Defendant was stopped in a car and subjected to a parole search after his parole officer was called. She did not perform the search, and PO’s can permit LEO’s to conduct the search. Johnson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 476, 2012 Ark. App. LEXIS 604 (September 12, 2012).

Defendant who spent most weeknights with his girlfriend and kept clothes there had standing to challenge a search of her apartment. Her consent was invalid based on 14 officers in the lobby and a threat of prosecution if she didn’t consent. People v Perez, 2012 NY Slip Op 22256, 37 Misc. 3d 734, 951 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Kings. Co. 2012).*

Assuming, without deciding, that the search warrant was issued without probable cause, the warrant was executed in good faith under Leon because of the breadth of the investigation they conducted which corroborated the CIs [and isn’t that part of PC?]. United States v. Miller, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131567 (M.D. N.C. September 14, 2012).*

Following Maynard and Weaver, a Delaware Superior Court judge suppresses warrantless use of GPS to track the defendant’s movements. State v. Holden, 54 A.3d 1123 (Del. Super. 2010).*

On the totality of circumstances, there was probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for defendant’s blood in a DUI case. Foley v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 10071 (Tex. App.– Corpus Christi–Edinburg December 21, 2010).* [Coincidentally, today on MSNBC’s morning news there was a story about judges in Texas issuing search warrants for blood because 50% of all DUI detainees refuse breath tests.]

There was probable cause for the search of defendant’s car, so Gant was inapplicable. United States v. Murphy, 405 Fed. Appx. 791 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).*

A student’s leaving a school campus and then coming back during the day justified a T.L.O. “special needs” search of the student’s belongings under school policy. In re Sean A., 191 Cal. App. 4th 182, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72 (4th Dist. 2010).*

Officers came to defendant’s house to serve his mother with a notice for trespass and harassment, and they saw what they thought were long guns in house, and she was a convicted felon. They got a search warrant for firearms and went back, discovering that the expected long guns were actually BB guns. They continued to a lockbox and wanted to search it for a possible handgun, and the occupants at first refused, and the officers said they would open it by force if they didn’t open it. They admitted there was cocaine in the lockbox, and another warrant was obtained for the lockbox. Garrison applies, and when the officers discovered that the long guns weren’t firearms, they were required to discontinue the search. State v. Schulz, 55 A.3d 933 (N.H. 2012):

Suppression is therefore the appropriate remedy under the circumstances. Had the magistrate known that Officer Alling observed BB guns, rather than firearms, and given that the affidavit did not provide any information as to how the BB guns were “used, intended to be used, or threatened to be used” so as to constitute a deadly weapon, RSA 625:11, V (2007), no warrant would have been authorized because there would have been no probable cause to believe the defendant’s mother was committing, or had committed, the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm or other deadly weapon, see RSA 159:3 (2002).

It bears emphasizing that both the standard we have employed and the conclusion that we reach are compelled under the well-established constitutional precedents recited above. Even more so than in Garrison, where the police were required to discontinue searching after they “were put on notice of the risk that they might be” in the wrong apartment, Garrison, 480 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added), here the police were required to discontinue searching when they learned that the three guns that formed the sole factual basis for the warrant were not, in fact, firearms. In so concluding, we are not imposing a new constitutional burden on the police; as was recognized in Garrison, police officers have a duty to reassess probable cause based upon information acquired after the warrant issues but before or during a search. The police must, of course, have some latitude to conduct searches pursuant to warrants. What the police cannot do, however, is treat the search warrant as an authorization for a full-scale search irrespective of developments subsequent to the warrant’s issuance. While it may be the rare case in which facts discovered during the search clearly and unambiguously dispel probable cause, this is such a case. Accordingly, the execution of the warrant violated Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution.

The officer had no reasonable belief that defendant was in a third party’s residence to enter to arrest defendant: His car was not outside and he was only seen there the day before. Essentially, the officer admitted they didn’t want to wait around all day for him to show up. Gutierrez v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 628, 2012 Ark. App. LEXIS 740 (November 7, 2012).

The trial court’s conclusion that defendant consented to a general search of her home rather than a photographing was supported by the record. State v. Saunders, 55 A.3d 1014 (N.H. 2012).*

The district where the evidence was seized by the police was the logical place for the forfeiture to be tried. The claimant’s motion for a change of venue is denied. United States v. $1,074,900.00 in United States Currency, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161943 (D. Neb. November 13, 2012).*

A Colombian wiretap gave highly specific information that a kilo of heroin was coming to a hotel room in Queens. Every detail gleaned from the wiretap proved to be accurate, and it played out as foretold. When the officers went to the motel room door, the evasive actions of defendant added to the probable cause. The warrantless entry was justified because the defendant was clearly aware the police were there for the heroin and it would be moved or destroyed if not seized right then. United States v. Moreno, 701 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2012).*

Defendant had a choice to consent between a blood draw by needle or a breath test. Since he said he was afraid of a needle, it is clear that he consented to a breath test. Fienen v. State, 2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1597 (November 21, 2012).*

Defendant did not show that the searches were unlawful where defense counsel did not challenge them. As to an inventory, the record does not show that there was an inventory except for paperwork filled out saying it was from an inventory, and that at least shows an attempt at complying with standardized procedures. Defendant, at least, did not show the search to be invalid if his 2255 filing. Rosado v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165609 (D. Mass. November 20, 2012).*

Telling a person that he’s the target of a child pornography investigation creates exigency to seize his work computer so he won’t destroy what’s on it. Here, the officers told defendant they had probable cause against him. United States v. Brown, 701 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 2012):

Based on their investigation, the detectives had probable cause to believe that any computer used by either Brown or Yarboro during their work shifts at Medical Transport harbored evidence of child pornography. Accordingly, when the Charlottesville detectives informed Brown that they were investigating internet crimes against children, they had probable cause to believe that Brown’s laptop, which he possessed during his work shift, contained evidence of child pornography. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of property “[w]here law enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that [the property] holds contraband or evidence of a crime …, if the exigencies of the circumstances demand it.”). Following up on Brown’s response, it was entirely reasonable for the officers to seize Brown’s laptop – as they did – to prevent either it or its contents from being damaged or destroyed. See King at 1862.

Police created exigency?

A search warrant for a computer with child pornography at defendant’s address included searching an RV on the premises using a wireless router. The RV was being used as a residence, and the warrant included the house and vehicles on the premises. Hines v. State, 317 Ga. App. 541, 731 S.E.2d 782 (2012).*

Petitioner’s vague allegation that defense counsel talked to an uncalled “somebody” about his arrest wasn’t shown to have an effect on the outcome of the litigation about the arrest. Dunston v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125865 (N.D. Tex. September 4, 2012).

Defendant lacked standing in a rental car when it was searched. It was rented by another person’s mother so he could go to work, and the other person loaned it to defendant who used it and returned it. It was searched thereafter when he gave it up. State v. Brown, 382 S.W.3d 147 (Mo. App. 2012).*

Removing the gearshift boot from a car as a part of an inventory search showed it was really a criminal search. Also, when the officer was conducting the inventory, she had no pen and paper in hand suggesting that there was no inventory. The video of the inventory process also was relied upon. State v. Williams, 382 S.W.3d 232 (Mo. App. 2012):

Although we do not have the inventory report itself, from Officer Laffoon’s cross-examination we know that she also failed to document all of the valuable property found within the vehicle. According to Officer Laffoon’s testimony, and as depicted in the video recording, two cell phones found in the vehicle were returned to Williams. The Kansas City Police Department inventory policy provides that “[p]roperty other than evidence and contraband may be released at the scene by the officer to a responsible person. Release information on the reverse side of the Physical Evidence/Property Inventory Report, Form 236 P.D., will be completed prior to releasing the property.” Despite the explicit requirement to document the release of property to third parties, Officer Laffoon admitted on cross-examination that “no, it doesn’t look like [the cell phones] ended up being listed on there.”

We also note that the dashboard video recording makes clear that Officer Laffoon “did not have a pen, [and] did not write anything down” as she conducted her search. United States v. Garcia-Medina, No. 2:11-CR-545-TC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80620, 2012 WL 23597765, at *4 (D. Utah Aug. 20, 2012). Although Officer Laffoon told Officer Henry that she should be the only person physically searching the vehicle’s interior, she did not complete the inventory form. According to Officer Laffoon, Officer Henry completed the form, “[m]ore than likely” based on what she told him. The video recording reflects that Officer Henry did not ask Officer Laffoon whether she had Tow-In reports in her patrol car until fifteen minutes after the search had begun. The fact that Officer Laffoon had no device to actually document the property she was uncovering, and that fifteen minutes elapsed before Officer Henry began the process of documenting whatever he listed, are additional factors indicating that this was not a true inventory.

Officer Laffoon’s failure to completely and accurately document the property found in Williams’ vehicle as required by the Kansas City Police Department inventory policy, and the behavior indicating that her objective was not to prepare an exhaustive property listing, are highly significant in determining whether this was a bona fide inventory search. “The policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory.'” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990) (emphasis added). The underlying purpose of an inventory search is (or at least should be) to produce a report documenting the nature, and condition, of property being impounded, to protect the police department from spurious claims of lost or damaged property. Investigating officers’ failure to properly record the property they find is a significant consideration in determining the bona fides of the inventory.

While Massachusetts decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijuana for a search of the car, the finding of a warrant on defendant justified his arrest and search because it would have inevitably have happened at the police station anyway. Commonwealth v. Lobo, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 803, 978 N.E.2d 807 (2012).*

Defendant and others were suspected, from looking at hours of casino video surveillance, of conspiring to rob winning casino patrons, following them from Lawrenceburg, Indiana back to Cincinnati and robbing them at their homes. Officers developed probable cause for defendant, and the inventory search of her vehicle when she was arrested followed SOP and was done in good faith and not as a pretext for criminal investigation. State v. Erkins, 2012 Ohio 5372, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4712 (1st Dist November 21, 2012).*

Defendant drifted over the fog line, and he was stopped. The officer wrote him a warning, and told him he was free to leave. Then he asked if he could ask more questions, defendant agreed, and he asked about whether there was anything illegal in the car. Defendant’s heart rate obviously jumped. Defendant validly consented to a search of the car. United States v. Salas, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165008 (E.D. Okla. November 1, 2012).*

A residential search warrant that did not mention vehicles still authorized a search of all vehicles parked on the curtilage belonging there. United States v. Hickman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144962 (D. Kan. October 9, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for a headlight violation, and a drug dog was immediately called to the scene. While the DL was being checked, which took 17 minutes, the dog alerted on the passenger door and passenger’s purse on the hood. This was all reasonable. State v. Wilcox, 2012 Ohio 4582, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4028 (5th Dist. September 25, 2012).*

Defendant’s consent to search a validly stopped bus was not during an unreasonably prolonged stop. Rocha v. State, 317 Ga. App. 863, 733 S.E.2d 38 (2012).*

The police can stop drivers who engage in erratic driving behavior, even if it is simply weaving within a lane. McRae v. Hogan, 317 Ga. App. 813, 732 S.E.2d 853 (2012).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion to continue the stop where defendant and his passenger were in a brand new rental car, neither was on the paperwork, and they didn’t know the name of the renter. State v. Jalloh, 2012 Ohio 5314, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 4636 (2d Dist. November 16, 2012).

Because digital camera can record videos, a digital camera is seizable under a search warrant for “video recording devices.” United States v. Carson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165041 (C.D. Ill. November 19, 2012),* R&R 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168149 (C.D. Ill. October 25, 2012).

Defendant’s consent to DUI test was valid where he signed two consent forms that said it was voluntary, and he was not in custody when he signed. State v. Doyle, 139 Conn. App. 367, 55 A.3d 805 (2012).*

A Washington state ABC compliance check of a licensed establishment that only had officers in open areas was not a search under the constitutions. Dodge City Saloon v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 168 Wn. App. 388, 288 P.3d 343 (2012):

In this case, the Liquor Board’s actions did not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes because the Liquor Board did not violate Dodge City’s privacy interests. Dodge City had no reasonable privacy interest in areas of its licensed premises that it actively invites the public to enter. Barlow’s Inc., 436 U.S. at 315. Even if, as Dodge City argues, it had a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy to exclude persons under 21 years old, which it did not, Dodge City lost that interest when it voluntarily admitted C.M. onto the premises. United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Once consent has been obtained from one with authority to give it, any expectation of privacy has been lost.”). Thus, the Liquor Board’s officers did not conduct a “search” when they entered the public portions of Dodge City’s premises and observed only what members of the public could also observe. Likewise, the Liquor Board’s officers did not conduct a “search” when they observed C.M.’s entry into Dodge City from a public street. Accordingly, because there was no “search” in this case, the Liquor Board’s actions do not implicate constitutional considerations and Dodge City has no “search” on which to base a Fourth Amendment or article I, section 7 unreasonable search and seizure claim. Centimark Corp., 129 Wn. App. at 375.

A face-to-face meeting better the affiant for a search warrant and the issuing magistrate is not required. Here, they recognized each other’s voices, the affiant swore over the phone and faxed the affidavit to the magistrate who faxed back the signed search warrant. Clay v. State, 382 S.W.3d 465 (Tex. App. – Waco March 21, 2012), discretionary review granted by Clay, 2012 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 847 (Tex. Crim.
App. June 27, 2012):

The second statement relied upon by Clay is a comment by the Court that, while recognizing innovations such as telephonic search warrants should not be foreclosed by the requirement of a signed affidavit, “[w]e leave those potential future changes to the Texas Legislature….” Smith v. State, 207 S.W.3d 787, 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). This statement, Clay believes, is an acknowledgment that a procedure to obtain warrants by telephone and facsimile has not been authorized by statute, does not exist under Texas law, and therefore cannot be a valid practice in Texas at the present time. We believe it is not such an acknowledgement and certainly is not such a prohibition. As the Court stated, it is important for the law to retain some flexibility in the face of technological advances. Id. at 792. Had there been no flexibility in the statute, the Smith Court would have been compelled to hold that a signed affidavit was required. It did not. And thus, the statute is also flexible so as to allow for the taking of an oath over the telephone or by some other electronic means of communication under certain circumstances. That is the nature of the development of the common law. We must decide only the issue presented—in this case, is the affidavit invalid because it was not made on an oath administered face-to-face.

Police were searching woods for a murder suspect and they encountered defendant, whom they asked for identification and why he was in the woods. This was not an investigative detention subject to the Fourth Amendment. He wasn’t the suspect they were looking for. Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 2012 PA Super 118, 46 A.3d 781 (2012).*

The stop was justified based on the testimony even though its basis wasn’t mentioned in the reports. “No extrinsic evidence has been offered to contradict Officer Nelson’s testimony, and ‘[t]he mere fact an incident report omits certain details is not sufficient to render the officer’s testimony concerning the underlying action facially implausible.’ United States v. Mendoza, 677 F.3d 822, 828 (8th Cir. 2012).” United States v. Gant, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78853 (D. Minn. June 7, 2012).*

Defendant’s post-conviction claim that his 2007 conviction should be voided because of Gant was rejected, not on Davis grounds, but on the automobile exception. United States v. Carter, 481 Fed. Appx. 475 (11th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant claimed an illegal search caused his statement, but he’d been indicted by this time, and he couldn’t show that it coerced his statement. United States v. Powner, 481 Fed. Appx. 529 (11th Cir. 2012)*:

Similarly, Powner’s assertion that when the police questioned him after his arrest on September 28, 2009, they “had at their disposal all of the illegally seized evidence,” falls short of demonstrating that the police actually used that tainted evidence to coerce Powner’s post-arrest statements. Therefore, we decline to hold that Ceccolini bars the admission of either Powner’s statements or the trial testimony of his co-defendants.

Reasonable suspicion is needed to detain a package, and the markings and other information gave that here. A dog then alerted, and then a search warrant obtained. Then there was a controlled delivery to defendant’s house. United States v. Tapia, 481 Fed. Appx. 288 (8th Cir. 2012):

As a law enforcement officer, Meyer needed “reasonable suspicion that a piece of mail, or a package shipped via a commercial carrier, contains contraband to lawfully seize it for investigative purposes.” United States v. Lakoskey, 462 F.3d 965, 975 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2004)). A seizure occurs “when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.

“Appeal from a grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff-appellant Jody Fabrikant’s federal constitutional claims, which arose from a search of her property, her arrest on animal abuse charges, and the seizure, spaying and neutering, and fostering of her dogs during the pendency of state criminal proceedings. We conclude that (1) defendants acted under color of state law when they sterilized Fabrikant’s dogs and fostered them out to temporary homes following the animals’ seizure; (2) defendants are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity on Fabrikant’s due process claims, as their actions did not violate any “clearly established” constitutional or statutory right; and (3) defendants involved in the search and arrest are entitled to summary judgment on Fabrikant’s malicious prosecution, unreasonable search and seizure, and First Amendment retaliation claims because their actions were supported by probable cause. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.” Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2012).*

After defendant was arrested for child pornography, his computer was left with his girlfriend who the officer questioned to determine her relationship to the computer. Satisfied that she had complete access and had personal files on the computer, too, he obtained her valid consent to search it. United States v. Stanley, 481 Fed. Appx. 335 (9th Cir. 2012).*

Statute of limitations for plaintiff prison inmate’s § 1983 complaint for a wrongful search began when he knew the search occurred. Here, it was time barred when filed. Woodson v. Payton, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22579 (3d Cir. November 2, 2012).*

Failure to intervene instruction from the plaintiff was wrong on the law, but he can’t complain on appeal. Sanchez v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. November 2, 2012).*

A parent sued the defendant school board under the Fourth Amendment for giving the child an H1-N1 shot. Also, “Plaintiffs’ Complaint did not come close to meeting these rigorous standards” of deliberate indifference or shocking the conscience. B.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. of St. Louis, 698 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2012).*

Officers saw bullet holes in a car next to defendant’s fenced backyard and shell casings. While two hours had passed and there were 20 officers in the area, the entry was justified because of the risk of a wounded person, not a gunman. United States v. Schmidt, 700 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2012):

At the time of the search, gunshots had recently been heard in the neighborhood. Bullet holes were in a car that was adjacent to the backyard, bullet holes were in the 1424/1426 duplex itself, and there was a trail of about nine spent casings on the ground nearby, including five right next to the 1424/1426 duplex and one in the yard. These circumstances, taken together, made it reasonable for an officer to believe, at the time of the search, that people in the backyard area may have recently been shot and in need of immediate aid.

Schmidt principally argues that by the time of the search, two hours had already passed since the shots were fired and over 20 officers had blanketed the block. But the prime exigency in this case was the potential for wounded victims, not necessarily the threat of further shooting. If a victim had been shot in the yard, as a reasonable officer could have suspected, that victim would not have become any less wounded after two hours had passed; to the contrary, he would need immediate aid. It would not have made sense for an officer to wait for a warrant when a shooting victim could have been dying in the yard, and the officer also did not need to know that someone had actually been shot in order to go into the yard. …

Defendant had an interview for a job with the FBI and he failed the polygraph on child pornography. He admitted that he had child pornography on his home computer as a part of research on international child pornography. Based on his admissions from the interview process, FBI agents procured a search warrant for his computer. His admissions were not custodial and were freely made. United States v. Pelletier, 700 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 2012)*:

Federal investigative agents will tell you that some cases are hard to solve. Some cases require years of effort—chasing down false leads and reigning in flighty witnesses. Others require painstaking scientific analysis, or weeks of poring over financial records for a hidden clue. And some cases are never solved at all—the right witness never comes forward, the right lead never pans out, or the right clue never turns up.

This is not one of those cases. The defendant, Dominick Pelletier, admitted during a job interview with the FBI that he had pornographic pictures of children on his home computer. Instead of joining the FBI’s vaunted ranks, Pelletier was indicted for one count of possession of child pornography. After the district court denied two of his motions to suppress, Pelletier entered a conditional guilty plea and reserved the right to appeal the denial of the suppression motions. Finding no error, we affirm.