Above the Law: NSA Surveillance In 2013: The Year Of Vindicated Political Paranoia by Tamara Tabo:

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HuffPo: False Confessions: A Review of 2013 by Steve Drizin:

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HuffPo: What to Watch in Drug Policy in 2014 by Stephen Gutwillig, Deputy Executive Director, Drug Policy Alliance:

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ecommerce times: Surveillance Rights and Wrongs, Part 1: Begging the Questions by Richard Adhikari:

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The “third party doctrine” at large:

eff.org: New Decision Shows How Businesses Can Challenge Warrantless Records Collection, Even if You Can’t by Hanni Fakhoury:

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WaPo: Justice Dept. challenges NSA ruling by Sari Horwitz:

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BLT: DOJ Surveillance Law Memo Can Remain Secret, Court Says:

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A typographical error by the judge in the date of the search warrant does not invalidate it. This issue, too, is covered by the good faith exception, and it makes no sense to suppress based on this. “Courts from other jurisdictions have concluded that a clerical or scrivener’s error does not justify invalidating the warrant and suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant. E.g., State v. Dalton, 887 P.2d 379 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Steffes, 887 P.2d 1196, 1210 (Mont. 1994).” State v. McKnight, 128 Haw. 328, 289 P.3d 964 (App. 2012), aff’d State v. McKnight, 2013 Haw. LEXIS 427 (December 31, 2013) (posted here):

Defendant was a truck driver stopped for reported erratic driving. Although he was able to offer an innocent explanation and did not seem impaired, the officer did not have to accept that and could inquire further. Having him pull the truck to a different place to get out of traffic was not unreasonable. State v. McCaa, 963 N.E.2d 24 (Ind. App. 2012):

Although we consider it a somewhat close call, we conclude that Sergeant Cothran was still entitled to detain McCaa for further investigation at the time he told McCaa to move his truck to the gas station. When Sergeant Cothran was speaking with McCaa for between thirty seconds and one minute, McCaa offered a seemingly plausible explanation for his erratic driving and exhibited no outward signs of impairment. A reasonable person, however, would have been entitled to doubt McCaa’s story. First, although plausible, the story was undeniably self-serving and therefore suspect. We will not adopt the rule that reasonable suspicion vanishes as soon as a suspect offers a plausible, innocent explanation for his seemingly criminal behavior.

Other officers radioed the stopping officers that defendants’ vehicle committed a traffic offense, and the officers conducted a felony stop ordering them out at gunpoint with hands up, then searching the car. There is nothing in the record supporting the search of the car or even the use of a Terry stop in this case, and the search is suppressed as unreasonable under any possible theory. The government’s alternative argument of impoundment is treated as “too little, too late” [my words]. United States v. Bucannon, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 410 (S.D. Ohio January 3, 2014):

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Having no DL in Iowa authorizes impoundment, but the statute doesn’t provide any criteria to control over discretion. Here, there was no justification for impoundment, and the officer essentially admitted that the defendant’s refusal to consent to a search factored in to his decision. The evidence should be suppressed because this was an unreasonable search. United States v. Himes, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181970 (N.D. Iowa December 30, 2013):

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Tasering defendant to remove drugs from his mouth raised a Fourth Amendment question of excessive force to search. The trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress without a hearing. People v. Atkinson, 2013 NY Slip Op 7769, 111 A.D.3d 1061, 975 N.Y.S.2d 227 (3d Dept. 2013):

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GPS tracking of a state employee in his personal car was unreasonable. Based on O’Connor, a workplace search, which this was, didn’t require a warrant, but it was nonetheless unreasonable. Matter of Cunningham v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 2013 NY Slip Op 04838, 21 N.Y.3d 515, 974 N.Y.S.2d 896, 997 N.E.2d 468, 163 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P61,366 (2013):

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Police may impound a vehicle for revoked license registration and plates, and for no insurance, when the driver does not ask to make her own towing arrangements. Thus, this inventory was proper. State v. Rohde, 839 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. App. 2013).

An anonymous tip of a DUI was corroborated when the exact vehicle was found with the driver visibly drunk. Cook v. Rankin County, 2013 Miss. App. LEXIS 831 (December 3, 2013).*

A DV arrest does not have to take place at the precise place it occurred; reasonably close proximity is enough. This happened at the N.M. state fairgrounds. State v. Almanzar, 2013 N.M. LEXIS 413 (December 2, 2013).*

The search warrant overall was not bare bones, but it was as to defendant’s address. There was minimal information about him, and the good faith exception would not be applied. An officer’s general statements based on training and experience alone do not constitute “substantial basis” for the issuance of a warrant. People v. Rojas, 2013 IL App (1st) 113780, 998 N.E.2d 567 (2013).

Officers had probable cause from controlled buys occurring from defendant’s property. When he was arrested on his porch, and the door was ajar, it was not unreasonable to conduct a protective sweep to make sure there weren’t others there. United States v. Walenty, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147474 (W.D. Mo. September 23, 2013).*

Defendant was recorded by an informant telling of plans to rob a bank. He was arrested leaving his house to go to a storage unit to retrieve a mask and gun for the robbery. The search warrant for the storage unit and his house was based on the recording, not the search incident to his arrest. United States v. Smith, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147759 (S.D. N.Y. October 11, 2013).*

The NYPD officer’s union, Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc., sued NYC over its policy requiring a breathalyzer of any officer involved in a shooting. The court previously affirmed denial of summary judgment. Lynch v. City of New York (“Lynch I”), 589 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2009). As in Lynch I, the court reaffirms that the “special needs” analysis prevails, and judgment is for the city. Lynch v. City of New York, 737 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2013):

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Qualified immunity protects government employees from a claim that the due process clause and Fourth Amendment create an interest between home confinement and movement to actual custody. As in qualified immunity, “no relevant authority existed at the time of the incident.” And, of course, the Fourth Amendment issue goes undecided in this circuit. Ortega v. United States Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 737 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 2013)*:

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Defendant was charged with wire fraud in a scheme that had him trafficking in stolen computer parts. Local police discovered it and passed it to the FBI. A search warrant for his house produced 170 boxes of parts and his computer. Files on the computer helped prove the fraud. The warrant was not overbroad and the entirety had to be read in context. While the search warrant “is certainly not a model of precise drafting,” it is not constitutionally infirm. Besides, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Kuc, 737 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013):

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The Hill: Rand Paul to file class action suit against NSA ‘soon’ by Mario Trujillo:

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