A search warrant for an apartment permitted also the search of the storage unit associated with the apartment. The key to the unit was found on defendant. See United States v. Ware, 890 F.2d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 1989). United States v. Thompson, 690 F.3d 977 (8th Cir. 2012).

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in jail calls. United States v. Shavers, 693 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2012).

Defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging defendant’s search of his person that produced keys or his statement. Keys were not probable cause to believe that there were drugs in the house, and there was no independent evidence there were drugs in the house. There were none on his person. People v. Hill, 2012 IL App (1st) 102028, 364 Ill. Dec. 677, 977 N.E.2d 166 (2012),* mod. on denial of rehearing August 24, 2012, Opinion withdrawn by People v. Hill, 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 708 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist., Aug. 23, 2012).

Abandonment before a stop is not the product of the stop. Williams v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 337, 2012 Ark. App. LEXIS 441 (May 9, 2012).*

Defendant was convicted of assaulting an officer serving a search warrant for his DNA. He did not show sufficient evidence to get a self-defense instruction that he was fighting off an “unauthorized assailant.” United States v. Johnson, 480 Fed. Appx. 437 (9th Cir. 2012).*

Probation officers had probable cause to believe that defendant was living at the apartment they searched. They also had reasonable suspicion to stop him on the street for possession of a weapon based on a CI’s corroborated tip. United States v. Asprilla, 473 Fed. Appx. 570 (9th Cir. 2012).*

COA (2253(c)) in a 2254 denied on petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim. The contention that the free standing Fourth Amendment claim was decided wrongly by state courts is barred under Stone v. Powell and AEDPA. McIntyre v. McKune, 480 Fed. Appx. 486 (10th Cir. 2012):

Unlike the situation in Gamble, however, there is no indication that the Kansas courts refused to recognize or apply the correct legal standards in this case. McIntyre’s belief that the state courts decided the claim wrongly does not mean that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate. See Matthews v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1175, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009). He was able to brief his arguments, and the trial court held a hearing on whether to hold a Franks hearing. At that hearing, in addition to concluding that a Franks hearing was not warranted, the trial court held that the omissions were not material. McIntyre’s counsel declined to raise suppression in his direct criminal appeal, but the Kansas Court of Appeals allowed McIntyre to file a pro se supplemental brief challenging the denial of suppression. After the Kansas Court of Appeals specifically acknowledged the pro se brief and stated that the arguments were meritless, McIntyre again on direct appeal was able to file a pro se petition for review to place the issue before the Kansas Supreme Court. No reasonable jurist would find it debatable whether McIntyre had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in the Kansas courts.2 See Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 401 (10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, even though he did not receive a Franks hearing).

Defendant’s probation was not over for purposes of this probation search where a petition to revoke had been filed and unresolved at the time of the search, effectively extending probation. United States v. Izatt, 480 Fed. Appx. 447 (9th Cir. 2012).*

There was probable cause and nexus for a search warrant of defendant’s house where he left the house to go directly to a drug deal. United States v. Thornton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65652 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2012).*

Defendant got a Franks hearing, and it was readily apparent that the proof failed. Faced with that, the defense still didn’t withdraw the motion. United States v. Villar, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65528 (S.D. Fla. May 1, 2012).*

Defendant was a suspect in receiving cell phones stolen from Wal-Mart. The police recorded him talking with their CI who worked for Wal-Mart and he took a bag of phones and put them in his trunk. The trunk could be searched for the cell phones under the automobile exception. State v. Kamleh, 2012 Ohio 2061, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1810 (8th Dist. May 10, 2012).*

The legality of the inventory of defendant’s car was moot where defendant fled from the car at the time of the stop. Wilson v. State, 966 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. App. 2012).*

The district court did not clearly err in finding that consent was voluntary. The fact one person in the house was in custody did not mean that the consenter was. Also, there admittedly was no warning of a right to refuse, but that is only a factor in the totality. United States v. Graham, 480 Fed. Appx. 453 (9th Cir. 2012).*

Attempted search of water department employee’s meters was not in violation of clearly established law, so the complaint failed to state a claim for relief against city officials, if it even violated the Fourth Amendment. Clemente v. Vaslo, 679 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant’s admission that he had child pornography on his flash drive being used on a university library computer was justification for his arrest by university police. He consented to a further search. United States v. LaPradd, 480 Fed. Appx. 405, 2012 FED App. 0495N (6th Cir. 2012).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not pursuing a search claim that would have lost under the automobile exception anyway. United States v. Whitfield, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67292 (E.D. Va. May 11, 2012).*

Consent to search a car, given knowing that the object of the search is drugs, is consent to open closed packages within the vehicle. Here, it was a gift box. State v. Howell, 284 Neb. 559, 822 N.W.2d 391 (2012):

[7,8] These cases guide our resolution of the instant case. Lewis asked Howell if there were drugs or weapons in the vehicle immediately prior to obtaining consent to search. Thus, a reasonable person would have been on notice that Lewis was looking for drugs or weapons. The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object. One could reasonably expect drugs to be hidden in a closed container such as the gift-wrapped box. “A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.” When Howell consented to a search of the vehicle, he did not place any limitation on the search. After Lewis observed the gift-wrapped box, he asked Howell to whom it belonged and whether it was “basically” Howell’s. Despite Lewis’ interest in the box, Howell did not revoke or limit his consent to search. The general rule is that when a suspect does not limit the scope of a search, and does not object when the search exceeds what he later claims was a more limited consent, an officer is justified in searching the entire vehicle. In the instant case, Lewis used a knife to cut the tape on the gift wrap and created a tear in the box as he tried to peer inside. However, the box and gift wrap were not rendered useless by the search. The tear in the generic cardboard box could be fixed with a piece of tape, and the wrapping paper could be secured to the box with another piece of tape. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the search of the box was within the scope of Howell’s consent. Thus, the district court did not err in overruling Howell’s motion to suppress the evidence.

Defendant’s cell phone records were improperly obtained by a flawed process, but the inevitable discovery doctrine supported the finding of the victim’s body after the finding of the murder weapon, so the body would not be suppressed. State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 54 A.3d 772 (2012):

We turn then to the question whether the State did establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that it had sufficient probable cause to obtain these telephone records without regard to the improperly-obtained information they gleaned from reviewing those records. That inquiry, in turn, requires consideration of whether it would have obtained those records in the ordinary course, and whether it originally obtained the tainted information through flagrant police misconduct. In analyzing these questions, it is important to recognize that we are dealing with three separate sets of telephone records: those of Roberts, obtained through Holt’s deficient affidavit; those of defendant, obtained through an error on the part of his service provider; and those of Bellinger, obtained as a result of error both on the part of the police and his service provider.

The initial question is whether the record supports a finding that the police would have, through a source independent of Holt’s defective affidavit, sought and obtained Roberts’s telephone records. We are satisfied that it does. We previously laid out in chronological detail the manner in which this investigation unfolded. That record permits us to isolate what the police knew and when they learned it.

Although Holt prepared and submitted his affidavit seeking Roberts’s telephone records on January 14, the trial court found the records were not received until at least January 21. By that date, the police knew that serious discrepancies existed with respect to the information provided by Roberts’s alibi witnesses. They also knew that several of those alibi witnesses said they had spoken to Roberts on his cell phone while he was at the barber shop. We are satisfied that those discrepancies, which were significant both in terms of their nature and their quantity, when combined with the knowledge of the ongoing, violent dispute between Roberts and Priester, would have permitted the police to demonstrate the existence of probable cause for an examination of Roberts’s telephone records, entirely untainted by the initially deficient affidavit.

Further, normal police investigative procedures would have led them to seek a communications data warrant to review Roberts’s telephone records to determine if they could lend support to Roberts’s alibi or indicate that it might be concocted. That they would have sought such a warrant as part of their normal investigation is indicated by the fact that they did, in fact, seek such a warrant, even though the application itself was flawed.

. . .

In sum, the question of suppression of the telephone records and the evidence developed from those records involves a two-step analysis, involving both the inevitable discovery doctrine and the independent source rule. The independent source here is the murder weapon; once that was recovered, the police would, through their normal investigatory steps, have inevitably been led to Bellinger and to defendant. The Appellate Division concluded correctly that the trial court should not have granted the motion to suppress.

Defendant succeeds in showing that the justification for the traffic stop, a cracked windshield, did not support it. A mere cracked windshield is not a traffic offense because the driver’s view is not obstructed. Also, it did not indicate that the vehicle had been involved in an accident. Therefore, the community caretaking function did not justify the stop. Since there was no motion to suppress, the defendant showed that if a motion had been filed, it likely would have been successful. State v. Moser, 20 Neb. App. 209, 822 N.W.2d 424 (2012). [Caution: If the record is undeveloped on this, the state could still win the motion to suppress on remand when it gets to make a complete record.]

After defendant was told he was free to leave, the officer asked for consent which was denied. Then the officer asked if defendant would consent to a drug dog going around the car, and he did. It took 22 minutes for the dog to arrive. The district court suppressed, but the Eighth Circuit reversed. United States v. Grant, 696 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2012) (Senior Judge Bright dissented; he was on my first oral argument there over 35 years ago; he was appointed by LBJ).*

The district court erred in granting the motion to suppress a protective sweep. When officers arrived at a disturbance call, they heard defendant threaten a woman, and the gun he allegedly had was unaccounted for with another person inside. United States v. Laudermilt, 677 F.3d 605 (4th Cir. 2012)*:

Applying this framework, we believe the district court erred in granting the suppression motion. We begin by noting our agreement with the district court that the protective sweep was justified by Buie. The officers were responding to a potentially volatile situation involving a firearm and a domestic dispute, and they personally witnessed Laudermilt threatening Kuri and her family. When the officers arrested Laudermilt, the firearm was unaccounted for and—even by Laudermilt’s own admission—at least one other person was in the home. In addition, as the officers were arriving on the scene, two individuals were leaving in a vehicle, one of whom was “slouched” over in his seat. Clearly, these articulable facts would have led a reasonably prudent officer to believe a protective sweep was warranted.

Nexus to this apartment was shown by defendant’s mail being received there and his admitting that his immigration documents were there. When defendant was confronted with a piece of mail, his demeanor changed and he refused to cooperate about going to apartment to get his immigration documents. A search warrant was obtained for the apartment. United States v. Abdul-Ganiu, 480 Fed. Appx. 128 (3d Cir. 2012).*

Defendant’s challenge to his 1992 search was originally on scope of search rather than the validity of third party consent. Reviewing for plain error, counsel was not ineffective for not challenging the consent on that ground rather than voluntariness. “Strickland grants no license to question counsel’s strategic decisions.” United States v. Balogun, 480 Fed. Appx. 27 (2d Cir. 2012).*

Defendant passed out in his car going the wrong way through a McDonald’s drive-in was reasonable suspicion. State v. Ownby, 2012 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 274 (May 3, 2012).*

Reasonableness for due process purposes can equal reasonableness for Fourth Amendment purposes. Kinnison v. City of San Antonio, 480 Fed. Appx. 271 (5th Cir. 2012):

“As the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a government search is ‘reasonableness.'” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). “[A] ‘reasonableness’ determination[] involves a balancing of all relevant factors,” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996), and for Fourth Amendment purposes generally “requires no more of government officials than that of due process of law. Both constitutional provisions recognize an exigency exception, and, thus, lead to no practical distinction in” the summary action context. Flatford v. City of Monroe, 17 F.3d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43 (1993)); see also Freeman, 242 F.3d at 652 (noting that Supreme Court precedent “forecasts, even if it does not compel, that a balancing of the public and private interests at stake will favor the public interest in nuisance abatement after the conclusion of adequate administrative proceedings” (citing GM Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977))).

We see no reason to depart from the general practice of tethering the outcome of the Fourth Amendment inquiry to whether the property deprivation offended due process. In light of the procedural due process analysis above, we conclude that the district court should not have granted summary judgment on Kinnison’s Fourth Amendment claim. Cf. Samuels v. Meriwether, 94 F.3d 1163, 1168 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n abatement carried out in accordance with procedural due process is reasonable in the absence of any factors that outweigh governmental interests.”) (citations omitted).

Defendant was hanging around a convenience store at closing time, and it had been robbed multiple times before at closing. A patdown was performed by one officer producing nothing, but the second officer noticed that defendant turned slightly like he was adjusting something. A second patdown was done that produced a weapon, and it was valid under the Fourth Amendment. Lewis v. State, 307 Ga. App. 593, 705 S.E.2d 693 (2011).*

An identified citizen who called police to say a woman was acting bizarrely in his driveway talking about tar heroin was justification for a stop. When she was stopped, she was glassy eyed and under the influence of something. The stop was reasonable. Leatherman v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 518 (Ky. App. 2011).*

This case had three different CIs and two were long time CIs with a good history. On the totality of circumstances there was probable cause. State v. Williams, 209 N.C. App. 255, 703 S.E.2d 905 (2011).*

“[A]lthough the issue is close, there was probable cause to stop and search the vehicle based on the collective knowledge of law enforcement through the wiretap and visual surveillance.” United States v. Edenilson-Reyes, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140187 (N.D. Ga. October 25, 2010).*

Defendant was lawfully ordered out of the car, and it matters not that it was early into the stop or when the papers were returned because the stop is not over until the officer says he can go. Some continuation of stops are minimal intrusions. State v. Donaldson, 380 S.W.3d 86 (Tenn. 2012):

After being stopped for a traffic violation, however, a driver should expect “to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984); cf. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101 (finding that because questioning of the defendant did not prolong the stop, no independent Fourth Amendment justification was needed for the questioning based upon the legitimacy of the initial stop). “[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654. Mimms and its progeny permit the intrusion if the officer merely removes a defendant from his vehicle absent undue delay. The question, however, of where a de minimis intrusion ends and an undue delay begins is necessarily a fact-specific inquiry. See United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “a fact-bound, context-dependent inquiry” must be conducted in each case to determine whether the duration of the stop was unreasonable). It is impossible to select “an arbitrary quantity of time and proclaim that any prolongation less than that amount is categorically ‘de minimis’ — as convenient as such a rule might be.” Everett, 601 F.3d at 493. A number of cases, including our Berrios opinion, however, illuminate the distinction. There, the officer not only stopped the defendant for speeding and frisked him for weapons but also placed the defendant in the back seat of a locked patrol car before checking his driver’s license and vehicle registration. Because the evidence established that the officer had done so to test the anxiety level of the defendant as an investigative technique, we held that the extended detention, under those particular circumstances, did not qualify as “de minimis.” Berrios, 235 S.W.3d at 107. The case before us is distinguishable on the facts. Officer Baker described the stop of the Defendant as “normal.” Nothing in the record indicates that it lasted more than five minutes. Unlike the circumstances in Berrios, the intrusion was minimal.

Common law marriage to owner of car gave standing to contest its search. State v. Copeland, 380 S.W.3d 214 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi & Edinburgh 2012), Petition for discretionary review granted by Shirley Tex. v. Copeland, 2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1502 (Tex. Crim. App., Nov. 5, 2012).

Utah declines to follow a “but for” test and requires the “exploitation” test of Wong Sun. State v. Vit, 2012 UT App 219, 285 P.3d 17, 714 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (2012).

Reasonable suspicion: “(1) Mubdi took an excessive amount of time to pull over; (2) he was exceedingly nervous; (3) he kept his foot on the car brake instead of shifting the transmission into park; (4) he could not provide details as to his destination or the family member he intended to visit; (5) he did not rent the car, contrary to what he told York; (6) he was not authorized to drive the rental car; and (7) the car was beyond the bounds authorized by the rental contract.” United States v. Mubdi, 691 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2012).*

Plaintiff’s claim he was a U.S. citizen wrongfully deported and rejected when he came back to the U.S. through ATL customs when they discredited his newly issued passport relying on the original bogus records survives as to the government under Bivens. Most of the officers get qualified immunity. Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (M.D. Ga. 2012):

After being detained for fifty-one days by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division of the Department of Homeland Security (“ICE”), Mark Daniel Lyttle (“Lyttle”), a United States citizen with diminished mental capacity, was flown to Hidalgo, Texas, transported to the Mexican border, forced to disembark, and sent off on foot into Mexico with only three dollars in his pocket. Wearing his prison-issued jump suit from the Stewart Detention Center, a privately managed ICE facility in Georgia, and speaking no Spanish, Lyttle wandered around Central America for 125 days, sleeping in the streets, staying in shelters, and being imprisoned and abused in Mexico, Honduras, and Nicaragua because he had no identity or proof of citizenship. Ultimately, Lyttle found his way to the United States Embassy in Guatemala, where an Embassy employee helped him contact his family in the United States to arrange for his return home.

In his Complaint, Lyttle alleges that ICE employees detained him without probable cause and subsequently deported him unlawfully to Mexico, knowing that he was a United States citizen with a diminished mental capacity. 1 Lyttle seeks damages from the responsible ICE officers in their individual capacities pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for violating his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.

. . .

Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 47 & 49) are granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the Court dismisses the following claims: (1) the official capacity claims against Defendants James Hayes, Eric Holder, John Morton, Janet Napolitano, and Thomas Snow; (2) the individual capacity Bivens equal protection claims as to all Defendants against whom they are asserted; (3) the individual capacity Bivens Fifth Amendment due process claims against Defendants Johnston, Keys, and Moore; and (4) the individual capacity Bivens Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claims against Johnston, Keys, and Moore. The following claims remain pending: (1) the Bivens Fifth Amendment due process claims against Defendants Collado, Moten, Mondragon, Simonse, and Hayes; (2) the Bivens Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claims against Defendants Collado, Moten, Mondragon, Simonse, and Hayes; and (3) the Federal Tort Claims Act claims against the United States for false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Correct Formatting Error (ECF No. 62) is unopposed and moot after issuance of this Order.

Under Ohio law, the smell of marijuana justifies a search of the interior but not necessarily a search of the trunk. Here it was a stronger smell, and the lack of any real quantity of marijuana in the passenger compartment justified a search of the trunk. State v. Perry, 2012 Ohio 4888, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4275 (11th Dist. October 22, 2012). [Note: This is one of those justifications that the officer can make up to overcome, so what’s the point?]

“[U]nlike a physical stop to check the vehicle’s license plate, a computerized license-plate check is not a seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment.” The LPN was checked without stopping the car. State v. Setinich, 822 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. App. 2012).

The burden shifting of warrantless seizures and searches is applied here to identification procedures. State v. Withrow, 2012 Ohio 4887, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4276 (11th Dist. October 22, 2012).*

Taking defendant from his car at gunpoint and handcuffing him on the ground was reasonable under the circumstances, and it did not rise to the level of an arrest. United States v. Salas-Garcia, 698 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2012):

By contrast, the officers in this case acted reasonably under the totality of circumstances. The “quantum of force” used to detain Salas-Garcia was reasonable under the circumstances. The officers in this case did not conduct a felony arrest of Salas-Garcia. As Agent Davis explained in his testimony, a felony stop is “a very heightened state of readiness” by the police, where the officers arrive in “several units with guns drawn, giving specific orders to an occupant of a vehicle to do certain things.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 96. But in this case, the patrol officers were only given instructions “to stop the car.” Id. As the district court noted, there is nothing in the record that suggests that the patrol officer who stopped Salas-Garcia “drew or displayed his weapon, forced Defendant to the ground, or employed restraints other than handcuffs.” Aplt. App. at 16-17.

Given the limited amount of information that the Task Force agents and uniformed patrol officers had regarding Salas-Garcia, placing him in handcuffs was reasonable under the circumstances to ensure both officer and public safety. We have noted that “”[a]n officer in today’s reality has an objective, reasonable basis to fear for his or her life every time a motorist is stopped.'” United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) …

Police responded to a domestic battery call, and defendant’s live-in girlfriend was outside but afraid to go in to retrieve her things to get out. She told the police he kept a gun inside. When the police went in with her, they could see in the closet men’s and women’s clothes. Based on the situation presented to them, they had a reasonable belief in her authority and did not have to question her further about it. People v. Smith, 2012 NY Slip Op 927, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9155 (4th Dept. December 28, 2012):

Thus, “the record establishes that the searching officer[s] relied in good faith on the apparent authority of [the complainant] to consent to the search, and the circumstances reasonably indicated that [she] had the requisite authority to consent to the search” (People v Fontaine, 27 AD3d 1144, 1145, lv denied 6 NY3d 847; see People v Frankline, 87 AD3d 831, 833, lv denied 19 NY3d 973; People v Littleton, 62 AD3d 1267, 1269, lv denied 12 NY3d 926). Contrary to defendant’s contention, the searching officers were “not required to make some inquiry into the actual state of authority'” of complainant to consent to a search because they were not “faced with a situation which would cause a reasonable person to question the consenting part[y’s] power or control over the premises or property to be inspected'” (Fontaine, 27 AD3d at 1145, quoting Adams, 53 NY2d at 10).

“I’m gonna check the car real quick and get you on your way, alright?” is not a search by consent. State v. Ross, 2012 Ohio 6111, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 5274 (9th Dist. December 26, 2012):

[*P19] As soon as Officer Perez completed his pat down search, he indicated that he wanted to search Ross’ car. Specifically, he stated, “I’m gonna check the car real quick and get you on your way, alright?” Ross repeatedly stated during the exchange that he did not understand why it was necessary for Officer Perez to search the car. Each time, Officer Perez indicated that the search was something that needed to be done and simply ended his statements with “alright?” Officer Perez also told Ross: (1) “well, it’s not even really your car,” (2) there was concern due to the fact that Ross had just left a high crime area, and (3) after Ross had just left a motel, “people leaving the motel, this is kind of what we do.” When Ross finally assented to the search, he stated in the same sentence “but there’s no need for this.” Officer Perez never clarified Ross’ statement. Instead, he stated that the search would only take a few minutes and proceeded to search the car.

Consent was found purely on a question of credibility of the witnesses. Since defendant admitting lying twice to the officer about his identity, it wasn’t error for the trial court to believe the officer. State v. Jones, 2012 Ohio 6150, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 5313 (9th Dist. December 28, 2012).*