It’s not the court’s job to review the warrant application to see if it’s up to par. Defendant’s motion to suppress was nothing more than a motion to check the state judge’s work. United States v. White, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79104 (D. Minn. May 13, 2013):

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TPM: Report: NSA Accidentally Collected Data From Innocent Americans by Igor Bobic:

The National Security Agency inadvertently collected data from innocent Americans in 2009, including private email messages and phone conversations, prompting a review by Attorney General Eric Holder in the way the agency manages its domestic surveillance program, NBC News reported Friday: …

NYT: Report Says T.S.A. Screening Is Not Objective by Michael S. Schmidt:

The Transportation Security Administration has little evidence that an airport passenger screening program, which some employees believe is a magnet for racial profiling and has cost taxpayers nearly one billion dollars, screens passengers objectively, according to a report by the inspector general for the Homeland Security Department.

Mother Jones: Justice Department Fights Release of Secret Court Opinion Finding Unconstitutional Surveillance by David Korn:

Government lawyers are trying to keep buried a classified court finding that a domestic spying program went too far.

Politico: NSA memo pushed to ‘rethink’ 4th Amendment by Philip Ewing (in 2001!):

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WaPo: Wonkbook: These programs might well have been legal. That’s almost worse by Ezra Klein and Evan Soltas:

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Defendant’s car was stopped because of excessive tinting, and he was gotten out of the car. He had on sagging pants, and he kept squatting when talking to the officers and they were sure he was hiding something, so they had him stand up and a gun slid out a pantleg. This was all reasonable. United States v. Castle, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78412 (W.D. Tenn. May 17, 2013).*

Defendant’s van was already stopped on a parking lot known for drug dealing, and the police approached. One of the passengers ran off, and that heightened to reasonable suspicion what was going on in the vehicle. State v. Griffin, 2013 Ohio 2230, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 2155 (2d Dist. May 31, 2013).*

Defendant’s stop was not overlong or unreasonable. State v. Bartone, 2013 Ohio 2228, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 2154 (2d Dist. May 31, 2013).*

Defendant’s guilty plea waived his suppression motion. United States v. Cooper, 2013 CCA LEXIS 473 (N.M.C.C.A. May 30, 2013).*

Probable cause for a search for child prostitution on defendant’s computer did not limit the ability of officers to look at pictures. United States v. Skow, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142668 (N.D. Ga. September 13, 2012).*

“‘Let’s go back to my apartment and get my license. It’s in my wallet,’ or words of similar import” was consent to enter defendant’s apartment. In plain view was paperwork and credit cards suggesting stolen credit cards. A search warrant would be reasonable based on these observations in an entry by consent. State v. Mangum, 153 Idaho 705, 291 P.3d 44 (App. 2012).*

The officer stopped defendant for expired tags. There was reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop into an investigation of prostitution solicitation, because: (1) the officer saw prostitutes working the area; (2) defendant backed out of the alley after seeing the officer; (3) he avoided eye contact with the officer; and (4) the officer suspected the passenger was working as a prostitute based on her clothing and heavy make-up. Defendant’s consent to search his fanny pack was not based on an unreasonable stop. State v. Olson, 2012 NMSC 35, 285 P.3d 1066 (2012).*

Officers responding to a 911 hang up call could approach the front door of the house from where the call came and knock. Getting no answer, they could survey the perimeter to see what was going on. They came back to the front door and then smelled marijuana, for which they got a search warrant. United States v. Robbins, 682 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 2012).*

Defendant’s specific argument that his stop for driving too long in the left lane could not be the basis for his stop 20+ miles after the sign was not made below, and it did not show plain error. United States v. Castro, 480 Fed. Appx. 782 (5th Cir. 2012).*

An officer merely walking up to a stopped car is not a seizure. Here, two cars were stopped, and the officer stopped between them. He walked back to the second car to tell them they were not being stopped, and they were not seized. State v. Ray, 153 Idaho 564, 286 P.3d 1114 (2012).*

Excessive force in a seizure shouldn’t lead to suppression of evidence not causally related to it. State v. Herr, 2013 WI App 37, 346 Wis. 2d 603, 828 N.W.2d 896 (2013):

P11 As there is no causal relationship between the alleged use of unreasonable force and the evidence sought to be suppressed, Herr’s suggested remedy would ill serve our legal system. Deterring police misconduct is an important goal, but not one that should necessarily be pursued at the expense of bringing criminals to justice. See Felix, 339 Wis. 2d 670, ¶39. The exclusionary rule is an extraordinary remedy that exacts “substantial social costs,” including potentially releasing guilty and dangerous criminals into our communities and impairing the truth-seeking objectives of our legal system. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591. “Suppression of evidence … has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.” Id. Even though the threat that evidence may be suppressed may deter some police officers from using unreasonable force in carrying out otherwise lawful seizures, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require courts to exclude all evidence or forgo prosecuting a defendant following unlawful police conduct.” Felix, 339 Wis. 2d 670, ¶40. As the evidence Herr seeks to suppress was not causally related to the alleged use of unreasonable force, we affirm the decision of the circuit court and Herr’s conviction.

Defendant did not have standing in the place he was found, but he had standing to challenge the search of his backpack that was with him, right up to the time he abandoned it. Defendant was found by pinging his cell phone, and he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the signal emitted by the phone to the provider, analyzing Jones and Smith and coming down with Smith. People v Moorer, 2013 NY Slip Op 23048, 39 Misc. 3d 603, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Monroe Co. 2013):

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Iowa concludes that a parole agreement with a consent provision is not true consent under the state constitution. The case has a complete analysis of consent of probationers v. parolees and concludes there is no bargaining power for the parolee. [Not that anybody truly has that much bargaining power.] State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa 2013):

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Officers gave chase to a bank robber who was carrying a GPS in a bait pack of money. When the package stopped moving, it was in one of 20 cars. Considering the gravity of the situation, stopping all 20 at a roadblock was reasonable. It was not constitutionally required for the officers to further attempt to narrow down the potential vehicles involved. United States v. Paetsch, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D. Colo. 2012):

Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the Court holds that the officers’ initial stop of the twenty vehicles was reasonable, and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Applying the statement of law cited immediately above from Edmond, the roadblock here was, without a doubt, designed “to catch a dangerous criminal ….” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44. At the time the 20 vehicles were detained, the Aurora Police Department was seeking an armed individual whom they knew had robbed a bank with the use of a visible handgun, clearly designed to instill fear in the individuals in the bank, and creating the potential for a fatal shooting at the bank. In the Court’s view it was entirely reasonable for the officers to assume that the robber continued to be armed and dangerous, especially given the fact that the mass traffic stop was effected less than 15 minutes after the bank robbery itself had taken place.

WaPo: Documents: U.S. mining data from 9 leading Internet firms; companies deny knowledge By Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras:

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Who’s Your Cop?

One of the common threads about the rise of the warrior cop phenomenon is the frustration with a very serious erosion of Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights. It has always been a paramount part of our society that our police officers wear distinct uniforms, in large part so that you recognize them as officers of the state. When you see out of uniform officers on television at crime scenes, the officers always wear jackets with their id clearly marked in large letters, whether that designation is FBI, ATF or even just POLICE. It is a fundamental principle of our liberty that your words cannot be used against you if you are interrogated without knowing that jeopardy has attached, although the Maryland v. King decision has raised doubts even about that.

During the aftermath of the bombings on April 15, one of the striking things about the thugs stalking through the streets of Watertown is that they were unmarked, and it was virtually impossible to tell who those folks were. But of even greater concern is a phenomenon reported in some of the books coming out this summer about warrior cops–the notion that cops are never off duty, and that no miranda warnings are ever given when the issue is “public safety.” There are a growing number of cases of people who have been convicted of crimes for making statements to cops, who seemed to just be neighbors at a little league game, or people arrested after inviting a neighbor in for dinner–who happened to be a cop. …

Salon.com: The Supreme Court Fails the Fourth Amendment Test; What all the justices don’t understand about police investigations by Barry Friedman:

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Salon.com: Liberals find common ground with … Scalia? The arch-conservative is suddenly siding with left-wing justices in a raft of Fourth Amendment cases. Here’s why by Jillian Rayfield

DHS report: Civil Rights/Civil Liberties Impact Assessment, Border Searches of Electronic Devices. Page 2 of the pdf:

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The prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s refusal to let the police look at the soles of his shoes was not a comment on the exercise of a constitutional right because there was no expectation of privacy in the soles of one’s shoes under state precedent. State v. Wright, 153 Idaho 478, 283 P.3d 795 (App. 2012).

Defendant was suspected of a murder and the police had the weapon and probable cause for her. There was a substantial basis for issuing a search warrant for her house to look for more. Hughes v. State, 90 So. 3d 613 (Miss. 2012).* [Note: What is missing from this case is a discussion of nexus: What is the relationship of the murder to the house or potential evidence in the house? Sure defendant lived there, but more has to be required. Granted, cases say “is it a reasonable and normal inference that evidence will be found in one’s house after a crime, a normal base of operations?” They never say what. Here, they found shoes linked to the murder, but they had no idea before; this was a general rummaging. Thus, the case virtually stands for the proposition that a murder suspect’s house is subject to search even though the murder didn’t occur there. Remember also that there is no murder scene exception to the warrant requirement, so does this case mean that there is a murder suspect exception to nexus?]