Officer violated Payton by entering to arrest without an arrest warrant when defendant answered the door. State v. Ojeda, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 6904 (Fla. 3d DCA May 1, 2013).

Omission from the affidavit for search warrant that the CI had sold drugs in the past was neither material nor necessary to the finding of probable cause for Franks purposes. United States v. Harris, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61069 (W.D. Pa. April 29, 2013).*

Nervousness and conflicting stories justified continuing the stop with questions after warning ticket was issued. United States v. Quintero-Felix, 714 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 2013).*

A motion to suppress something and motion in limine over other evidence. United States v. Rosberg, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60613 (D. Neb. April 29, 2013).*

Year old information in a child pornography case was not stale. Defendant had been taking pictures of the victim for a year before stopping, too. United States v. Puskas, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62259 (S.D. W.Va. May 1, 2013).*

NYTimes: U.S. Is Secretly Collecting Records of Verizon Calls by Charlie Savage and Edward Wyatt:

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There is a difference between an “unlawful arrest” under state law and an “unconstitutional arrest” under Virginia v. Moore. “Neither a Maryland statute nor rule of procedure can render unconstitutional what the Fourth Amendment deems to be constitutional.” In re Darryl P., 211 Md. App. 112, 63 A.3d 1142 (2013).

Defendant was stopped at a yield sign as a patrol car came up from behind. After the officer stopped, defendant sat there for another 13 seconds before the officer decided to turn on his overhead lights and check on the driver under the community caretaking function. The fact defendant started to drive off did not nullify the purpose of the stop. State v. Shelley, 2013 Ohio 1116, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1003 (7th Dist. March 22, 2013).*

Disagreeing with the majority of cases and following the minority view, the Davis good faith exception is not applied to pre-Jones GPS use. United States v. Robinson, 903 F. Supp. 2d 766 (E.D. Mo. 2012):

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Defendant had standing to challenge the search of a mailed package even though the return address was not his name. United States v. Gardenier, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160030 (D. Mont. November 7, 2012):

The parties do not dispute that Gardenier sent the package, even though the return label read “Jenny Harbinger.” As the sender of the package, Gardenier had a legitimate expectation of privacy in it. She thus has standing to challenge the warrantless seizure of the package from the UPS facility and the subsequent search of the package at the Task Force headquarters.

A store security guard reported to the police, apparently without any factual justification, that somebody in a car was doing drugs. A police car pulled up behind the car, without blue lights on, but non-flashing white lights on the light bar. That still conveyed “Stay put” and was a seizure. The seizure was without factual justification. United States v. Gray, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159292 (D. Kan. November 7, 2012).*

The facts are not in dispute, so defendant is not entitled to a hearing on his motion to suppress a probation search. It was a valid probation search. United States v. Muhammad, 903 F. Supp. 2d 132 (E.D. N.Y. 2012)*; United States v. Washington, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159863 (S.D. N.Y. November 7, 2012).*

A subpoena had been issued for GPS data from a cell phone, and then it was withdrawn hours later. There was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. The fact call information was obtained was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Jayne v. Blunk, 502 Fed. Appx. 641 (9th Cir. 2012)*:

Jayne attests that he saw a document listing telephone numbers obtained from his call records. But there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers dialed or from which calls are received, so the acquisition of such information does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).

Defendant was convicted by guilty plea of a sex offense against a child, and a condition of his release thereafter was searches of his home and computer. He twice avoided computer searches, and probation finally searched it finding child pornography. The search condition was reasonable and specific enough. People v. Wheeler, 2012 NY Slip Op 06661, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6649 (4th Dept. October 5, 2012).*

Yahoo! searched defendant’s photo files in its storage, and this was a private search. They received a tip it contained child pornography. United States v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621 (1st Cir. 2012).*

At the post-trial conference, based on trial testimony, the district court changed its finding from consent to probable cause for the search. This was supported by the record. United States v. Pascual, 502 Fed. Appx. 75 (3d Cir. 2012).*

An officer grabbed defendant’s arm and asked where he was going, and defendant ran. He was not seized by the grabbing for his arm. He was not seized until he was subdued. Henson v. United States, 55 A.3d 859 (D.C. 2012).*

Yahoo! News: A damning dissent: Scalia’s dissent for the ages in the DNA case by Jeffrey Rosen, National Constitution Center:

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SCOTUS decides Maryland v. King: DNA testing on arrest with PC constitutional (5-4, per Kennedy) (SCOTUSBlog). I’m not surprised at the outcome, but I’m surprised Scalia dissented and Breyer concurred. It would have been different if the skin had to be penetrated. Which begs the question: If technology makes this outcome, what about cell phone search incident? Please, also read Scalia’s dissent. He, too, is becoming the conscience of the Fourth Amendment, and he shows that Kennedy’s majority opinion doesn’t hold water. Essentially, the government is given the power to conduct yet another warrantless search of the person without probable cause.

Syllabus:

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NYT: Blacks Are Singled Out for Marijuana Arrests, Federal Data Suggests by Ian Urbina:

WASHINGTON — Black Americans were nearly four times as likely than whites to be arrested on charges of marijuana possession in 2010, even though the two groups used the drug at similar rates, according to new federal data.

This disparity had grown steadily from a decade before, and in some states, including Iowa, Minnesota and Illinois, blacks were around eight times as likely to be arrested.

MintPress: Justice Dept Pressured To Release Document Proving Fourth Amendment Rights Violations under FISA by Katie Rucke:

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Based on the trial court’s findings, the DWI checkpoint in this case was reasonable. State v. Nolan, 211 N.C. App. 109, 712 S.E.2d 279 (2011):

“To determine whether a seizure at a checkpoint is reasonable requires a balancing of the public’s interest and an individual’s privacy interest.” Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 293, 612 S.E.2d at 342. “In order to make this determination, this Court has required application of the three-prong test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 361, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640 (1979).” Jarrett, __ N.C. App. at __, 692 S.E.2d at 424-25 (citing Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 293, 612 S.E.2d at 342). “Under Brown, the trial court must consider ‘[1] the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure[;] [2] the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest[;] and [3] the severity of the interference with individual liberty.’” Id. at __, 692 S.E.2d at 425 (quoting Rose, 170 N.C. App. at 293-94, 612 S.E.2d at 342 (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

The affidavit was not stale despite its lack of specific time because the reasonable inference was that it was really recent. “[T]he affidavit adequately suggested a continuing criminal operation.” Jones v. State, 338 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App.—Houston (1st Dist.) 2011)*:

Mindful that a grudging, negative attitude towards warrants would be inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s preference for searches conducted pursuant to warrants, see Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S. Ct. at 2331, we hold that the temporal references within the affidavit allowed the magistrate to determine there was a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. We reach this conclusion because the affidavit adequately suggested a continuing criminal operation, including “recently” obtained information from the first confidential informant, from the affiant’s own investigation, and from the second confidential informant who made the controlled buy. All of this information supported the affiant’s belief that a violation was “currently” taking place on a specified date when the affidavit was sworn, and at a time which was no more than 24 minutes before the specified time when the search warrant was signed.

The CI was identified and told the truth about his own criminality before he gave information about defendant’s, so he was credible enough for the search warrant to issue. State v. Stotridge, 2013 Ark. 1325, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1239 (4th Dist. February 5, 2013).*

Defendant was told to “stay put” while the officer ran his information, so he was seized [the officer had the license, too], and then he was ordered out of the car and the officer saw what he thought was marijuana visible in his pocket. The smell of marijuana in the car and the driver’s apparent impairment justified the search of defendant’s backpack for marijuana under the automobile exception. State v. Tovar, 299 P.3d 580 (Ore. App. 2013).*

The stop of plaintiff’s car in Big Bend TX based on a BOLO that proved incorrect was still with sufficient reasonable suspicion to provide qualified immunity for a protective sweep of the car for a fugitive. Davila v. United States, 713 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2013).*

Just because the landlord’s tenant was missing for two weeks and hadn’t paid rent was not a true exigency justifying a police welfare check of his house that resulted in finding marijuana. Significantly, the landlord went in the house himself earlier finding nothing amiss, just that there was no sign of and no word from the tenant. State v. Vargas, 213 N.J. 301, 63 A.3d 175 (2013):

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When a landowner takes residential property subject to a deed restriction showing that it is subject to the N.J. Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act, there is a reduced expectation of privacy to entries onto the land by regulators. It is not highly regulated, just regulated, and entries are still subject to reasonableness. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Huber, 213 N.J. 338, 63 A.3d 197 (2013):

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Defendant’s computer was seized in a child pornography investigation, and the search warrant had an expiration date for searching the hard drive of 90 days. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B). It was searched a year later. There is no per se rule of exclusion for violating this provision, and trial judge was within her discretion to determine that the search was unreasonable for waiting a year. United States v. Cote, 72 M.J. 41 (C.A. A.F. 2013):

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Defendant was a known drug dealer, and his actions on the day in question showed a hand-to-hand drug transaction, and that was sufficient to stop him. United States v. Jackson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45276 (E.D. Okla. February 28, 2013).*

Driving in the left lane without passing for one mile as justification for the stop. Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).*

Defendant failed to show standing to challenge the search warrant and search of the premises in this case. A vehicle was searched which he disavowed, so he has no standing as to that either. United States v. Alamo-Santellanes, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43872 (D. Minn. February 26, 2013).*

Under Jones, defendant had no standing to challenge placement of a GPS device on his employer’s vehicle to track him. Failure to argue below a Jones trespass on installation of a GPS transmitter on defendant’s employer’s van was waiver for appeal. State v. Estrella, 230 Ariz. 401, 286 P.3d 150 (App. 2012).*

There was reasonable suspicion for a defendant’s stop for showing up at a house at 3 am and yelling for somebody unknown to come out, and the homeowner came out and the defendant left “like a bat out of hell,” and defendant had done this before. State v. Rissley, 2012 WI App 112, 344 Wis. 2d 422, 824 N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App. 2012).*

Defendant was neither a tenant nor an overnight guest, so he did not have standing in the apartment searched. Windom v. State, 379 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 2012).*

An officer responding to a call of shots fired in a gang dispute stopped a car “hurriedly” leaving the scene a block away when the occupants had rival gang colors to the area they were in. This was reasonable suspicion on the totality because of the officer’s knowledge of the local gangs. The stop was to see what they knew. State v. Moreno, 173 Wn. App. 479, 294 P.3d 812 (2013) ( dissent):

A police officer may rely on his experience to evaluate apparently innocuous facts. Martinez, 135 Wn. App. at 180 (citing State v. Samsel, 39 Wn. App. 564, 570-71, 694 P.2d 670 (1985)). Facts “which appear innocuous to the average person may appear incriminating to a police officer in light of past experience.” Samsel, 39 Wn. App. at 570. Police officers are not required to set aside that experience. Id. at 570-71. Mr. Moreno argues the stop here was based on nothing more than a hunch. But here, officers were essentially responding to a crime in progress. See Thompson, 93 Wn.2d at 842; Martinez, 135 Wn. App. at 181-82. Multiple reports of gunfire had been reported one block away just moments before the stop. Sergeant Salinas had considerable experience with gangs in this specific area. He knew the shots came in a Sureño neighborhood. He saw Mr. Bojorquez was wearing a red shirt, associated with the rival Norteño gang. He knew people would not be expected to wear red in a Sureño neighborhood. He saw the car hurriedly leaving the alley given the poor alleyway conditions. Given all, Sergeant Salinas reasonably believed “this car is somehow involved or … they can tell me more about what’s happened.” RP at 57.

The government perfunctorily defended the search and lost on Fourth Amendment grounds and failed to fully address the good faith exception in the district court, instead briefing it on appeal. The case is remanded to the district court to give the government another bite at the apple only because Davis came along after the district court ruled. United States v. Fugate, 499 Fed. Appx. 514, 2012 FED App. 0994N (6th Cir. 2012):

Here, the district court did not have the benefit of the parties’ briefing and argument on this issue. Likewise, the Supreme Court issued Davis after the district court granted Fugate’s motion to suppress. As we explained in Master, “the Supreme Court has effectively created a balancing test by requiring that in order for a court to suppress evidence following the finding of a Fourth Amendment violation, the benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.” In Master, we remanded to allow the district court to consider whether the officers’ conduct was deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent. 614 F.3d at 243 (citation and alterations omitted). As in Master, the district court has not had this opportunity, and we therefore remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.