Something one doesn’t see often: Officers couldn’t support need for a protective sweep, so the entry is suppressed. United States v. Anyanwu, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53582 (N.D. Ga. March 18, 2013):

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The affidavit for search warrant provided probable cause on the totality of information. While the reporting victim was young, that did not undermine her statement that her father had sex with her because of some limited corroboration from statements of the father. The search warrant also was not stale. “When the affidavit recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, the passage of time becomes less significant.” The victim’s statements supported a request in the warrant for writings and pictures. Jarnagin v. State, 392 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2012).*

Defendant’s 2255 claim that defense counsel was ineffective for not challenging the search warrant was denied because there was no search warrant. Defense counsel did challenge a warrantless search. United States v. Anderson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171275 (E.D. Va. December 3, 2012).*

Claimant’s stop was reasonable based on a traffic offense, and it was not so long before consent was given that it was unreasonable. United States v. $89,980.00 United States Currency, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171893 (S.D. Tex. November 9, 2012).*

The nature of plaintiff’s consent to search her car was open ended. The officer asked about “guns and bombs” and she said no and he could look. The officer pulled a letter out of an open envelope from a court to her husband, put it back, and let her go because nothing of interest was found. The officer had qualified immunity because of the open-ended consent search. Winfield v. Trottier, 710 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2013).*

Defense counsel can’t be ineffective for not making a motion to suppress that would have lost, here about a plain view during defendant’s arrest and protective sweep that led to 404(b) evidence at this trial of cocaine on the floor. Davis v. United States, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30924 (E.D. Tenn. March 6, 2013).*

It appeared to the officers that defendant and his girlfriend shared the bedroom, so that gave her common authority to consent to a search of it. United States v. Dantzler, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31492 (E.D. N.Y. March 6, 2013).*

The court credits the officers that one of them saw a gun pulled by the defendant in a high crime area, and that led to his stop. United States v. Abney, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31336 (D. N.J. March 6, 2013).*

The officer stopped defendant for wandering on the road, and the court believes the officer. The video of the driving encounter doesn’t contradict the officer or help the defendant. United States v. Coleman, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30429 (S.D. Ill. March 6, 2013).*

When a family member calls 911 about an overdose and emergency responders know that the person they called about is a heroin user, the responders have exigent circumstances to enter. Here, the occupants rebuffed the police saying an RN in the house checked him out, but they could see he was still in need of treatment. Under prior case law, that did not dissipate the exigency. The responders could also check for the source of the overdose and do a protective sweep. Stricker v. Twp. of Cambridge, 710 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2013):

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The search warrant for blood was based on a template that had the name of another person in the warrant too. This was a mere typographical error that was correctable by the court [citing no case law at all]. State v. Green, 91 So. 3d 315 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2012):

The blood sample taken from the defendant was withdrawn pursuant to a warrant issued based on a probable cause affidavit. The affidavit submitted in support of the warrant application inadvertently contained in several places the name of an individual not associated with the case. The attesting officer utilized a template to generate the affidavit and failed to change the name of the accused to the defendant’s name in several places. The affidavit, however, also contained the name, date of birth and address of the defendant, sufficiently describing the defendant as the person from whom evidence was being sought. In addition, the search warrant contained only the name of the defendant. Since it is apparent from the four corners of the affidavit that the defendant was the individual from whom the evidence was to be seized, the mistaken references to the other individual are not fatal to the affidavit.

Defendant’s tractor trailer logbooks made little sense and also showed that defendant came from California heading to Miami, but he’d gone through Montana. Defendant couldn’t account for his downtime, and the officer brought the defendant between the vehicles to talk to him. He asked for consent to use a drug dog which defendant consented to. Freeman v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 144, 391 S.W.3d 682 (2012).*

Officers have a right to rely on NCIC information about priors, and the fact it later turned out to be inaccurate did not deprive it of being probable cause at the time of the stop. State v. Flores, 392 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2012).

A passenger producing a “blunt” is probable cause that there is other contraband in the vehicle. State v. Mitchell, 2012 N.C. App. LEXIS 1374 (December 4, 2012).*

The totality of circumstances provided the police with reasonable suspicion that defendant had drugs in his vehicle because of good information about an earlier meth buy. United States v. Valencia, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173269 (W.D. Ky. September 14, 2012).*

Double anonymous informant hearsay is insufficient to base a search. The state misses the mark by arguing that the defendant doesn’t show that they aren’t reliable since the defendant has no way of knowing who they are in the first place. Sutton v. State, 319 Ga. App. 597, 737 S.E.2d 706 (2013). The first anonymous informant’s name was “It”:

While making broad, conclusory statements regarding It’s credibility and motivations, however, the affidavit does not say whether It provided the information to the officer over the phone or in person; whether the officer confirmed that It was, in fact, the person he or she claimed to be; whether the officer’s conclusions that It was “mature” and employed with no criminal record and no motivation to lie about the defendant was based upon his independent confirmation of those facts or whether he simply relied on It’s statements to him; or whether It had previously provided reliable information to the officer or other officers regarding criminal activity by other individuals.

If one anonymous informant almost can never be enough, surely passing one through another can’t either.

A general inventory policy that the contents of vehicles be inventoried but that does not specify that closed containers be inventoried does not permit specifically opening the closed containers. One officer testified to “inventorying thousands of vehicles” and always interpreting it that way. State v. Hullum, 2013 Ohio 1448, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1360 (8th Dist. April 11, 2013):

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New American: Idaho Supports Fourth Amendment, Enacts Drone Restrictions by Joe Wolverton, II:

Another state is stepping in and shielding its citizens from constant surveillance by the government or law enforcement.

On April 11, Idaho Governor C.L. “Butch” Otter signed into law the “Preserving Freedom From Unwanted Surveillance Act,” an act reinforcing the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

The law amends the Idaho code, placing new restrictions on the use of drones by government or law enforcement, particularly when it comes to the gathering of evidence and surveillance of private property.

None of the defendants had standing to challenge placement of a GPS device on a cargo van that belonged to none of them. United States v. Martinez-Turcio, 494 Fed. Appx. 354 (4th Cir. 2012).*

An isolated comment that the defendant might want to talk to an attorney before consenting to a search of his computer did not justify a mistrial. (It was also inherent in the defense questioning.) State v. Abraham, 2012 Ohio 4248, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3732 (9th Dist. September 19, 2012).*

Defendant’s furtive movements in the car and then hesitancy in getting out of the car and putting his hands on his head justified a protective frisk. The trial court erred in suppressing. State v. Wade, 2012 Ohio 4255, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3737 (9th Dist. September 19, 2012).*

Defendant was stopped and detained a little long, but it was with reasonable suspicion. Defendant’s car was seen at a hotel parking lot, and it was subjected to a dog sniff when it was parked, and the dog alerted. That justified a search under the automobile exception. An invalid warrant had been obtained, but that does not prevent the government from relying on an exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Holleman, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124443 (N.D. Iowa August 30, 2012).

The request for consent came with returning the paperwork to the driver, and that did not prolong the stop. White v. State, 319 Ga. App. 540, 732 S.E.2d 107 (2012).*

“Video and/or audio recording devices” and storage devices in a child pornography search warrant includes DVDs, VHS tapes, and 8mm tapes. United States v. Csanadi, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124130 (D. Conn. August 31, 2012).*

Defendant’s identity as one who was in the country illegally after previously being deported would not be suppressed, “even if the Court were to find something unconstitutional about the search of the home or Defendant’s detention.” United States v. Segundo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185484 (E.D. Tex. December 13, 2012).

Defendant’s stop for blocking the street was valid, and the officer could reasonably suspect further evidence of crime because defendant dropped a pill bottle into the car when he got out. State v. Reed, 107 So. 3d 1262 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2013).*

“The affidavit was detailed and replete with information from which probable cause could be found” in his trucks parked at his house. United States v. Brown, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13256 (D. S.D. January 31, 2013).*

The officers had articulable facts that others might be present when they were executing an arrest warrant for defendant justifying a protective sweep. United States v. Crail, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115540 (S.D. Ohio August 16, 2012).*

In a federal civil rights criminal prosecution of a police officer, it was well established that a strip search of a female arrestee on the side of the road would violate the Fourth Amendment despite the lack of a specific case in point. Something would be required, and here there was nothing. United States v. Morris, 494 Fed. Appx. 574 (6th Cir. 2012).*

Issue preclusion doesn’t apply to a federal charge from dismissal of a state traffic ticket that formed the basis of a stop. Here, the officer just didn’t show in traffic court. There was probable cause for the stop. United States v. Wilkins, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126528 (N.D. Ohio September 6, 2012).

A probationer’s positive drug test is reasonable suspicion for an immediate probation search of his home. United States v. Crews, 494 Fed. Appx. 240 (3d Cir. 2012).

The defendant’s dispute that one fact finding was illogical really wasn’t reason to find that the magistrate clearly erred in concluding there was a basis for the stop. United States v. Love, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126385 (W.D. Tenn. September 6, 2012).*

Search of shoes is not permitted during a pat down for weapons. State v. Cleveland, 319 Ga. App. 225, 733 S.E.2d 12 (2012).*

Defense counsel not ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress a search of a house admittedly abandoned in an effort to distance defendant from it. [The court also found a business letter and divorce decree not “private papers,” which is ridiculous, as an alternative ground for why a motion to suppress wouldn’t be granted.] Flemister v. State, 317 Ga. App. 749, 732 S.E.2d 810 (2012).*

Officers responded to a fireworks complaint, and ended up detaining a juvenile. The nature of the report without specifics and finding a car with no reasonable suspicion didn’t help. The stop of the juvenile was without reasonable suspicion. In re Ashley W., 284 Neb. 424, 821 N.W.2d 706 (2012).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion because of the owner not being present with the car, the occupants were inconsistent in describing their travel plans, they were nervous, and they had multiple types of air fresheners. “[E]ven a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.” Commonwealth v. Caban, 2012 PA Super 278, 60 A.3d 120 (2012).*

The CI here was named and was the next door neighbor relating observations and what he heard from occupants of the house, and that was enough to give the officers probable cause for a search warrant for marijuana plants in the basement. Yet, the officer had PC without the information from the CI, so that is academic. Here, defendant was verified to be a medical marijuana cardholder, and he consented to the search of his basement and showed the officers around. State v. Deshaw, 2012 MT 284, 367 Mont. 218, 291 P.3d 561 (2012).*

The stop was reasonable in duration, and the passenger has standing to challenge the length of the stop. Since it was reasonable, he lacks standing to challenge the search of the car. State v. Franklin, __ N.C. App. __, 736 S.E.2d 218 (2012).*

A lost and final suppression motion is collateral estoppel to the basis for the seizure in a forfeiture. Three Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Five & No/100 Dollars v. State, No. 04-11-00666-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10453 (Tex. App. – San Antonio December 19, 2012).

Stashing a gun in the rafters of a back porch of an apartment with another apartment door there was a waiver of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Also, removing the defendant was for interrogation and because the police felt he didn’t have standing to object to a search anyway. The court finds Randolph not violated. United States v. Constant, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15524 (D. Me. February 5, 2013).*

Probable cause existed for search of defendant’s house for evidence of social security and passport fraud. United States v. Cadet, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436 (N.D. Ga. January 16, 2013).*

Based on reports, defendant’s parole officer had reasonable suspicion to believe he was involved in guns and drugs, so a search of his house was justified. Guns and drugs were in plain view, so a more intense search was permitted. State v. Edwards, 107 So. 3d 883 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2013).*

Defendant’s “No Trespassing” sign alone was not determinative of complete privacy. More was required. He otherwise consented to entry into the house. State v. Cam, 255 Ore. App. 1, 296 P.3d 578 (2013):

We agree with the state that, under the circumstances, defendant’s intent to exclude visitors from his property was not manifest. The state correctly notes that the posting of a sign indicating that property is private does not in and of itself suggest that visitors to the property are excluded. As we said in Gabbard, in order to exclude the casual visitor from approaching a residence, “a person must make a greater showing than that which would be required to exclude individuals who would use the property for their own purpose, such as hiking.” …

Threat to issue further traffic citations if defendant didn’t consent makes his consent involuntary. State v. Beaudreau, 255 Ore. App. 175, 296 P.3d 623 (2013).*

Exigent circumstances supported police entry into a hotel room with a manager’s key where a “visibly upset woman” reported a rape in the room by a foreign visitor whom the police feared might flee if they took the time to get a warrant, even a telephonic warrant, because they had no information on the man other than a first name. People v Green, 2013 NY Slip Op 295, 104 A.D.3d 12, 958 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st Dept. 2013):

Finally, we reject defendant’s argument that his suppression motion should have been granted. The warrantless entry into his hotel room was justified by exigent circumstances (see People v McBride, 14 NY3d 440, 445-446 [2010], …). A visibly upset woman informed the police that she had just been raped and that the foreign visitor who had raped her, and whom she knew only by his first name, was staying in the hotel room. The police had probable cause to arrest defendant for a very serious charge, and they had reason to believe that he was still in the hotel room2. [2 At trial, defendant was acquitted of the rape charge.] Regardless of whether defendant was aware that he was about to be arrested, there was a danger that he might choose to flee (see People v Williams, 181 AD2d 474, 476 [1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 1055 [1992]), or might simply check out of the hotel and return to his native country, rendering him nearly impossible to locate given the lack of pedigree information. Similarly, there was reason to believe that a drug used in commission of the alleged rape was in the room, and that defendant might dispose of it either to destroy evidence or for some other reason.

Additionally, the officers entered the hotel room peaceably, using the manager’s key, and the record does not establish that it would have been practical for the police to proceed by way of a warrant, by telephone or otherwise (see United States v Malik, 642 F Supp 1009, 1012 [SD NY 1986]). After the police entered, defendant gave his written consent to a search of the room, which yielded evidence relating to the reckless endangerment charge of which defendant was ultimately convicted. The People established the voluntariness of that consent by clear and convincing evidence (see generally People v Gonzalez, 39 NY2d 122, 128-131 [1976]), including evidence that the police informed defendant that he had the right to refuse to consent to a search. The record also supports the hearing court’s finding that the consensual search was attenuated from any illegality in the police entry.

Search incident of the call log of defendant’s cell phone was valid. (Maybe that’s all that’s subject to search incident.) People v. Taylor, 2012 COA 91, 296 P.3d 317 (2012):

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