The “black box” in a vehicle was a part of the “instrumentality of crime” in this vehicle manslaughter case, and it could be seized and searched without a search warrant. Also, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. People v. Diaz, 213 Cal. App. 4th 743, 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90 (4th Dist. 2013):

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An officer sitting at a red light at 1 am observed defendant’s car pull off the road ahead and stop. It was reasonable for the officer to assume that the motorist was experiencing some sort of distress or problem, and the officer could pull up to inquire under the community caretaking function. Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).*

Petitioner’s stop was with reasonable suspicion of OWI, so his arrest and revocation of his driving privileges for refusing a breath test was permissible. Court of appeals reversed. In re Refusal of Anagnos; States v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, 341 Wis. 2d 576, 815 N.W.2d 675 (2012).*

Probable cause came from matching defendant’s vehicle to several area gas station robberies, and then finding the car outside defendant’s home. The fact it did not appear in the last video of a robbery was not determinative. United States v. Mercado-Cañizares, 887 F. Supp. 2d 379 (D. P.R. 2012).*

In an overprescribing case against a doctor, the 39 page affidavit for a search warrant for his house and office did not require an expert’s opinion that he was overprescribing and that he continued to prescribe after being told patients were addicted and some overdosed. United States v. Joseph, 709 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir. 2013)*:

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An intensive search of defendant’s hard drive seized at the border was not reasonable under the border search doctrine. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).

The introduction:

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Under the totality of circumstances, “[o]fficers in conducting such an investigation are fully entitled to rely upon their professional experience and specialized training to draw inferences from and make deductions about the cumulative information available to them, information that might well seem entirely innocuous to the untrained eye.” United States v. Valencia, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173269 (W.D. Ky. September 13, 2012).*

In a combined suppression hearing and bench trial, the defense properly preserved the objection to the admission of the evidence for appeal. The search of the defendant’s person was invalid because the consent was coerced. State v. Spagnola, 295 Kan. 1098, 289 P.3d 68 (2012).*

Defense counsel was not ineffective for not raising a suppression issue that was a loser. United States v. Altamirano-Quintero, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25127 (10th Cir. December 6, 2012).*

The state could not rely on lack of standing to support admission of the product of the search where it did not raise it at the suppression hearing. State v. Jepson, 2012 Ore. App. LEXIS 1525 (December 19, 2012).*

Defendant was on probation and in custody, and his consent was not coerced even though there were several police officers around. He’d been on probation with this PO before, and he knew that he was subject to home inspection searches as a condition. State v. Brock, 254 Ore. App. 273, 295 P.3d 89 (2012).*

Because “‘[A]ny person of ordinary intelligence, who had a reasonable opportunity to observe a vehicle in motion and judge its speed may testify as to his estimation of the speed of that vehicle.’ State v. Barnhill, …”, the officer’s testimony, if credited, is enough for a stop. Here, the officer testified defendant was speeding, going in the opposite direction, speed observed for four seconds. State v. Royster, 737 S.E.2d 400 (N.C. App. 2012).*

Plaintiffs’ gated front yard was curtilage, and the officer had to know it. Kicking open the gate hitting plaintiff was unreasonable. Sims v. Stanton, 706 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2012), amended January 16, 2012:

Sims’s small, enclosed, residential yard is quintessential curtilage. “[A] small, enclosed yard adjacent to a home in a residential neighborhood [] is unquestionably such a ‘clearly marked’ area ‘to which the activity of home life extends,’ and so is ‘curtilage’ subject to the Fourth Amendment protection.” Struckman, 603 F.3d at 739 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12). Because Sims’s front yard obviously meets the definition of curtilage, the district court did not need to analyze it under the factors announced by the Supreme Court in United States v. Dunn. 480 U.S. at 294. These factors serve as “useful analytical tools” to ensure that Fourth Amendment protections extend to areas that are much further from the house but that still should be “treated as the home itself.” Id. at 300-01. Here, however, the factors are unnecessary because it is “easily understood from our daily experience” that Sims’s yard is curtilage.⁴ Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182 n.12; see also Struckman, 603 F.3d at 739.

4 Of course, applying the Dunn factors to Sims’s yard leads to the same result. The first factor, “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,” id. at 301, is met because her front yard is adjacent to her home and extends only a short distance. The second factor, whether the area is “included within an enclosure surrounding the home,” id., is met because a tall wooden fence encloses both her front yard and her home. Sims meets the third factor, “the nature of the uses to which the area is put,” id., because Sims stated that she enjoyed a high degree of privacy in her front yard, that she used it to store her wheelchair, and that she entertains guests there. The final factor, “steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by,” id., is met because the gate that Stanton kicked in was a “sturdy, solid wood,” six-foot-high fence with narrow slats between the planks of wood.

Defendant was driving normally, arousing no suspicion, but he was stopped on I-70 in Indiana because his blue Nissan with Utah plates came back to a white Nissan. Considering the law from various circuits and states, the court concludes that a color difference alone is not reasonable suspicion of anything, and the stop had to be suppressed as was the pound of heroin found in defendant’s car. United States v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2013):

Uribe’s motion to suppress presents an issue of first impression in this circuit and, apparently, in the federal courts: whether a discrepancy between the observed color of a car and the color listed on its registration alone is sufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Where our sister circuits have considered color discrepancies, they have relied on the discrepancy as only one of several factors establishing reasonable suspicion.

Although it appears that no federal court has addressed the exact issue presented in this case, several state courts have done so. …

Defendant’s computer was subject to three search warrants and affidavits. The third one had two paragraphs referring to statements later suppressed. Removing the paragraphs does not alter the probable cause finding. [The court went the long way to this via the good faith exception and deterrence instead of cutting to the chase.] United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2013).*

Where the automobile exception applies, the fact a backpack formerly in the car is outside it at the time of search doesn’t mean it can’t be searched. United States v. Vehikite, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24841 (D. Utah February 22, 2013).*

The delay in getting information about defendant from dispatch because “the dispatcher was not the normal dispatcher” [while making no sense] didn’t unreasonably extend the stop to 27 minutes to get basic information about the defendant and allow time for the drug dog to arrive. That makes the detention not unreasonable. [Once again, a trial and appellate court defer to the police our rights]. State v. Williams, 2013 Ohio 594, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 528 (4th Dist. January 30, 2013).*

Defense counsel can’t concede a Fourth Amendment issue in the papers and then argue against it on appeal. United States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013):

In his motion to suppress, the defendant explicitly “concede[d] that based upon his speed Officer Hall had a reasonable articulable suspicion to effect a traffic stop of his vehicle.” This concession corresponds to the officer’s account and no more is exigible to render the stop legitimate. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996) (holding that the appropriate Fourth Amendment test is one of objective reasonableness); Ruidíaz, 529 F.3d at 29 (same). That ends this aspect of the matter: a party cannot concede an issue in the district court and later, on appeal, attempt to repudiate that concession and resurrect the issue. To hold otherwise would be to allow a litigant to lead a trial court down a primrose path and later, on appeal, profit from the invited error. We will not sanction such tactics. Cf. Merchant v. Ruhle, 740 F.2d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 1984) (warning against permitting the use of “agreeable acquiescence to perceivable error as a weapon of appellate advocacy”).

Search incident includes text messages on a cell phone removed from the person, following the majority. State v. James, 48 Kan. App. 2d 310, 288 P.3d 504 (2012):

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Where the statute is silent, there is no constitutional impediment to swearing to the affidavit for a search warrant over the telephone. After all, federal Rule 41 permits it, and so do several states. Clay v. State, 391 S.W.3d 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (dissent):

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The officer reasonably relied on information that defendant had been evicted for the landlord’s consent to search. Later information was to the contrary, but “reasonableness is not assessed through the lens of hindsight. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188.” Biera v. State, 391 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2012):

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Defendant who did not have a possessory interest in a car did not have standing to contest installation of a GPS device, even if it violated the rights of the owner under Jones. United States v. Maldonado, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99992 (D. Minn. July 19, 2012).

Defendant’s 2255 claim that the search exceeded the consent was decided on direct appeal. Also, watching a search by consent and not objecting to scope supports that the search was within the scope of the consent. United States v. Greer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100121 (D. Neb. July 19, 2012).*

The officer had reasonable suspicion after defendant’s stop because defendant acted in a manner potentially consistent with criminal activity when he shook uncontrollably, stared straight ahead without looking at the officer, and refused to cooperate with lawful requests to exit the vehicle. United States v. Hill, 492 Fed. Appx. 365 (4th Cir. 2012).*

A foot in a shutting house door is an entry into the home, and qualified immunity was properly denied. Dalcour v. City of Lakewood, 492 Fed. Appx. 924 (10th Cir. 2012):

The Supreme Court has clearly established that Fourth Amendment protection starts at the physical limits of a home. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (warning that “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances”). The Court has “shifted the qualified immunity analysis from a scavenger hunt for prior cases with precisely the same facts toward the more relevant inquiry of whether the law put officials on fair notice that the described conduct was unconstitutional.” Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1134 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] general constitutional rule … can apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though [such conduct] has not previously been held unlawful.” Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 914 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). In sum, the qualified immunity analysis requires that we determine whether a reasonable officer would have known that the conduct at issue was unconstitutional.

In the present case, based on the extensive Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent emphasizing the significance of any physical intrusion into a home, a reasonable officer should have known that placing a foot into the doorway amounted to an entry of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes. Because the facts presented do not establish an objectively reasonable basis for believing anyone in the home needed immediate aid or that there was any other exigent circumstance which would justify a warrantless entry, the district court erred in granting Agent Gillespie qualified immunity.

Defense counsel was not ineffective for advising defendant to not testify at the suppression hearing because of the possibility of false testimony leading to an obstruction enhancement on the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Taylor, 492 Fed. Appx. 941 (10th Cir. 2012).*

Inventory of a closed compartment in the door was reasonable when it was discovered during the inventory and no tools were needed to open it. United States v. Cervantes-Perez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113028 (D. Minn. July 21, 2012).

Taking all of the facts offered by the government, there was no probable cause to believe that defendant’s vehicle was involved in a crime. Omitted facts would have been helpful, and the affidavit was not devoid of probable cause that the good faith exception should not apply. United States v. Stately, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112782 (D. Minn. July 2, 2012).*

Defendants’ car was stopped for a traffic offense, and the driver wouldn’t look the officers in the eye and was nervous. His hands were on the steering wheel, and there were no furtive movements. A “protective sweep” of the car producing a gun hidden in the back seat was unreasonable because of a lack of furtive movements. The others were not abnormal. “[N]ervous or anxious behavior in combination with factors that add nothing to the equation will not support a reasonable suspicion that an officer’s safety may be compromised.’ … See Commonwealth v. Cardoso, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 901, 702 N.E.2d 398 (1998) (officer may not conduct patfrisk just because nervous defendant does not maintain eye contact).” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 336, 973 N.E.2d 146 (2012). [There was also an arrest warrant outstanding for a traffic offense, but that adds nothing, either.]

There was probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest, so a Fourth Amendment false arrest case fails. Ghaith v. Rauschenberger, 493 Fed. Appx. 731 (6th Cir. 2012).*

In a federal DP case, defense counsel’s alleged failures on a motion to suppress which included challenging the search warrant under the state nighttime search law [not a Fourth Amendment issue] were not ineffective assistance and those issues were tried in the original proceeding and already appealed. Barrett v. United States, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115360 (E.D. Okla. August 16, 2012).*

The CI repeatedly reported defendant for selling drugs from his house. Four controlled buys were conducted, and, while they might have been deficient to make a separate criminal case for each, they were still sufficient to show probable cause. (Also, Ohio amended its version of Rule 41, and the version at the time of the search applies. [n.2]) State v. Eldridge, 2012 Ohio 3747, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 3309 (4th Dist. August 10, 2012)* [Note: The state logically could have declined to pursue the delivery charges to avoid having to out their snitch which they would have to do under Roviaro.]

Where defendant was arrested for no valid DL and his car would be left on the highway, his car was subject to impoundment. The officer was not required to formally arrest defendant before conducting the inventory if it is otherwise valid. United States v. Johnson, 492 Fed. Appx. 437 (4th Cir. 2012).

The automobile exception applies with probable cause and the vehicle being “readily moveable.” The vehicle here was parked on his property but was still readily movable even with him in custody. State v. Alarcon-Chavez, 284 Neb. 322, 821 N.W.2d 359 (2012).*

Defendant’s asserted standing in the house searched was because he had drug money in the safe. It was somebody else’s place used for cocaine production. This was governed by Carter. United States v. Rivera-Pabon, 493 Fed. Appx. 15 (11th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant was stopped for a lane change violation after the officer already noted that the windows were too dark. The stop was lawful on the second traffic offense, too. The length of the stop to complete the paperwork was only seven minutes, and that’s reasonable. United States v. Whitlock, 493 Fed. Appx. 27 (11th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant was the target of a search warrant for taking artifacts from protected lands in Alaska which he even revealed on a website photograph. When officers got there, they found child pornography on the walls. They left and got another search warrant for that, and it was proper. United States v. Franz, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149882 (E.D. Pa. October 18, 2012).*

Police were called to a domestic disturbance and arrested the defendant in possession of a backpack. Even though he was handcuffed, he was not secured in the back seat of a police car, and a search incident of the backpack was reasonable because of the violent nature of the arrest. State v. Ellison, 172 Wn. App. 710, 291 P.3d 921 (2013):

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