamphetamine manufacture would be found there. State v. Harper, 152 Idaho 93, 266 P.3d 1198 (App. 2011).*

Officers’ alleged failure to knock before entry was entitled to qualified immunity or was constitutionally justified. The officers knew that a gun was likely involved, and the search warrant included weapons. Under Richards and Wilson, this was sufficient to dispense with announcement for officer safety. Youngbey v. March, 400 U.S. App. D.C. 177, 676 F.3d 1114 (2012).*

Defendants were moving around from room to room in a hotel, and vacated two rooms. The police had probable cause to search the rooms they were in as well as the abandoned rooms for firearms. A gun was actually abandoned in one of the vacated rooms. United States v. Albury, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53644 (M.D. Fla. April 17, 2012).*

Officers searching a computer hard drive had the benefit of the plain view doctrine when they came upon obvious chat logs and foreign travel information. United States v. Johnston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53323 (E.D. Cal. April 16, 2012).*

The Nation: Checking Big Brother by David Cole:

What if the government was tapping your phone unconstitutionally, and there was nothing you could do about it? That’s just life in the United States of America, at least according to the Justice Department. On Monday, October 29, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli Jr. argued in the Supreme Court that, for all practical purposes, the most expansive authority Congress has ever given the government to intercept Americans’ international phone calls and e-mails could not be challenged in court, even by the very people most likely to be harmed by it.

Officers responded to a domestic abuse call and entered without a warrant and guns drawn when they got no answer. Defendant was in the shower with loud music playing and he did not respond to the officers’ knock or calling out. Instead of going to the bathroom, they lifted the flap of a suitcase laying open and found a gun. The search of the suitcase was without exigent circumstances. State v. Roberson, 2012 Ohio 5106, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4468 (2d Dist. November 2, 2012)*:

[*P25] At the close of the suppression hearing, counsel for the State argued that the exigent circumstance was the weapon itself. Tr. 46. However, the mere presence of firearms does not create an exigent circumstance. United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir.1994); State v. Sharpe, 174 Ohio App.3d 498, 2008 Ohio 267, 882 N.E.2d 960, at ¶ 50 (2d Dist.).

[*P26] Furthermore, we do not agree that the search of the suitcase necessarily would increase officer safety. The search of the suitcase would result in one of two scenarios. First, if a firearm was found in the suitcase, then the firearm had already been secured by the police and therefore the firearm posed no immediate risk to anyone, including the officers. Under this scenario, the search of the suitcase would do nothing to increase officer safety. We acknowledge that the discovery of the gun in the suitcase may have provided the police with additional comfort or relief as they ultimately approached the bathroom to get Roberson to exit. But the search of the suitcase itself in an apartment that had already been secured would not increase officer safety.

[*P27] On the other hand, discovery that the weapon was not in the suitcase would do nothing to secure the safety of the officers “as the whereabouts of the gun would still be unknown.” State v. Simmons, 4th Dist. Highland No. 05CA4, 2006 Ohio 953, ¶ 43. While it is true that the discovery that the gun was not located in the suitcase may have put the officers on heightened alert that Roberson may have the gun on his person in the bathroom, the officers had already been made aware that this was a possibility. Indeed, beginning with their entry into the apartment, the officers had proceeded with their guns drawn, as if Roberson had the gun on his person. This is completely understandable given that police officers often have to proceed with the utmost caution, assuming the worst-case scenario, in order to ensure the protection of the public and themselves. This is especially true when a firearm is involved. While we do not minimize the need for officer safety, we do not agree that the search of the suitcase was necessary or helpful to ensure officer safety in the particular facts of this case.

Defendant was excluded from the house searched by an ex parte order of the domestic relations court and the locks had been changed. The fact he had a deed giving him an interest in the property was not determinative, and he had no standing to challenge the search of the house. State v. Cannon, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 900 (October 30, 2012)

The defendant’s first challenge to the trial court’s conclusion that she had no standing to challenge the searches is that the pending divorce action between the parties, and the accompanying ex parte order granting the victim exclusive possession of their former marital residence, abated with his death. However, even assuming the defendant is correct in this assertion, the operation of civil law is not dispositive of the Fourth Amendment inquiry. As our Supreme Court has explained, “[i]n defining the scope of [Fourth Amendment protections], we adhere to the view expressed in [prior] cases that arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like, ought not to control.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. Rather, “‘(n)o one circumstance is talismanic to the Rakas inquiry.'” Turnbill, 640 S.W.2d at 46 (quoting United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1154-1155 (5th Cir. 1981)).

The defendant also directs our attention to the fact that the victim had surrendered his interest in the marital home to the defendant via a quit claim deed in 2005, and consequently, the defendant was the sole title holder of record of the home at the time of the searches. The defendant further directs our attention to evidence in the record that the defendant and the victim were engaged in an “on-again, off-again” relationship during the months preceding the murder, that they were attempting to reconcile at the time of the victim’s death, and that the defendant stored some of her clothing at the house. While these facts standing alone might tend to favor the defendant, they are insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence when viewed in the context of the record as a whole. At most, they establish that the defendant had an ownership interest in the property searched and a subjective expectation of privacy. However, mere title “does not establish a privacy interest in property, State v. Smith, 656 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), and these two factors must be balanced against the remaining Turnbull and other relevant factors.

A person who does not live at a residence and who has no key to a residence usually has no reasonable expectation of privacy in that residence. See State v. Transou, 928 S.W.2d 949, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). It is undisputed that the defendant lived in a separate location—an apartment located approximately one-half of a mile from the residence at issue. Moreover, the defendant has failed to direct our attention to any clear evidence in the record that supports her claim that she still had a key to the residence that functioned after (as record testimony reflects) the victim had the locks changed following her departure on May 5, 2008.

Police were investigating regular interstate shipment of drugs, and defendant was suspected of picking up one of the packages. Defendant fled from a traffic stop, and the officer was able to confront him with a Taser, ordering him to the ground. That was not unreasonable. United States v. Clement, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157814 (W.D. La. October 11, 2012)*:

Using some force on a subject, pointing a weapon at a suspect and handcuffing a suspect, whether singly or in combination, does not automatically convert an investigatory detention into an arrest requiring probable cause. Campbell, 178 F.3d at 349 citing Sanders, 994 F.2d at 206. This is particularly the case when officers are investigating drug transactions where safety may be a concern, as drugs and firearms are commonly found in connection with each other. See United States v. Majors, 328 F.3d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[F]irearms are tools of the trade for those engaged in illegal drug activities.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126, 132 fn. 20 (5th Cir. 1992).

Jonathan Turley: The Watering Down of the Fourth Amendment by Lawrence E. Rafferty (guest blogger):

We all know or should know the Fourth Amendment and how it protects all citizens from an illegal search and seizure of our property and person. “‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’” Cornell Law

Over the years, this valuable right has been watered down. Recently, the Roberts Court heard arguments in a case that did not get much media attention. That case involved a man who was arrested and detained after a traffic stop just because he had been in an apartment that the police had just exercised a search warrant. The name of the case is Bailey v. United States and oral arguments in front of the Supreme Court were heard on November 1st, 2012. Bailey v. United States. The narrow issue that the Supreme Court is deciding is whether an individual can be detained by the police merely because he recently left a residence before the police executed a search warrant at that location. Sounds like a no brainer, doesn’t it?

The Hill: Police drones prompt privacy concerns by Brendan Sasso:

Drones are well-known for their ability to hunt down suspected terrorists abroad, but they have also increasingly become a popular tool of police departments around the country.

Drones are cheaper to build and fly than helicopters, making them a cost-effective option for police departments looking to gain a bird’s eye view of a scene. But privacy groups are sounding alarm that there aren’t enough legal safeguards in place to prevent drones from being used for mass surveillance.

The privacy groups are pushing Congress to pass a law that would set nationwide restrictions on how police can use drones.

Security Theater: WaPo: Airport security checks are vulnerable to fake boarding passes, experts warn by Astrid Riecken:

More than 11 years after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, it remains possible to use fake boarding passes to get through airport security checks, according to new evidence from security researchers and official documents.

The security vulnerabilities could allow terrorists or others on “no-fly” lists to pass through airport checkpoints with fraudulent passes and proceed through expedited screening. They could even allow them to board planes, security analysts warn.

A reference to the drug crimes statute in a search warrant was a mere scrivener’s error where the search warrant clearly was looking for semen on sheets. Magness v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 609, 2012 Ark. App. LEXIS 721 (October 31, 2012):

Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of his cabin based on his allegation that the warrant’s reference to section 5-64-401 in the description of the property to be seized rendered it defective. Highly technical attacks on search warrants are not favored because the success of such attacks could discourage law-enforcement officers from utilizing search warrants. [Moss v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 14, ___ S.W.3d ___.] Moreover, to uphold the validity of an affidavit made in support of a search warrant, it is not necessary that the affidavit be completely without inaccuracy as long as the inaccuracies are relatively minor when viewed in the context of the totality of the circumstances, including the affidavit taken as a whole and the weight of the testimony of the participants who procured and executed the search warrant. Moss, supra.

SailFeed.com: Coast Guard Boardings and Your Fourth Amendment Rights, Part 2 & Part 3 by Clark Beek

Officers with an arrest warrant had probable cause, not just reasonable suspicion which is all that is required, to believe that defendant was in a camper, so they could enter it. United States v. Locke, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155207 (E.D. Tenn. October 29, 2012),* R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156221 (E.D. Tenn. August 29, 2012).*

Defendant’s stop was based on a purported hostage of a smuggler calling 911 and identifying herself. That was entitled to more reliability. United States v. Lagos, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155108 (S.D. Tex. October 30, 2012).*

Property owner’s Fourth Amendment administrative warrant claim changed on appeal, so the change was defaulted. Levitt v. City of Oak Ridge, 2012 Tenn. App. LEXIS 753 (October 30, 2012).*

Defendant admitting that he committed the traffic violation that led to the stop, his pretext argument fails. United States v. Ford, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155208 (E.D. Tenn. October 30, 2012),* R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156222 (E.D. Tenn. August 17, 2012).*

Defendant failed to show IAC of defense counsel in not challenging the search under a warrant for the multi-resident house he lived in where his pleading was not helpful, the cases cited were no help, and he failed to show how the police violated the Fourth Amendment. Ables v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155220 (S.D. Ohio October 30, 2012).*

Defendant raised and lost the search and seizure issue in the direct appeal, and he offers nothing to permit revising it. Smith v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155083 (S.D. Ill. October 30, 2012).*

The court declines to view each paragraph of the affidavit separately because it has to consider the totality of the circumstances. On the totality, there is probable cause. A search of defendant’s detached garage was permissible under a search warrant for the house. United States v. Green, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156068 (N.D. Ohio October 31, 2012).*

Four men went into a house when a police showed up in the neighborhood. They could see a gun in defendant’s waistband, and he was last in. That was a furtive movement first, and reaching for a gun was probable cause. The officer was acting reasonably giving pursuit and then stopping for the gun when it was discarded in flight through the house. State v. Gibson, 2012 La. App. LEXIS 1354 (La. App. 5 Cir. October 30, 2012).*

The court concludes that the officers are not believable and the officers were searching defendant’s apartment without a warrant or exigent circumstances when they obtained his consent which could not be voluntary. United States v. Johnson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155710 (E.D. Pa. October 31, 2012).

Notice of forfeiture provides due process so there is no Bivens claim for such forfeitures. Rankin v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156034 (S.D. Miss. October 31, 2012).*

The SW was based on IP access to child pornography, and it was in somebody else’s name. That, however, does not invalidate the search warrant, and the cases defendant cites in his 2255 don’t support his claim. Ables v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155220 (S.D. Ohio October 30, 2012).*

“[A] general statistical inquiry into the background of individual canine units” should be avoided by the courts. United States v. King, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155647 (D. Kan. October 31, 2012):

The [Tenth Circuit] further cautioned against a general statistical inquiry into the background of individual canine units:

[I]t surely goes without saying that a drug dog’s alert establishes probable cause only if that dog is reliable. But none of this means we mount a full-scale statistical inquisition into each dog’s history. Instead, courts typically rely on the dog’s certification as proof of its reliability. After all, it is safe to assume that canine professionals are better equipped than judges to say whether an individual dog is up to snuff. And beyond this, a dog’s credentials provide a bright-line rule for when officers may rely on the dog’s alerts – a far improvement over requiring them to guess whether the dog’s performance will survive judicial scrutiny after the fact. Of course, if a credentialing organization proved to be a sham, its certification would no longer serve as proof of reliability. But the judicial task, we hold, is so limited: to assessing the reliability of the credentialing organization, not individual dogs. And in this case there is no suggestion that the California Narcotic Canine Association, the organization that credentialed the drug dog in this case, is all smoke and mirrors.

[United States v. Ludwidg, 641 F.3d 1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 2011)]. (emphasis added, citations omitted).

OK, so there is no defense to the alleged “well trained” drug dog?

Cop talk adopted by the court: Not “dog”; it’s now “canine unit.”