The stopped motorist pulled his license and registration from his rear pants pocket. His later gesture to the center console of the vehicle was cause for police concern and justified a frisk of the console under Mimms [and Long]. United States v. Colen, 482 Fed. Appx. 710 (3d Cir. 2012):

Here, the police acted reasonably. Their suspicion was aroused when they saw Colen quickly shut the center console as they first approached the car. They did not conduct a search at that point although they clearly could have under Mimms. Thereafter, Colen removed his license and registration from his rear pants pocket, thus negating a possible explanation for his gestures toward the center console. When the officers returned to their car, they both saw Colen again reaching for the center console. Only then did the officers remove him from the car, frisk him, and search the portion of the interior of the car that would have been within his immediate control when they allowed him to get back in. It was during that protective search that Officer Mason found the loaded handgun.

When deciding to conduct the kind of limited search that occurred here, “an officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed’ so long as the officer’s concern was objectively reasonable.” United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Moorefield, 111 F.3d at 13-14). The officers’ decision to check the center console for weapons was completely justified by the circumstances here.

A lengthy explanation of reasonable suspicion and suspected forged paper tags is United States v. Mendoza, 691 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2012).* Was it a genuine suspicion or not?

Separation of an agitated parent and her child in an ER for treatment was not a Fourth Amendment violation. Mueller v. Auker, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18972 (9th Cir. September 10, 2012) (prior appeal Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2009)):

The Fourth Amendment usually requires an officer to have a warrant issued upon probable cause before seizing someone, but “neither probable cause nor a warrant is required when ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.'” Yin v. California, 95 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995)). In these “special needs” cases, we “dispense[ ] with the probable cause and warrant requirements and simply appl[y] a balancing test to determine if a search or seizure is reasonable and thus constitutional.” Yin, 95 F.3d at 869.

Democracy Now: Bronx Residents Accosted by NYPD Win Landmark Court Ruling Deeming “Stop and Frisk” Tactic Illegal:

A federal judge has ruled that New York City police are not allowed to routinely stop pedestrians outside of private residential buildings in the Bronx. The stops are part of the so-called Clean Halls program, which has prompted allegations of police harassment by some residents who say they are being accosted outside of the buildings in which they live. Previous data on the New York Police Department’s “stop-and-frisk” policy has shown African-American and Latino men make up a hugely disproportionate share of those stopped. We’re joined by Molly Kovel, staff attorney with the Bronx Defenders and part of the legal team in the case, and by Abdullah Turner, a Bronx resident whose building is enrolled in the Clean Halls program and who says he was unfairly arrested while waiting for a friend inside. [includes rush transcript]

Defendant lived on a building on a relative’s property, and he argued it violated curtilage to even come to his door. A path in the grass from a dirt road was enough to show that the front door could be approached. State v. Robertson, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 12 (January 7, 2013):

The Defendant’s main contention with regards to whether the police officers executed a valid “knock and talk” is that there was no “pathway” from Grinnell Drive to the Defendant’s building. Likewise, the Defendant argues that there was no “pathway” from the dirt road to the door of the building. However, the validity of an attempted “knock and talk” does not depend on the existence of a cobblestone pathway or a set of ornate stepping stones leading from the road directly to a defendant’s front door. Nor is the procedure limited only to buildings that the police can reach by major public thoroughfares. Instead, the operative question is whether the defendant has an expectation of privacy in the area between the roadway and the defendant’s front door. This principle applies regardless of whether the police are approaching a one-room shack off of a dirt road or a residence off of Old Hickory Boulevard.

NYLJ: Federal Judge Orders NYPD to Limit Trespass Searches by Mark Hamblett:

In the latest in a series of rulings in hotly contested litigation over New York City Police Department stop-and-frisk policies, a federal judge has found that police officers are violating the Fourth Amendment rights of people stopped on suspicion of trespass as they walk into and out of privately owned buildings that participate in a Bronx anti-crime program.

Supreme Court signals blood tests protected by Fourth Amendment by M. Alex Johnson, staff writer, NBC News:

Justices indicated Wednesday that the dangers of drunken driving don’t trump the Fourth Amendment, peppering lawyers for the state of Missouri with objections to their request that the Supreme Court allow law enforcement to order blood tests for DUI without suspects’ consent.

The case, Missouri v. McNeely, is seen as a landmark that could clear up almost 50 years of uncertainty over the constitutionality of blood tests that are conducted without a warrant. Legal scholars say it could rewrite drunken-driving laws in all 50 states.

The case hinges on how you interpret a 1966 opinion by then-Chief Justice William Brennan, who wrote (.pdf) that law enforcement should get a warrant before taking a blood draw without a suspect’s consent, except in a few very limited circumstances that rise to the level of an emergency.

See also ScotusBlog: Argument recap: Compromise on DUI blood tests? by Lyle Denniston:

Analysis:

Even allowing for the reality that what is said at a Supreme Court hearing does not necessarily dictate the outcome, now and then a case comes along where the Justices join so obviously in a common pursuit of a compromise that little suspense remains. That happened on Wednesday, in the case of Missouri v. McNeely (docket 11-1425), when it seemed quite predictable that the Court is not going to let police across the nation order — on their own authority — the taking of blood samples from those suspected of drunk driving. Police, it would appear, are at least going to have to try to get a search warrant, even though they sometimes will be allowed to do without one.

Defendant was seen at a gun show in possession of a rifle slung over his back with a box of ammunition in hand by his PO, and he was photographed. That was used to get an arrest warrant from a state court judge. When an arrest was sought with a multiagency task force, the officers heard a woman say “your probation officer is here” and sounds of a gun being readied to fire. Backup was sought. They finally came out, and officers went in to conduct a protective sweep “for the protection of the officers.” Aside from a duffle bag of “AK-47s,” suspicious chemicals were seen, and they called for the ATF to come and check for bombmaking materials, and that was justified by exigent circumstances. Then a search warrant was sought. The evidence shows that officers had an objectively reasonable belief that defendant was residing at the third party’s residence (Steagald). United States v. Yarbrough, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2571 (S.D. Tex. January 8, 2013)*:

Applying these principles to this firearm case, the Court concludes that exigent circumstances continued to exist from the time the agents and officers heard the sound of guns being racked through the time the search warrant was obtained. The quantity of people and firearms, as well as the chemicals and other explosive precursors justified the entry of ATF agents for purposes of inspecting the premises for danger and indications of criminal activity. Defendants did not supply any authority on which to base a conclusion that the exigent circumstances had come to rest and no further danger was present. And the facts in this case would not support such a conclusion.

Defendant was a passenger without standing. Moreover, he wasn’t even in the car when it was searched hours later. “In any event, this case did not involve a traffic stop, Defendant’s stint as a passenger in the vehicle had ended hours before he was arrested, and he was standing outside the vehicle when confronted by Officer Stewart.” United States v. Spencer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183866 (D. Minn. December 14, 2012).*

The motion to suppress is denied because the defendant consented. The defendant’s motion to dismiss for outrageous governmental conduct in the consent search is denied, and the government’s motion for sanctions against defense counsel for being so far off the mark here is held in abeyance. United States v. Amar, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2653 (W.D. Okla. January 8, 2013). [Pursue the motion to suppress if you can, but don’t seek sanctions unless you win easily. Just because the police violated the Fourth Amendment, the defense hardly is justified in seeking sanctions. If the search was that bad, presumably the government wouldn’t have sought the indictment.]

“But whether law enforcement officers had probable cause to believe the truck contained contraband, they had probable cause to believe it contained evidence of a crime. The totality of the circumstances – the wire intercepts, observations from the pole camera outside Mr. Davis’s home, and the agents’ knowledge and experience – allowed a reasonable officer to deduce with fair probability that the truck contained a secret compartment.” United States v. Reese, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2422 (M.D. Ala. January 8, 2013).*

The consent to search defendant’s car was voluntary; she offered to let the officer search without being asked. United States v. Rodriguez, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2566 (S.D. Tex. January 8, 2013).*

There was no reasonable suspicion for defendant’s stop for allegedly being nervous and only allegedly walking away from the officers after making eye contact with one and saying “shit.” One of them said he had a suspicious bulge in his clothing like a gun. This was around a gas station in Detroit so it was “high crime,” so they said. This is like United States v. Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2011), and there is no reasonable suspicion. United States v. Davis, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1862 (E.D. Mich. January 7, 2013).*

Defendants asserted a Franks challenge, and the court had a hearing to find out what was the deliberate omission, and it didn’t undermine the existing probable cause or really even amount to anything. United States v. Kistner, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2128 (S.D. Ohio January 4, 2013).*

Probable cause supported both the search warrant and the vehicle tracking order in this case (sought 11 days before Jones came down) issued under both federal and state statute. United States v. Ponce, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183671 (D. Minn. December 10, 2012).*

There was an inventory policy, and it was followed. The police here even offered to defendant for somebody to come to get the car, and he declined. Partial noncompliance with the inventory process does not make it void, as long as it was otherwise a true inventory. United States v. Shaw, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1754 (N.D. Tex. January 7, 2013):

In Rowland the officers failed to comply with procedures requiring a listing of all items in the vehicle. Rowland, 341 F.3d at 779-80. The court held that this noncompliance was not dispositive, and it examined whether other evidence demonstrated that the inventory search was pretextual. Id. at 780. One officer testified that he had only recorded items he considered possible evidence. The court found that this indicated that the search was pretextual because, if the search had actually been for the legitimate purpose of protecting the vehicle owner’s property, the officer should have recorded all the property. Id. at 781. An officer also testified that the search was partly conducted to investigate whether the vehicle contained drugs, and the officer called for a drug-sniffing dog to examine the vehicle. Id. at 780. The court pointed out that the officers had failed to follow the standardized procedures and that this failure was coupled with evidence indicating that the officers “sifted through the vehicle’s contents searching only for and recording only incriminating evidence; something law enforcement may not do.” Id. at 782.

So, how much is enough?

After clearing the house where there was a suspected meth lab from the strong smell of anhydrous ammonia and starter fluid, the police lacked exigency for a warrantless entry again. There was no evidence of what dangers there were from the pill soak or the odor. State v. Hawks, 2013 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 2 (January 2, 2013):

The facts in this case are significantly different from the facts in Meeks. Granted, the odor of anhydrous ammonia and starter fluid was strong and could be smelled from a significant distance. However, by the time Captain Uselton arrived at the scene, police officers had removed the appellant’s family from the home, had determined that the appellant was not present, and were waiting “a distance” away. Captain Uselton arrived and searched the home again but did not find anyone inside. It was the State’s burden to show the existence of exigent circumstances. However, unlike Meeks, the State did not present any evidence about the dangers the strong odor or the soaking Sudafed posed to Captain Uselton, other officers at the scene, the appellant’s neighbors, or anyone in the surrounding vicinity. Therefore, we conclude that the proof fails to show the existence of exigent circumstances that exempted law enforcement from searching the residence without a warrant.

A reasonably conducted foreclosure sale doesn’t violate the Fourth Amendment, even it if applies (relying on a case making such an assumption). Citimortgage, Inc. v. Kraetzner, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1416 (D. Minn. January 4, 2013).*

Handcuffing and frisking did not extend the stop, and they were reasonable under the circumstances. United States v. Newman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183516 (W.D. Mo. November 15, 2012) (R&R).*

Following what it says is the better rule, there is no requirement for probable cause to each person on a wiretap as long as there is PC as to one. United States v. Tn, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183606 (W.D. Tex. September 25, 2012).*

Exigent circumstances justified DNA swabs from the defendant at the time of his arrest with probable cause for rape, even though he was handcuffed behind his back. State v. Parker, 48 Kan. App. 2d 68, 282 P.3d 643 (2012):

An officer testified that even though Parker was handcuffed, he could have wiped his hand on his pants before officers could get a warrant, potentially destroying fragile DNA evidence. Parker suggests that officers instead could have monitored him for however long it took to locate a judge and get a search warrant. But even a momentary slipup might result in the destruction of evidence. The district court properly concluded that the officer reasonably believed there was a threat of imminent loss or destruction of evidence if the swabs weren’t taken immediately. The district court thus properly denied the motion to suppress the DNA evidence and properly admitted that evidence.

Firemen responding to a call of an unresponsive man found defendant passed out at the wheel of a parked car and finally awoke him, also seeing a firearm between his legs. The “search” and entry into the car was reasonable. Also, the car was stolen, and there’s no standing in a stolen car. United States v. Overton, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125043 (S.D. Ohio September 4, 2012).*

The trial court’s findings were equivocal about driving over the centerline, and the appellate court erred in making its own factfinding. Remanded for real factfinding. State v. Garza, 295 Kan. 326, 286 P.3d 554 (2012).*

Smell of raw marijuana coming from a car when it was stopped and seeing a “marijuana ‘shake’” was probable cause to search the trunk. State v. Bonham, 2012 Ohio 3982, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3513 (5th Dist. August 28, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped at the San Jose light rail station around midnight for allegedly resembling one of two Black males who were suspected of committing a sexual battery a week earlier at noon. After he provided a false ID, he was arrested and cocaine base was found. The court finds that the description of the assailants a week earlier did not match defendant, and there was no justification for his detention in the first place. People v. Walker, 210 Cal. App. 4th 165, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 271 (6th Dist. 2012).*

Third party consent justified the police entry. Their view of the premises from open fields first was not unlawful. City of Mansfield v. Studer, 2012 Ohio 4840, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4242 (5th Dist. October 17, 2012).*

The traffic stop was justified by an unsignaled lane change, and reasonable suspicion existed from defendant having been followed from a drug house. The wait for the drug dog was minimal. Wilson v. State, 318 Ga. App. 59, 733 S.E.2d 365 (2012).*

Plaintiff’s 1983 case was an attempt to relitigate his state criminal case, and it was barred under Heck v. Humphrey. Alternatively, it is time barred because search claims don’t depend on overturning the state conviction to accrue. Hunt v. Michigan, 482 Fed. Appx. 20 (6th Cir. 2012)*:

But even if we were to agree with Hunt that some of his search-and-seizure claims are not barred by Heck, dismissal of his complaint was still proper because those claims are time-barred. The search and arrest about which Hunt complains occurred in October 1998, but Hunt did not file his complaint until November 2009, well beyond the three-year statute of limitations that applies to § 1983 claims in Michigan. See Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 713-14 (6th Cir. 2005). To the extent his claims are not barred by Heck, they do not benefit from the rule that a claim so barred does not accrue until the state conviction has been overturned. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90; see Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 641 (6th Cir. 2007). Because Hunt’s claims are either Heck-barred or time-barred, the district court properly dismissed his complaint.

A police officer from another city working plain clothes at a bar with a t-shirt with “Security” on the back who found a gun was not a state actor at the time of employment. The record was clear he was serving the interests of the bar and not the police, and he called the police to “sort it out” after the encounter. United States v. Cintron, 482 Fed. Appx. 353 (10th Cir. 2012):

The OK Corral Club, not the Boley Police Department, hired and paid Mr. Reed for his security guard work at the club. Not all security team members were off-duty police officers. As for the members of OK Corral’s security staff who were off-duty police officers, the OK Corral Club hired them and did not rely on official assistance from the police department. See Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that off-duty police officer working as security teller at a bank was a state actor when that position was part of a “secondary hiring” program and the security teller’s “primary duty was to the [police] department, not to the bank”).

Mr. Reed was not wearing his police uniform, did not have his badge, and never identified himself as a police officer. See Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1429-30 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that off-duty police officer working as a store security guard was acting under color of state law when he flashed his badge, identified himself as a police officer, and arrested the alleged shoplifter on the spot), vacated on other grounds,City of Lawton, Okla. v. Lusby, 474 U.S. 805 (1985).

At the suppression hearing, Mr. Reed explained that he was working to further the interests of the OK Corral Club, not those of the police department. … “Well, yeah, but I don’t [enforce the laws] there. I just … protect and keep the staff and the property safe over there. It’s not a matter of me really enforcing the laws over there. We just look out for the safety over there.” Id. at 34-35. He also explained that had he been acting as a police officer, he would have acted differently and would have “put [Mr. Cintron] on the ground.” Id. at 32.

Finally, Mr. Reed did not formally arrest Mr. Citron. …

Under the facts, it probably wouldn’t make any difference, either.

Defendant was arrested by the DEA with a SWAT team, and he consented to a limited search and a gun was found. He effectively withdrew consent, and the search stopped. The gun found earlier was admissible. United States v. Posa, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78456 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2012).*

Defendant consented to a search of his car, and there was probable cause in any event. United States v. Lee, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78579 (D. Haw. June 6, 2012).*

On the totality of evidence, there was probable cause to believe there was drug evidence in defendant’s car. United States v. Rucker, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78323 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2012).*

Defendant’s nervousness, criminal history, geographical limitations on use of his rental car, and possession of industrial degreaser was not reasonable suspicion. United States v. Johnson, 482 Fed. Appx. 137 (6th Cir. 2012).*

The judicially-created exclusionary rule is not applicable in a civil, administrative driver’s license revocation or suspension proceeding. Miller v. Toler, 729 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 2012).*

Defendant’s truck was under surveillance near the border with Mexico for 72 hours, and officers suspected drugs in an auxiliary fuel tank, which had become common at the time. All the factors involving this vehicle pointed to reasonable suspicion because of the suspicious activities with the truck of proximity to the border. The officers suspected that the vehicle could have been driven across the river at a shallow point. United States v. Mark, 481 Fed. Appx. 899 (5th Cir. 2012).*

On the totality, the officer had reasonable suspicion that defendant was carrying drugs in his car. [Note the court mentions consent was denied, but this is not mentioned later as a factor in reasonable suspicion.] State v. Smith, 373 S.W.3d 502 (Mo. App. 2012)*:

Here, Appellant was first legitimately stopped for two traffic violations. Already knowing that Appellant had just left a residence known for drug activity, Officer Buske first made contact with Appellant and was struck by Appellant’s nervousness, sweating, and shaking. Further, he recognized Appellant from dealing with him on previous occasions and knew of his history of drug use and criminal activity. It was at this point that Officer Buske requested to search Appellant’s vehicle and Appellant denied that request such that Officer Buske made the decision to request a police dog to sniff the vehicle which was done in an expeditious manner.

“Driving in Montana constitutes a privilege, not a right.” Taking one’s driver’s license for refusing a breath test was a reasonable seizure, and there is nothing to suppress. Nichols v. Dept. Of Justice, Drivers’ License Bureau, 2011 MT 33, 359 Mont. 251, 248 P.3d 813 (2011).

Defendant was driving slowly through a Polaris dealer’s parking lot at night with his headlights off. Considering the expensive inventory, the officer thought that really suspicious and stopped him, and he was found to be under the influence. The stop was valid. State v. Rodriguez, 2011 MT 36, 359 Mont. 281, 248 P.3d 850 (2011).*

Like in Hodari D., defendant was approached by the police and he turned to walk away, discarding a bag of dope in the process, and that was an abandonment. State v. Eaton, 2011 N.C. App. LEXIS 319 (March 1, 2011).*

UNCG University police had a mutual aid agreement with the local police, and a stop by the University police outside of its jurisdiction was not a substantial violation of state law to justify suppressing the arrest. State v. Scruggs, 209 N.C. App. 725, 706 S.E.2d 836 (2011).*