CA6: Fourth Amendment does not recognize de minimus intrusions of the home

One defendant in this § 1983 case argued that his entry into plaintiffs’ home was de minimus and, therefore, reasonable. The Sixth Circuit disagreed that a de minimus entry is reasonable, finding support in Payton and Steagald. Andrews v. Hickman County, 700 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 2012):

Finally, Wade argues that his actions were de minimis and thus qualify for an exception where conduct that technically qualifies as a warrantless search or seizure may be found reasonable and thus excused due to the minor nature of the violation. The de minimis rationale has been recognized in limited circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984). Wade cites Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001), to support his claim that his intrusion was de minimis and reasonable. However, McArthur is clearly distinguishable from Wade’s alleged conduct. McArthur involved the temporary seizure of an individual and a trailer while law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant. The officers had been told by the individual’s wife that she had just seen the individual in question hide drugs in the trailer in which he lived. Id. at 329. An officer then proceeded to prevent the individual from reentering the trailer for the two hours it took another officer to obtain a warrant. Id. Unlike the officer in McArthur, Wade and Chessor did not enter the Andrews’ home to preserve the status quo while a warrant was sought. Wade had no intention of seeking a warrant or preserving evidence when he stepped into the Andrews’ home. In addition, Wade’s entry into the home was not de minimis. Under either his account or that of the Plaintiffs, he fully entered the Andrews’ home, unlike the officer in McArthur who remained in the doorway observing the individual when he was allowed to reenter the trailer for cigarettes and to use the phone. See id. Further, Wade cannot rely on cases such as United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984), which held that the destruction of a small amount of cocaine during a field test of the substance was a de minimis seizure, because his violation is an invasion of a different degree. Indeed, even in Jacobsen the Supreme Court emphasized that, despite its holding, “where more substantial invasions of constitutionally protected interests are involved, a warrantless search or seizure is unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances.” 466 U.S. at 125 n.28. The Court cited Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980), and Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 68 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1981), to support the proposition, suggesting that cases implicating warrantless in-home searches and arrests are not appropriate for de minimis arguments. See id.

Wade carried out a warrantless, non-consensual entry into the Andrews’ home. As Payton instructs, “the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” 445 U.S. at 590. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Andrews, a violation of the Andrews’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures has been shown.