One defendant in this § 1983 case argued that his entry into plaintiffs’ home was de minimus and, therefore, reasonable. The Sixth Circuit disagreed that a de minimus entry is reasonable, finding support in Payton and Steagald. Andrews v. Hickman County, 700 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 2012):

Finally, Wade argues that his actions were de minimis and thus qualify for an exception where conduct that technically qualifies as a warrantless search or seizure may be found reasonable and thus excused due to the minor nature of the violation. The de minimis rationale has been recognized in limited circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984). Wade cites Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001), to support his claim that his intrusion was de minimis and reasonable. However, McArthur is clearly distinguishable from Wade’s alleged conduct. McArthur involved the temporary seizure of an individual and a trailer while law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant. The officers had been told by the individual’s wife that she had just seen the individual in question hide drugs in the trailer in which he lived. Id. at 329. An officer then proceeded to prevent the individual from reentering the trailer for the two hours it took another officer to obtain a warrant. Id. Unlike the officer in McArthur, Wade and Chessor did not enter the Andrews’ home to preserve the status quo while a warrant was sought. Wade had no intention of seeking a warrant or preserving evidence when he stepped into the Andrews’ home. In addition, Wade’s entry into the home was not de minimis. Under either his account or that of the Plaintiffs, he fully entered the Andrews’ home, unlike the officer in McArthur who remained in the doorway observing the individual when he was allowed to reenter the trailer for cigarettes and to use the phone. See id. Further, Wade cannot rely on cases such as United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984), which held that the destruction of a small amount of cocaine during a field test of the substance was a de minimis seizure, because his violation is an invasion of a different degree. Indeed, even in Jacobsen the Supreme Court emphasized that, despite its holding, “where more substantial invasions of constitutionally protected interests are involved, a warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances.” 466 U.S. at 125 n.28. The Court cited Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980), and Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981), to support the proposition, suggesting that cases implicating warrantless in-home searches and arrests are not appropriate for de minimis arguments. See id.

Wade carried out a warrantless, non-consensual entry into the Andrews’ home. As Payton instructs, “the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” 445 U.S. at 590. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Andrews, a violation of the Andrews’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures has been shown.

If Brady likely applies to suppression motions, there was no showing that the evidence was sufficiently impeaching to change the outcome. United States v. Harmon, 871 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. N.M. 2012).*

Circuit courts have split on the issue whether Brady v. Maryland’s restrictions apply to suppression hearings, although it is not likely that a prosecutor must disclose impeachment evidence before a suppression hearing in light of the Supreme Court’s conclusion in United States v. Ruiz that a prosecutor does not have to disclose impeachment evidence before the entry of a guilty plea. In an unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit, without discussing whether Brady v. Maryland applies to a suppression hearing, rejected a defendant’s argument that the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose impeachment evidence before a suppression hearing on the basis that the evidence was not impeachment evidence and not material. See United States v. Johnson, 117 F.3d 1429, 1997 WL 381926 at *3 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision). …

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has recognized that “it is hardly clear that the Brady line of Supreme Court cases applies to suppression hearings,” because “[s]uppression hearings do not determine a defendant’s guilt or punishment, yet Brady rests on the idea that due process is violated when the withheld evidence is ‘material either to guilt or to punishment.'” United States v. Bowie, 198 F.3d 905, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Without deciding the issue and in an unpublished opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit quoted with approval this language from United States v. Bowie. See United States v. Bullock, 130 F.App’x 706, 723 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (“Whether the suppression hearing might have come out the other way, however, is of questionable relevance to the Brady issues at stake here.”). The Fifth Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, before the Supreme Court issued its United States v. Ruiz decision, that Brady v. Maryland restrictions apply to suppression hearings. See United States v. Barton, 995 F.2d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e hold that the due process principles announced in Brady and its progeny must be applied to a suppression hearing involving a challenge to the truthfulness of allegations in an affidavit for a search warrant.”); Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 965-66 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Timing is critical to proper Brady disclosure, and objections may be made under Brady to the state’s failure to disclose material evidence prior to a suppression hearing.”), vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930 (1992)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, under its precedent and the law from other circuits, it was not “obvious” for clear-error purposes that “Brady disclosures are required prior to suppression hearings.” United States v. Scott, 245 F.3d 890, 902 (7th Cir. 2001).

Defendant’s neighbors called to complain of a strange odor coming from his house. The fire department inserted a gas detection device by moving an air conditioner. In the course of that, they saw marijuana spread out on a table. The exigencies of the situation justified that entry. State v. Luong, 2012 Ohio 4519, 977 N.E.2d 1075 (12th Dist. October 1, 2012),*

There was probable cause to stop the car for either a traffic offense or possession of cocaine based on collective knowledge. United States v. Lincoln, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142836 (N.D. Ga. October 2, 2012).*

Defendant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel by defense counsel withdrawing part of the motion to suppress that would have lost anyway. State v. Dominguez, 2012 Ohio 4542, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3996 (12th Dist. October 1, 2012).*

New law review article: Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, __ N.C. J.L. & Tech. __ (2013):

Abstract:

United States v. Jones, in which the Court unanimously held that month-long Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking of a vehicle constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, did not in itself tell us too much. The government took an egregious position, and therefore lost nine to zero. We now apply a resurrected trespass-based conception of search, but we know extremely little about how to do so and what results it will alter. We know five Justices believe long-term location tracking is typically a search because it invades a reasonable, seemingly empirical, expectation of privacy. And we know one Justice is willing to reconsider the entire third party doctrine, which holds that one typically retains no Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in information conveyed to another.

But when we take a broader view, it is not merely one Justice who will not apply the third party doctrine in a strong form, and thus I have previously written the doctrine’s obituary. Jones fits nicely within a string of cases in which the Court is cautiously developing new standards of Fourth Amendment protections, rather than declaring generally applicable categorical rules. Given that it was a grand pronouncement of an allegedly categorical rule in United States v. Miller that has caused much of the trouble, this strikes me as a sensible way to proceed. I expect the road will not be smooth, but we are used to zigs and zags in the Fourth Amendment. It is hard to imagine anything less when the High Court is attempting to ferret out what is reasonable, which requires balancing private and law enforcement interests, and when technology, policing, crime, and social norms are constantly in flux.

Much of the ground has been plowed before, both by myself and others dating back many years, which calls for brevity. Indeed, Jones will surely spark a new crop of Fourth Amendment papers, the authors of some of which will read what has gone before and some of whom will not. But Jones provides a nice hinge around which to discuss where the Fourth Amendment has been and where it might be going – and more generally where citizens’ protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, which do not depend solely upon the Fourth Amendment, might be going. Here I will content myself with that relatively high level, and like many others I will begin in other fora to drill down into specifics of how the Fourth Amendment should apply to the particular techniques of location tracking.

The court finds a valid basis for a traffic stop to check a paper temporary tag in the back window that just wasn’t visible at night. It was valid, but it led to a dog sniff and finding drugs. United States v. Givens, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182909 (N.D. Iowa December 31, 2012).*

During a traffic stop for speeding, the officer saw numerous indications of possible drug trafficking from defendant’s story and looking at his vehicle which apparently had a hidden compartment. Parts of the reasonable suspicion came from a tip relayed by another trooper, heavy masking odors, a recently registered vehicle, nervousness, vague and inconsistent answers to travel questions, and a criminal history that included drug convictions and an open investigation. The detention was reasonable and led to valid consent. Moreover, the dog alert gave probable cause. United States v. Urias, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182879 (D. Utah December 7, 2012).*

Defendant was convicted of running a ponzi scheme from his house, and a search warrant had been executed on the records there. There was no motion to suppress filed, and he raised that in a 2255 petition claiming that his private journal had religious sentiment in it. He argued that this was a violation of self-incrimination, and apparently a violation of the First Amendment. As to self-incrimination, that’s a dead argument since Fisher v. United States. The argument is meritless, and defense counsel can’t be ineffective for raising a meritless claim. Johnson v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182843 (W.D. Va. December 28, 2012).*

The trial court’s credibility determination that defendant consented to a search during a traffic stop was affirmed on appeal. State v. Scott, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1087 (December 28, 2012).*

Officer went to defendant’s door for a knock-and-talk and saw things in plain view that were subject to seizure. When defendant didn’t answer, the officer went to another door, this one on the side which was also visible from the street. Going to the back door would have been more troubling, but that’s not the case. State v. Ronewicz, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1085 (December 26, 2012):

The officer’s decision to move from the front door to the “back” door of the defendant’s residence while conducting the “knock and talk” is more troubling. This court has cautioned on numerous occasions that the “knock and talk” exception is not an open license for police officers to prowl through the yards of private citizens or peer through their windows. “Any substantial and unreasonable departure from an area where the public is impliedly invited exceeds the scope of the implied invitation and intrudes upon a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy.” Harris, 919 S.W.2d at 624 (internal quotation omitted). When Detective Howell stepped off the presumably well-worn path from the street to the defendant’s front door, he began treading on constitutionally-dangerous turf.

However, it is plain from the testimony and exhibits we have reviewed in this case that what the parties refer to as the “back” door of the defendant’s residence was actually more akin to a side door, as it was visible from the public street (because the defendant’s house was located on a corner lot), there was a path leading to it, and it was not fenced-in. …

Defendant’s claim that his teenage son was not able to legitimately consent to a police entry into the house was not in the motion to suppress nor specifically raised at the hearing, so it is waived. State v. Preston, 2012 Ohio 6176, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 5323 (12th Dist. December 28, 2012).

While the “motion to suppress was the sort of ‘shotgun,’ unfocused motion that courts disfavor,” the state was still on notice as to the issue. Defendant prevailed on the motion to suppress, and it’s affirmed. “[T]his judgment entry is not an opinion of the court.” State v. Gottesman, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 5325 (1st Dist. December 26, 2012):

While we agree that Gottesman’s motion to suppress was the sort of “shotgun,” unfocused motion that courts disfavor, we need not reach the issue of whether it was specific enough. The record indicates that the state was aware that Gottesman was raising the issue of probable cause to arrest. Further, without the testimony of the arresting officer, the state could not prove that the officer had had probable cause to arrest Gottesman, and numerous other issues related to the search and seizure. The trial court had little choice but to grant the motion to suppress.

The state further argues that Gottesman failed to meet his initial burden of showing that he was arrested without a warrant. See Xenia at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus. But this court has stated that while Xenia places the burden on the defendant to show the absence of a warrant, “this requirement should not be given a hypertechnical construction.” State v. Petrosky, 1st Dist. Nos. C-900264 and C-900265, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1257, *5 (Mar. 27, 1991). The record as a whole shows that the arresting officer did not have a warrant to arrest Gottesman. See id. at *5-6.

Defendant’s claim he didn’t flee–he merely walked away to a porch and sat down. That was flight enough for reasonable suspicion. United States v. Colbert, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182322 (N.D. Ill. December 27, 2012):

Defendant nevertheless argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion because Defendant did not “flee” from the police but simply ran onto a porch and sat down. (Def.’s Mot. Quash & Suppress 6.) But Defendant began running away from the officers when the man on the corner appeared to have alerted Defendant of their presence. Running upon noticing the police is highly evasive behavior. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 at 124 (“Headlong flight — wherever it occurs — is the consummate act of evasion”). Furthermore, courts regularly find evasive behavior short of the type at issue here sufficient to warrant a Terry stop. See, e.g., Oglesby, 597 F.3d at 894 (finding defendant’s actions in slowly taking a few steps away from a group while looking from side to side and angling his body away from the police officers were pertinent factors in determining reasonable suspicion); U.S. v. Harris, 188 Fed. Appx. 498, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2006) (“We have held that walking away quickly in the face of commands by police officers to stop is evasive behavior that contributes to the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion.”); U.S. v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop and concluding that “[i]t was also reasonable for [the officer] to interpret the [defendant’s] vehicle’s sudden acceleration as evidence of unprovoked flight”); U.S. v. Mays, 643 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2011) (“flight is not the only type of ‘nervous evasive behavior.’ Furtive movements made in response to a police presence may also properly contribute to an officer’s suspicions.”) (internal citations omitted); U.S. v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 660 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that courts can consider “evasive conduct that falls short of headlong flight” and holding that defendant’s “evasive conduct” included “immediately walk[ing] away as the officers approached, and although [defendant] did not run, he walked away at a quick pace, ignoring the officer’s commands to stop.”) Thus, Defendant’s actions, coupled with the circumstances already described, provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to stop and investigate him pursuant to Terry. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25; U.S. v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d at 729.

An IP address traced to defendant’s house was probable cause for a search warrant for computers hooked up to the premises for child pornography. Barrett v. State, 367 S.W.3d 919 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2012).*

The fact that defendant pursued a motion to suppress at the state trial court level shows that he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the search claim, so he could not make a Fourth Amendment habeas claim. Kidwell v. Martin, 480 Fed. Appx. 929 (10th Cir. 2012).*

(1) It was 1:15 a.m.; (2) criminal activity had recently increased in the area; (3) defendant was standing on the private property of an auto body shop; (4) the shop was closed; (5) no other businesses in the area were open; (6) no other people were nearby; (7) the officer heard a loud crash; (8) defendant fled; and (9) defendant was carrying bags. The officer reasonably concluded that he had reasonable suspicion that a theft had occurred. The motion to suppress was improperly granted. People v. Funez-Paiagua, 2012 CO 37, 276 P.3d 576 (2012).*

The stop and detention of the defendant was justified. Plain view of the interior of the car supported seizure of drugs, not Arizona v. Gant. State v. Burton, 98 So. 3d 375 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2012).*

The CI’s statement was entitled to credit on the probable cause determination by the issuing magistrate because it was based on first hand information and the CI was reliable in the past. State v. Banks, 95 So. 3d 508 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2012).*

Reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was created by defendant and his passenger giving inconsistent explanations regarding their travels, they were obviously nervous, there was a strong odor of air freshener and defendant had a criminal record. State v. Burney, 92 So. 3d 1184 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2012).*

When defendant was stopped, he fled on foot into a “gutted and abandoned house” with the arresting officer and backup in pursuit. He had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the house of another he fled into. State v. Dowdell, 99 So. 3d 1015 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2012).

Defendant’s stop for a broken taillight led to smell of marijuana coming from the passenger compartment and defendant’s valid arrest. State v. Long, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 642 (August 22, 2012).*

Defendant’s car was stopped with probable cause of a traffic offense or reasonable suspicion, and search of the car was found to be by consent. United States v. Brown, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120847 (D. S.C. August 27, 2012).*

Arrest for open container violation found during a traffic stop supported a search incident of the car. (IAC case) Knop v. State, 821 N.W.2d 779 (Iowa App. 2012).

In this IAC case, the stated reason for the stop was pretextual, but there was reasonable suspicion or probable cause based on a report from a fellow officer. Jones v. State, 821 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa App. 2012).*

A search of suitcases by consent was not voluntary where the officers illegally entered the hotel room and then asked for consent to search. “[M]ere acquiescence to the authority asserted by a police officer cannot substitute for free consent.” State v. Hamby, 317 Ga. App. 480, 731 S.E.2d 374 (2012).*

Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of a car driving in tandem with him. The stop was not overlong. The government conceded that turning on the cell phone was excessive and agreed not to use the contents. United States v. Robles, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140381 (S.D. Tex. September 28, 2012).*

A call from a mail carrier that there was a suspicious car in the area of recent burglaries did not provide reasonable suspicion for a stop of a car the day after the last burglaries. The car was also there the day before. State v. Wolf, 317 Ga. App. 706, 732 S.E.2d 782 (2012).*

Defendant was validly stopped for walking in the center of an alley because it technically violated a city ordinance. Her consent being under duress, however, was validly raised as a target of regular stops, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further findings on that. State v. Limoli, 2012 Ohio 4502, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3960 (10th Dist. September 28, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for driving a scooter without eye gear and a helmet. He was found to not have a license on him. A frisk was not justified. State v. Williams, 2011 Ohio 108, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 73 (8th Dist. January 13, 2011).*

Read as a whole, the affidavit for the search warrant showed when the CI said she smoked dope with the defendant, so search warrant was not stale. Moss v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 14, 380 S.W.3d 479 (2011).*

Defendant was stopped for a “pedestrian violation” [jaywalking?], the validity of which was not at issue, and the officer at 5′ from him could smell the overwhelming smell of marijuana. There was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the odor coming from his body. The stop was valid. State v. Hill, 54 So. 3d 530 (5th DCA January 14, 2011).*

The officer pulled the patrol car behind the defendant’s car who pulled into a parking space. The trial court failed to determine whether there was reasonable suspicion for a stop, so the case is remanded. State v. Thompson, 2011 ND 11, 793 N.W.2d 185 (2011).*

Defendant’s stop for parking in front of a driveway was cause. The fact he drove off before the stop did not void the stop. He was found to be DUI, and the stop was valid. Rickards v. State, 2011 Del. LEXIS 23 (January 12, 2011).*

Defendant was under arrest when he was handcuffed, and a search incident to the arrest produced keys to the apartment that the officers were getting a search warrant for. State v. Bazley, 60 So. 3d 7 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2011).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the length of a stop where the stop was lengthened by the wait for the owner of the car to come to the scene. Defense counsel also was not ineffective for not challenging the stop where the car was indisputably speeding. Owens v. United States, 869 F. Supp. 2d 653 (M.D. Pa. 2012).*

The same pro se defendant’s motion to suppress was denied where he never, after being invited to do so, said what it was he was trying to suppress. United States v. Goodrich, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56472 (W.D. Mo. April 23, 2012),* R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56470 (W.D. Mo. April 11, 2012).*

Pro se defendant’s claim that a search warrant could not issue without a criminal complaint also being issued is denied as without any legal basis. United States v. Goodrich, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56470 (W.D. Mo. April 23, 2012).*

Defendant’s Franks claim was based on speculation and is unsupported by the tenor of the affidavit. If the officers had looked at his laptop and seen the child pornography, that would have only strengthened the probable cause, and it didn’t. United States v. Miller, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56878 (W.D. Va. April 24, 2012).*

Defendant’s evasive behavior in replacing the license plate on his car to avoid detection when he was being investigated for a grow operation was reasonable suspicion. When officers stopped him, he was cooperative and admitted what he was doing. United States v. Valerio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2012).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the delay during a stop where it took time for the owner of the car to arrive or in challenging a stop based on a clear speeding violation. Owens v. United States, 869 F. Supp. 2d 653 (M.D. Pa. 2012).*

It isn’t required that the affiant actually viewed child pornography to get a search warrant, at least as long as somebody did and reported it to the affiant. It is not required to attach the photographs to the search warrant application. Even if some were computer generated images, there was still probable cause. United States v. Ranke, 480 Fed. Appx. 798, 2012 FED App. 0471N (6th Cir. 2012)*:

Next, Defendant argues that the affidavit was insufficiently detailed. He points out that the affidavit does not indicate how Detective Pitts determined that the images were of a minor and that Detective Pitts’ description of a boy “apparently masturbating” suggests that he never actually viewed the images personally. Defendant claims these deficiencies were compounded when Detective Pitts failed to attach the images to the affidavit for the state court judge’s independent review.

The implication, to the extent one exists, that Detective Pitts never viewed the images personally, as well as his failure to attach the photographs to the search warrant affidavit, are both factors that should have played into the state court judge’s probable cause analysis. However, neither precluded the judge from issuing the search warrant. First, an officer is entitled to rely on information supplied by other officers or agencies for the purposes of a search warrant affidavit, provided that the information and its sources are accurately described for the reviewing judge’s independent evaluation. See United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 385, 48 V.I. 980 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819, 823 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). Detective Pitts fulfilled that requirement when he provided an accurate description of the circumstances under which he “received information from federal authorities” regarding the greeting card, the accompanying photographs, and the incriminating evidence discovered in Brown’s cell. Likewise, Detective Pitts’ failure to attach the photographs themselves did not prevent the search warrant from being issued. A magistrate judge need not view all the evidence personally to make its decision, and the probable cause stage only requires an affidavit to show the “‘probability or substantial chance of’ possession of images of actual children; ‘an actual showing’ that the images depicted real children” is not required. Lapsins, 570 F.3d at 765 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13).

Knock-and-talk at defendant’s backdoor violated curtilage and was unreasonable. State v. Unger, 252 Ore. App. 478, 287 P.3d 1196 (2012):

In this case, the officers entered defendant’s backyard and, after obtaining defendant’s consent, entered and searched his house. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that (1) the officers’ entry into defendant’s backyard violated defendant’s Article I, section 9, rights because it was a search and it was not justified by either a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement, and (2) the officers’ entry into and search of defendant’s house also violated Article I, section 9, because, although defendant consented to the entry and search, his consent was invalid because it was the product of illegal police conduct, specifically, the illegal entry into his backyard.

We turn first to the officers’ entry into defendant’s backyard. As described, the officers went into defendant’s backyard and knocked at his back door. Under Oregon law, “intrusions onto residential curtilage are deemed to be trespasses unless the entry is ‘privileged or [has the occupant’s] express or implied consent.'” State v. Somfleth, 168 Ore. App. 414, 424-25, 8 P.3d 221 (2000) (quoting State v. Ohling, 70 Ore. App. 249, 252, 688 P.2d 1384, rev den, 298 Ore. 334 (1984)). “[A]bsent evidence of an intent to exclude, an occupant impliedly consents to people walking to the front door and knocking on it, because of social and legal norms of behavior.” State v. Portrey, 134 Ore. App. 460, 464, 896 P.2d 7 (1995); see also Ohling, 70 Ore. App. at 253. However, “[a]pproaches to points * * * other than a front door * * * are generally not regarded as being approaches to which the occupant has implicitly consented.” Pierce, 226 Ore. App. at 343. Accordingly, we have held that, as a general matter, an officer may enter a front yard and knock on a front door, but an officer may not enter a backyard and knock on a back door. Ohling, 70 Ore. App. at 253. Such an entry is a trespass and constitutes a search for the purposes of Article I, section 9. Ohling, 70 Ore. App. at 252.

Defendant was with four men, one of whom was wanted and in a high crime area. It was not unreasonable to order all four to the ground so the lone officer at the scene could control it. He was frisked quickly by the first officer there, and another showed up and subjected him to another frisk finding drugs. United States v. Howard, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157691 (W.D. Wis. October 22, 2012),* adopted 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157691 (W.D. Wis. November 2, 2012).*

Reaching over the console during a stop for a seatbelt violation is not a furtive gesture warranting a patdown. Nothing else suggested criminal conduct. Grantham v. City of Tuscaloosa, 2012 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 89 (November 2, 2012).*

A citizen informant in a bar told the officer that the defendant was going to get in a particular truck and drive, and he was “wasted” drunk. The face-to-face meeting with predictors that all proved true was reasonable suspicion for a stop. Venegas v. State, 2012 WY 136, 287 P.3d 746 (2012).*